Fiction and interaction how clicking a mouse can make you part of a fictional world by Walker, Jill
Fiction and Interaction
how clicking a mouse can make you
part of a fictional world
Jill Walker
Dr. art. thesis
Department of Humanistic Informatics
University of Bergen
Norway
2003
1C O N T E N T S
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I N T R O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Control ..................................................................................................................................... 9
Being part of a fictional world.............................................................................................. 12
Interactive art and literature................................................................................................ 13
Words and definitions .......................................................................................................... 16
Narrative ...............................................................................................................................17
Fictional ................................................................................................................................ 18
Interactive............................................................................................................................. 19
User, reader, player? ...........................................................................................................20
An outline of the thesis .........................................................................................................22
C H A P T E R  1  F I C T I O N  A N D  O N T O L O G I C A L  F U S I O N
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5
What is fiction?...................................................................................................................... 27
Fiction, representation and simulation...............................................................................29
Bino & Cool’s Masterclass ....................................................................................................33
Ontological fusion ................................................................................................................. 35
C H A P T E R  2  F R O M  D E P I C T I O N  T O  O N T O L O G I C A L
I N T E R A C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8
Depiction................................................................................................................................39
Depiction in hypertext ..........................................................................................................42
afternoon, a story ..................................................................................................................43
Zork ........................................................................................................................................48
Dream Kitchen ......................................................................................................................50
Deixis......................................................................................................................................58
Comparing interactions ........................................................................................................60
Ontological interaction .........................................................................................................62
C H A P T E R  3  F E E D I N G  O N L I N E  C A R O L I N E . . . . . . . 6 5
Personalised narrative ..........................................................................................................65
Evolving .................................................................................................................................68
2Viewer and viewed .................................................................................................................71
Is she flirting with me? ......................................................................................................... 75
Captivity................................................................................................................................. 79
Impotence and guilt ..............................................................................................................82
C H A P T E R  4  A D D R E S S I N G  T H E  R E A D E R . . . . . . . . . . 8 4
“Wonderfully stirring” ..........................................................................................................86
Narratees and readers...........................................................................................................88
Voyeurism or performance...................................................................................................89
Identification: the willing suspension of disbelief..............................................................93
Forced participation..............................................................................................................94
The ritual of submission ....................................................................................................... 97
C H A P T E R  5  A  N A R R A T O L O G I C A L  A P P R O A C H . . . 9 9
User and story .....................................................................................................................100
Other descriptions of user and story ................................................................................. 105
User and discourse.............................................................................................................. 106
Putting it together ................................................................................................................110
Uses and implications..........................................................................................................115
C H A P T E R  6  E X P L O I T A T I V E  F I C T I O N S :  S P A M ,
S C A M S  A N D  H O A X E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 7
Kaycee Nicole .......................................................................................................................118
Representation and dialogue ..............................................................................................119
Spam and dialogue.............................................................................................................. 123
An ad or a chatroom............................................................................................................ 126
Fictional characters............................................................................................................. 127
Interacting with a machine................................................................................................. 132
Machines simulating humans ............................................................................................ 134
Immersed or trapped? .........................................................................................................137
Metalepsis .............................................................................................................................141
Fusion................................................................................................................................... 142
C H A P T E R  7  C L I C K  H E R E  T O  K I L L  B I N  L A D E N 1 4 4
Community-based games ................................................................................................... 145
Goals and hindrances ......................................................................................................... 148
Bad Dudes vs. Bin Laden.................................................................................................... 150
3Mission 01: Kill Bin Laden ................................................................................................. 152
New skins for old games ..................................................................................................... 154
New York Defender............................................................................................................. 156
Bin Laden Liquors............................................................................................................... 159
Kabul Kaboom! ................................................................................................................... 162
Games and simulations ...................................................................................................... 163
Gulf War 2............................................................................................................................ 165
Winning or losing................................................................................................................ 167
Ashcroft Online and Al Quaidamon .................................................................................. 170
Brevity .................................................................................................................................. 174
Click here ............................................................................................................................. 176
C O N C L U S I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 7
B I B L I O G R A P H Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 0
I N D E X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 8
4AC K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
The research presented in this thesis was funded by the Norwegian Research Council’s
SKIKT program, and conducted at the Department of Humanistic Informatics at the
University of Bergen, and at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, where I was a
visiting scholar. I’d like to thank both all these institutions for their generous support.
My colleagues in Bergen have been staunch supporters, especially my fellow PhD
candidates, Carsten Jopp, Hilde Corneliussen and Jan Rune Holmevik.
During the writing process many colleagues have read parts of this thesis, or discussed
my ideas with me at seminars, conferences and in weblogs. I’d particularly like to thank
Terry Harpold, Lisbeth Klastrup, Susana Tosca, Adrian Miles, Anders Fagerjord,
Hanne-Lovise Skartveit, Torill Mortensen, Elin Sjursen, Mark Bernstein, Jesper Juul,
Markku Eskelinen, Raine Koskimaa, Deena Larsen, Noah Wardrip-Fruin, Nick
Montfort and Scott Rettberg. Thanks too to my father, David Walker, and my
grandfather, Kenneth F. Walker, who proofread the nearly completed manuscript and
helped me clarify the structure of the thesis in the last frantic weeks of editing. Both my
mother’s and my father’s practical help and simple belief in me has been invaluable.
Some of the chapters have been published elsewhere in different versions. Chapter 4,
“Addressing the Reader”, was published in the  Cybertext Yearbook for 2000, edited by
Raine Koskimaa and Markku Eskelinen. A version of chapter 3, on Online Caroline, is
forthcoming in Pat Harrigan and Noah Wardrip-Fruin’s First Person anthology. The
paper I prepared for MelbourneDAC, “Performing Fictions”, grew into chapters 1 and 2.
And finally, my supervisor, Espen Aarseth, has been an amazing mentor to me for many
years. I don’t think I would ever have considered an academic career if he hadn’t
insisted that I go to my first conference, ACM Hypertext 98, and given me strict orders
to give his greetings to key people in the field, people I’d never have dared to talk to if
not under orders. The generosity, friendliness, inclusiveness and enthusiasm of the
people I met there (Deena Larsen, Marjorie Luesebrink, Stuart Moulthrop were all quite
wonderful to a nervous newcomer, as were many others) and later at the Digital Arts
and Culture conferences, were also crucial to my wanting to become a researcher.
Thank you all.
Bergen, 9 May, 2003
(1988;  Walker 2002;  Walker 2003b;  Walker Forthcoming)
5I N T R O D U C T I O N
This thesis is about works in which the user is a character in the fictional world, and it is
about the kind of interaction that such works allow. In this introduction I will explain
my research goals and introduce the theme of control, which is important in the thesis.
I’ll also describe the genres I’m looking at, define some basic terms and present a
summary of what each chapter deals with. First, though, I’d like to introduce you to
David Still:
You have the opportunity to be David Still.
Would you like to know more about who you could be? (Still 2002)
I can describe davidstill.org, but I can’t tell you whether it’s art, performance, literature,
fiction, fact, forgery or joke. Let me describe the site to you and you’ll see my difficulty.
Figure 1. The entry page at http://davidstill.org, with a form from which email can be sent in David
Still’s name.
6When I enter the URL http://davidstill.org into the address field of my web browser,
the entire window fills up with the face of a smiling man. The image is cropped so that
only one eye is visible, but it looks straight at me, head cocked to one side in a greeting
that is almost flirtatiously coy1. A few sentences are superimposed upon the image:
Hi, my name is David Still
Have you ever wanted to pretend that you were someone else. Well, now you can! If you
want to, you can use me to send someone else an email, just use the form below.
“Use me”, it says. Already the question of use and power arises.
Along the bottom of the screen is a navigation bar with links to different parts of
the site. In the section labelled “messages”, you can browse through, and if you like,
send prewritten emails in David’s name. Choose “reply email” and you can see what
people who have been sent emails from “David Still” have replied to him, and you can
choose to reply, still in David’s name, to any of these. In “youth” you can read more
about David’s, sorry, your youth, and in “me & you” you can read the following
description of your surroundings as David Still:
You live in a neighbourhood called The Reality (De Realiteit). No, really, you do! It may
seem unusual, but all of the following is true, and you love it! All the neighbourhoods
here have names like these, for example, Almere has the film neighbourhood where you
can live on Humphrey Bogart Straat, or Audrey Hepburn Straat. A colleague lives on
Jimi Hendrix Straat, in the Music Neighbourhood, right round the corner from Elvis
Presley Straat and Bob Marley Straat. The City of Almere can be like this because it is
only 25 years old, built on Polder - 50 years ago there was only the sea here.
You also love the buildings in Almere, particularly the one you live in. It was love at first
sight. Called Zeiltoren (Sail Tower), it is No. 18 on de Realiteit and is lovely and blue,
unlike anywhere else you've lived before.
From there, you can poke around in photo albums of your adult life and of your
childhood, and you can read stories about your childhood memories. Taken by
themselves, these stories are simple hypertexts, with few links, rather like the stories
you can read at The Fray (Powazek 2002). These stories are easy to classify as
                                                  
1 Later, when you read about Online Caroline, you’ll find that I’m surprised that some
male readers appear to experience Caroline as flirtatious. I expect some people will be
similarly surprised that I find David flirtatious.
7narratives where links and images constitute an important part of the narration. But the
site as a whole is much more than narrative. Or rather: it is something other than
narrative.
A site like davidstill.org could easily be presented as art. But it is not displayed in
an art gallery or among a net artist’s works. The site has no context other than the
context created by other sites linking to it. When I first found the site, there were no
links pointing to it from art sites – it was not listed in Rhizome’s art base, where
network artists enter their projects, or linked from a curated net art exhibition or a
critical journal or even from artists’ listservs. The only links I found were from weblogs
and small, personal sites. None of these sites appeared to have more information about
the project than what is offered on the website itself.
A few months later, after I’d sent some messages as David Still, and received a
couple from him as well, I received an email from an “independent artspace located in
De Realiteit, an experimental architectural enclave in Almere” (Cargo 2003). The email
was a press release inviting me to a surprise birthday party for David Still, effectively
placing the project within the established art world:
“A good neighbour is worth more than a distant friend" runs an old Dutch proverb.
Cargo has taken this to heart and, on 9 March, will be throwing a surprise party for
David Still, the stranger who entered the world via cyberspace about two years ago, when
he also became part of De Realiteit. Cargo thinks that virtual personas are just as
entitled to a birthday, and is seizing this opportunity to introduce web art to a wider
public. Cargo has invited a number of visual artists and curators to contribute to the
party -by baking a cake, serenading David or singing his praises. And for all those who
have yet to meet him, David will be there, online, to introduce himself. (Cargo 2003)
Two different possible explanations as to why this site exists can be found within the
work itself, among the prewritten emails we are invited to send out to our friends in
David Still’s name. If we assume that the site’s contents and David Still himself are
fictional (and they may not be), then the first explanation resides inside the fiction with
them. This explanation is from the prewritten message titled "See me. Be me.":
8You inspired this site - it's just as much yours as mine. You know sometimes, when I'm
thinking of new photos or text I can use, it's almost as though you were in my head - you
feel that close! If I can't physically be near you, this is the next best thing. You can see
what I see, read my thoughts, even use my name - you can more or less be me. I want to
feel there's no distance between us - I want you to climb inside my head, I want you to
see me. Feel me. Be me.
This is a continuation of the “use me” motif presented on the first page of the site. There
is a desire to be inhabited, taken over, used by the audience which positions the visitor
to the site – the user – as active. Indeed the user does have a great deal of freedom:
emails can be sent to anybody the user pleases and though prewritten emails are
provided, the user can write his or her own just as easily.
The second explanation of the site’s intent is from the message titled “Playing the
Hero”, and this one appears more conventionally likely though it is far less evocative. It
describes a person who needed a hobby, and who therefore set up this site:
When I just moved here, I was quite excited. New opportunities. New people. But I
quickly got caught up in the old rut. Work, work and more work. But I love being in
communications. I love meeting people. So I decided to make my work my hobby and
designed a site for myself - about me - but something you can use as well. I suppose I'm
a sort of real life screen hero. You can 'borrow' my identity - send people emails
pretending to be me.
You know, it's getting kind of weird. Maybe I've become an artist - or am I the work of
art?
Though this scenario is easy to imagine as being actual, in a way it is more unsettling
than the first explanation because it blurs the boundaries of fiction and reality. If we
believe this scenario, then David Still is an actual person, actually living in a suburb of a
Dutch city, who has decided to offer up his identity to chance passers by on the Internet.
Are those pictures really of David Still, then? Are those stories really his memories?
What would it mean to offer one’s genuine identity (or a shell of it) to be used by
anyone, for any purpose? If he is not a performance artist, widely publicising this, what
does that do to our view of the everyday world? Is this simply the way people act
nowadays?
9Davidstill.org offers the user a very clearly defined role, that of David Still. He is
a man in his early thirties who works in communications. We know exactly what he
looks like and what his home looks like. And the role is offered clearly to us. The work
addresses us directly, using the second person: you. That "you" implies a more or less
specific role which we are invited to enact. We are given distinct actions to perform in
this role: we can send emails, browse through his memories and photos, imagining they
belong to us, and we can reply to emails sent to him.
This thesis is about works that do these things. It’s about works where the user is
offered a role in the fiction. What happens when you become a character in the story
you’re reading?
Control
In the last years the thematics of control has cropped up again and again in digital
works that tread the borderline between art and game. The reader or user is set in a
situation of seeming control and is then shown that this control is illusory, and in fact,
the reader is being controlled rather than controlling. The relationship between
machine and human – or art work and audience – is not equal and never has been.
Until the last decade or so, this inequality was usually quite clear: the audience is
passive. Of course that passivity was never absolute: we would interpret, discuss and
respond to art, turn the pages of books, choose which TV channel to watch, appropriate
art according to our own desires and needs. Sometimes artworks have caused riots or
panic; books have been burned and banned. Participatory theatre and situationist art
often required certain actions from the audience, and there have been books that
needed to be shuffled or ordered by each individual reader. But most art we
encountered expected us to stay still and look or listen carefully.
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With computers, that has changed. If I go to an exhibition of digital art, most of
the art works require me to do something rather than to stay quiet. For instance, Gary
Hill’s Tall Ships (1992) is an installation piece where the audience enters a dark tunnel.
On the walls are faintly projected video images of people, standing at first with their
backs turned. Nothing happens while the audience remains still. But if a spectator walks
up to the projected image, the person in the image slowly turns round and appears to
approach the spectator, until he or she stands gazing emptily out at the spectator,  large
as life though black and white and ghostlike. The image will stay there, dreamily
swaying a little, slightly translucent, until the spectator moves away. One could say that
Tall Ships reacts to its audience, but it is at least as accurate to say that the audience
reacts to it. When I encountered Tall Ships at the Deep.space exhibition at the
Australian Centre for the Moving Image (ACMI) in January 2003, the tunnel was full of
people moving too quickly for the motion sensors to react appropriately. It was difficult
to make sense of the installation. I had heard that there were motion sensors, and that
the images reacted according to where you stood, so I experimented until I found out
how to move in order to activate the videos.
Another interactive installation that forces its audience to act in particular ways
is Gisle Frøysland’s Joystuck III; The Walker (Frøysland 1999). Joystuck III uses a
treadmill for its interface. The treadmill is just like those you see in gyms: a simple strip
of rubber for running on. Movement is abstracted from place. I saw Joystuck III  in
January 2001, at a joint exhibition at Bergen Kunstforening. A screen hung in front of
the treadmill showing a still image of walking people frozen mid-step. I stepped upon
the treadmill, accepting its silent invitation, and I started to walk. The image on the
screen moved step by step, accompanied by sounds slow and thick as treacle. I trod
more quickly, and began to run to force the people on the screen to walk at a normal
pace, but try as I would the images moved too quickly or too slowly and something was
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wrong: the people were walking backwards. I changed strategies and began to walk
backwards myself, forcing the rubbery band beneath my boots to move the wrong
direction. The machinery creaked and squeaked in protest but the images gradually
became normal: finally the people on the screen walked in the right direction.
If you wish to see the video that forms the ostensible content of this artwork, you
must work in a very clear and very constricted way. A treadmill is a machine with a
fairly clear symbolism: it represents work and monotony, though perhaps also the joy of
a workout for those who enjoy gyms. You can’t run where you want on a treadmill: no
matter how you move, you actually stay exactly where you are.
As I experienced both Tall Ships and Joystuck III, I followed the machines rather
than vice versa. I tried to figure out what was expected of me and I tried to behave
accordingly. This is typical of our relationships not only with interactive artworks but
with everyday appliances like fax machines, photo copiers and video recorders. While
we eventually become accustomed to most of our appliances, adapting our fingers and
brains to thinking that text messaging or word processing is a natural extension of our
bodies,  interactive art works provoke us with constant new interfaces to master,
frustrating our attempts to make technology invisible. Interactive artworks like Tall
Ships and Joystuck force us to experience technology and interfaces as foreign, as
strange. They provide the defamiliarisation, the ostranenie, that the Russian Formalists
of the early twentieth century demanded of literature (Shklovsky 1988). The interface,
the deixis, the interaction between  user and machine is made visible.
Tall Ships, Joystuck III and Davidstill.org are all examples of the kinds of work I
explore in this thesis: fictional, interactive works where the relationship between the
user and the work is central to the meaning of the work. They are artworks, but I will
also be looking at works presented as literature, as games and even as spam, ads and
hoaxes.
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Being part of a fictional world
My main goal in this thesis is to deepen our understanding of interactive works where
the user is a character in the fictional world. I do this by analysing concrete works and
by developing a theoretical framework for understanding this kind of interaction.
Within this, there are two main threads. Firstly, I will examine how the user is
included in the fictional world. To this means I will propose a definition of ontological
interaction. This work is done primarily in chapters 1 and 2, though it continues to
develop throughout the thesis.
Secondly I look at how some works emphasise the deictic relationship between
user and work above the content of the work. This is explored in an analysis of Online
Caroline in chapter 3 and more explicitly in chapter 4’s discussion of the second person
address and the force implicit in it.
The two threads are combined in the discussion of force and control. Ontological
interaction equates the user’s actual and fictional actions, which can leave the user
complicit in fictional actions the work required her to perform in order to access the
work at all. The analyses, especially in chapters 3, 6 and 7, are where the exploration of
control primarily takes place.
Many previous discussions of interactive narrative have been structural in their
approach, and I also suggest a possible narratological analysis of interaction where the
user is a character in the work.
My method will be theoretical and analytical. I outline theories that can help to
understand this aspect of interaction, suggest a possible model for analysis, and apply
the theories and model to specific works. I have chosen two main theoretical
approaches: theories of fictional worlds and narratology. The authors I build upon here
discuss pre-digital art and narrative, and do not discuss interactivity. I do not simply
apply their theories to new genres, instead I select elements of their analyses that are
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particularly relevant to interactive works and expand these to describe the relationship
between user and work in interactive art and narrative. Throughout the thesis I also
draw upon theoretical work that specifically discusses interactivity and digital textuality.
In addition to approaching the topic theoretically I develop my concepts through
readings and discussions of a variety of individual works that emphasise the
relationship between user and work or user and machine. This both tests the concepts,
allows me to deepen their meaning, and presents examples of how one might
productively analyse interactive works.
The next section outlines the history of the genres I intend to discuss. Following
that there are definitions of basic terms (narrative, fiction, interaction, user) that often
cause confusion, and the introduction concludes with an outline of the structure of the
thesis.
Interactive art and literature
In 2001, when the British online writing organisation trAce invited submissions to a
writing competition, they asked each submitter how they would describe their work. At
the award ceremony, Mark Amerika, one of the judges, read a compilation of all the
suggested terms for these various forms of writing with computers:
Hypertext : active text : web-specific writing : new media work : new media writing : net
literature : Net Art : feminist hypermedia : poetry-multimedia installation : web
integrated writing : moving poetry : storytelling : multimedia : hypertext poem : net-art-
writing : Linguistic Aestheticism : journalism : new horizon breakthrough idea
exposition : internet based narrative : net.art : Possible Art : hyperfiction : Interactive
Fiction : Hypertext Fiction : hypermedia : digital literature : lit[art]ure : net.lit :
Hypertext Art : post-ultra modern digital art : public literature : Net-narrative :
community art : net-essays : cyberpoetry : Digital Exploration : mutations :digital
narrative : Net-specific hypermedia poetry : Hypermedia Literature : revolutionary web-
specific writing : hypermedia poetry : interactive literature : randomly created web
narrative : interactive poetry : Art : Proximism : Theater of Consciousness : Poetry :
Confrontationalism : InterMedia Theater : Hyper-Essay : Informational Sculpture :
Transformationalistic : Self-generating computer installation : hyperlinked : netArteFact
: Web Poetry : Web Art : Web projects : electronic literature : Organic hypertext : poetry
and prose : interactive artwork : hypermedia : byte-o-mania : web animated visual
poetry : A web-based poem : online content. (Amerika 2000)
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These are only the words used to explain artefacts that their creators’ thought of as in
some way literary, since they were all submitted in the hopes of winning a literary
award. None of the works I’ve mentioned so far can be clearly classified as literary,
though they all generate fiction and they are all interactive. Digital media are causing or
enabling once separate art forms to converge (Bolter and Grusin 1999). Literature, art,
drama, games, film, television, and comics – these once clearly separable forms of
expression are merging and it is becoming meaningless to view them as separate. In the
late eighties and early nineties, most hypertext fiction was obviously literary: skilfully
wrought patterns of words, poetic or narrative, with links. Images were used to some
extent in some pre-web works like Victory Garden (Moulthrop 1991) and Patchwork
Girl (Shelley Jackson 1995), and game-like elements were important in Uncle Buddy’s
Funhouse (McDaid 1992), but it was with the coming of the Web that the genre was
really exploded. Not just still images but video, animations, and complicated algorithms
became increasingly common. Sometimes the network explodes even the notion of
clearly bordered works, as in Davidstill.org.
The original form of publishing and distributing hypertext fiction was clearly
within a literary model, with publishers like Eastgate and Voyager selling the product
(on disk rather than in print, but still an object, clearly framed). The Web has a radically
different delivery form: everything is accessible to anyone who looks for it or chances
upon it while looking for something else. Self-publishing became easy and common.
Publication in online journals and ’zines became a mark of quality and recognition, but
is not necessary: many of the more successful literary interactive works are self-
published. In the last decade’s web works, network-specific genres have been
increasingly incorporated in web narratives and poems. Webcams, web diaries and
serial narratives have become more common both as artistic endeavours in their own
right and as elements of and inspirations to hypertext and interactive narrative.
15
At the same time, visual artists were experimenting with computers and the
Internet, though they were largely invisible to the literary community as the literary
experiments were to the artists. While the literary artists listed OuLiPo and other forms
of experimental literature as their ancestors (Nabokov 1962;  Cortazar 1998), the video
artists of the 60s, 70s and 80s are the forebears of visual networked art. In addition, a
lot of electronic art builds on concept art and the situationist movement of the 60s,
emphasising the network rather than the solitary computer. Beautiful images, polished
phrases and other marks of careful craftsmanship are often completely beside the point
in this kind of network art (Breeze 2003). Davidstill.org can be seen in relation to this
movement as well as alongside the swell of popular story telling on the web that is
evident in sites like The Fray (Powazek 2002), in organisations like the Center for
Digital Storytelling and in the surge of weblogs over the last few years.
As electronic art and literature were developing as sophisticated but fairly
unknown niches in the eighties and nineties, computer games were becoming a major
popular industry, rivalling though not surpassing the film industry by the turn of the
millennium. Their history lay in the text adventure games of the 70s and 80s, with their
focus on adventure, narrative strategy and role-playing; in the multi-user games of the
80s and 90s, with their emphasis on social interaction and role-playing; and in the early
graphical games of the 70s and 80s, where dexterity and contest were central.
The works I look at in most detail have many differences, and their creators have
assigned them to different genres. Online Caroline (Bevan and Wright 2000), which I
devote the first chapter of this thesis to, is alternately called an online drama and a soap
opera. Zork (Blank and Lebling 1981), which was popular in the early eighties, is a text
adventure game. That genre is still developing, but is now known as interactive fiction,
or IF (Montfort Forthcoming). Leon Cmielewski and Josephine Starr’s Dream Kitchen
(2000) is an artwork presented on CD-ROM. On the back cover of the CD it is simply
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called an “interactive”. Hypertext fictions of the first half of the nineties were a fairly
cohesive genre, and I look in varying detail at three hypertext fictions all published on
diskettes in the first half of the nineties by Eastgate Systems: Michael Joyce’s afternoon,
a story (1990), Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory Garden (1991) and Shelley Jackson’s
Patchwork Girl (1995). These are mostly textual, though in the latter two the spatial and
visual representation of the map of nodes and how they relate to each other is central to
the work as a whole. Megan Heyward’s I am a Singer (1997) is a visual narrative
distributed on CD-ROM that uses text, sound and video. Tim Etchell’s Surrender
Control (2001) is a sequence of suggestions and commands sent to subscribers as text
or SMS messages to their mobile phones. I also discuss some print books that are
narrated in the second person, appearing to address the reader directly as “you”. These
books include Steve Jackson’s gamebook The Citadel of Chaos (1983), Italo Calvino’s If
On a Winter’s Night a Traveller (1998) and Michel Butor’s La Modification (1957).
These works are all conceived by their creators as art or literature. The
interaction between user and machine is important in other, less culturally ambitious
works too. I discuss some of the short web-based games that have proliferated in
response to world events such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
following wars and debates. I also look at hoaxes, spams and ads that emphasise
interactivity both thematically and formally.
Words and definitions
Three words that will be important in this thesis are narrative, fiction and interaction.
These words are often used loosely and many disagreements have been caused by
different definitions of these terms, and especially of the term narrative, so I will begin
by defining how I will use these terms. There are also many different words commonly
used to describe the person who interacts with the work: player, reader, viewer, vuser,
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interactor and user are among them. I prefer the term “user”, and explain this below.
Other technical terms, including deixis, ontological fusion, depiction, story, discourse
and diegetic levels will be explained as they are discussed.
Narrative
I will use narrative in the narratological sense, not in the general sense in which it is
often used by cultural theorists and in popular debate, but as a structural quality and
not as a description of a work’s content or medium. There are several different
definitions of narrative within narratology (Genette 1980;  Prince 1987;  Bal 1997), but
the formal structure is the crucial aspect of all narratological definitions. A work is thus
narrative or not narrative depending on the way in which it is organised. For my
purposes, a work is narrative if it represents a series of events, which the user can
reconstruct in chronological order, and the events are bound together by some sense of
causality. Works that don’t fulfil these criteria completely may still have narrative
aspects, or parts of the work may be narrative.
There are clearly narrative aspects to many of the works I discuss in this thesis,
and some of them are narratives in a strict sense. The hypertext fiction afternoon, a
story, for instance, is a narrative although it can be read in many different ways,
because the reader can reconstruct an approximate chronology of events (Walker 1999).
The underlying story (what happens in which order) is not always clearcut, but neither
are all non-interactive narratives. Davidstill.org is not a narrative as a whole, because it
presents a situation and some possibilities rather than a series of events that are
causally related to one another. It does have small narratives embedded within it,
though. The sections about David Still’s childhood are simple narratives, and some of
the prewritten emails are also brief, minimal narratives. This embedding of narrative
elements within a larger, non-narrative work is common in digital art.
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Fictional
Fiction, as I will use the term, is not tied to any one genre or medium. By fiction I do not
mean an object such as a book or a story or even an image. These objects may, however,
generate fiction. Fiction refers to the fictional worlds prescribed by works. A fictional
work is a work that generates a fictional world.
This use of  the word fiction is defined by the Webster dictionary as: “something
feigned, invented, or imagined”. Fiction in this sense is not tied to a specific medium or
genre. However, fiction is often used to refer to a verbal, prose narrative. Webster’s first
definition of “fiction” is “The class of literature comprising works of imaginative
narration, esp. in prose form.” ("Fiction" 1989 def. 1) Fiction is commonly used in this
sense, that is as a noun that refers to a tangible object or work: “this work is a fiction”.
This use of the word fiction, which is expressed in the dictionary definition above,
makes the word a formal genre of literature, or perhaps a supergenre. This is a common
usage of the term, and obviously, if one sees fiction as a literary genre, a painting or a
game cannot be a fiction.
I will not use fiction in this way. In my view, some games and artworks and
websites have fictional aspects, just as some literature does. Their having fictional
qualities does not mean that they are fictions. Fiction, in my view, is not a genre. It
belongs to a different class of concept than game, image, narrative, novel, poetry or
concept art. These are formal genres, which we classify according to their formal
qualities. Fiction is not an object, it is a process, a fantasy emerging from the meeting of
user and work.
My understanding of fiction builds on Kendall Walton’s theory of
representational works, and I will expand upon this in chapters 1 and 2. In chapter 5 I
will deal with more formal matters and will use narratological theory. For now, it is
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enough to point out that narrative and fiction are two entirely different things.
Narratives can be fictional or non-fictional. Fictions can be narrative or non-narrative.
Interactive
The word “interactive” must be the most broadly used and abused word in the field.
Interactive has become a blanket term that is applied not only to anything to do with
computers but also used about many non-digital objects. Its popular use is so broad that
some scholars argue the term has become worthless (Aarseth 2003b). The word
interactivity is often used indiscriminately, but so are other terms that are also used
carefully in academic work: narrative and fiction are among them. My task will be to
use the word more clearly and clarify what aspects of its possible meanings I will
activate.
Interactive works demand that the user perform physical actions in order to
access the work. All representational work requires perceptual actions from the user,
such as looking or listening, and in addition users interpret. Readers of novels must also
turn the pages of their books, but this page turning is mechanic, at fixed intervals, and
usually has no relation to the story being read (exceptions include Cortazar’s Hopscotch
(1998), Pavic’s Dictionary of the Khazars (1988), Bing and Bringsværd’s “Faen. Nå har
de senket takhøyden igjen” (1971), Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962) and Madsen’s Days with
Diam (1994). Interactive works are not instantly accessible, but require a “non-trivial”
(Aarseth 1997) physical action before they can be appreciated. You can’t sit back and
watch a computer game or a hypertext as you can listen to a novel being read to you or
watch a film or theatre performance. Instead, “the text draws us into it because it cannot
exist without our participation” (Douglas 1996: 209). Users must perform physical
actions in addition to perceptual actions (such as looking and listening) in order to
access digital works.
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In chapters 1 and 2 I build a foundation for understanding interactivity in this
sense, and the first section of chapter 1 sets the understanding of interaction I have
presented in the last paragraphs in the context of other work on interactivity. Another,
more structural understanding of interaction is suggested in chapter 5. In chapters 3, 6
and 7 I discuss actual works in terms of the user’s interaction.
User, reader, player?
What shall I call the human interacting with the machine? Reader signifies a literary
paradigm and gives priority to the verbal text; viewer gives most importance to the
visual image and does not signal an awareness of the human’s actions and choices. User
is a familiar term in discussing technology. Towards the end of Cybertext, Aarseth
chooses to “dispense with the figure of the reader and instead bring in the user”, largely
to “keep the idea of readers and reading connected to its usual meanings”, while “[the]
user is allowed a wider range of behavior and roles across the field of media, from the
observing member of a theater audience to the subcreator of a game world” (Aarseth
1997: 173). Aarseth wishes to keep the two concepts apart to avoid the automatic though
perhaps faulty transfer of meanings from one communicative situation to another. User
is the most commonly used term in the computer game, web design and interactive
entertainment industry. Yet as Brenda Laurel points out it’s not a word that gives the
“user” much respect:
...that demeaning little word, "user". This term implies an unbalanced power
relationship - the experts make things; everybody else is just a user. (Laurel 2001: 49)
Outside of technology the word “user” (in English) often refers to drug addicts, people
our society in general shows very little respect for. We are not even “users” of most
other machines: we operate heavy machinery, drive cars and manoeuvre submarines.
Perhaps the widespread adoption of the word “user” in relation to personal computers
reveals an unpleasant truth about the relationship between computers and the general
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public. Computers and especially networked computers are in fact often thought of as
substances that easily can be abused. Internet addiction is a term much loved by the
media for its sensationalism, and by rehabilitation clinics for its profitability, but it is
also used seriously by many psychologists and researchers. Computer games are also
often seen as addictive, and stories abound of people whose lives and jobs and families
have been ignored because of their inability to stop playing Everquest or some other
game.
On the other hand, “to use” can have a different though equally negative sense.
“He used her” is a phrase suggesting a callous approach to another human being, where
the “she” referred to is treated as a thing rather than as an equal. Here the user is the
active party, though he is unethical. Though these instances of the word user have
different meanings, they all imply an inequal relationship between the user and that
which is used. I will return to this in chapter four, in the discussion of force in the
second person address.
Laurel suggests a number of alternatives to user: customer, audience, client,
player, participant, partner. The word player gives emphasis to the activity rather than
to the relationship. In this way it is closer to words like reader and viewer than to
audience or client. Other theorists have suggested other terms. Interactor (Douglas
1996;  Murray 1997) is intuitively meaningful, but has little currency. In the early
nineties, many argued that the reader of hypertext became a co-author of the text, and
this writer-reader was, for a while, called the wreader (Landow 1992;  Landow 1997; 
Rau 2000). Vuser is a similar linguistic compound, but more visually grounded, being
constructed from the words viewer and user (Seaman 2000).
Finally, though, I have chosen to use the most common term: user. I shall try to
keep the word’s ambivalence between activity and passivity open.
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An outline of the thesis
Chapter presents an approach to representational art that emphasises the user’s activity
in generating in a fictional world using the work. I explore this topic using Thomas
Pavel’s discussion of an ontological fusion between our actual selves and our fictional
selves when we engage with a fictional work (Pavel 1986) and Kendall Walton’s
theorisation of how we use fictional representations in our own games of make-believe
(Walton 1990). Along the way, I use the example of a rowing simulator and of the
interactive installation artwork Bino & Cool’s Masterclass (Bino and Cool 2002) as
illustrations of how these theories relate to interactive works.
In chapter 2 I use Walton’s notion of depiction and analyses of three interactive
works to develop a defintion of ontological interaction. The works discussed are
Michael Joyce’s hypertext fiction afternoon, a story (1990), the text adventure game
Zork 1: The Great Underground Empire (Blank and Lebling 1981) and the more visual
work Dream Kitchen (Cmielewski and Starrs 2000).
Chapter 3 is a close reading of Online Caroline, an online drama. Online Caroline
is a particularly interesting case study because it explicitly includes the user in the
fiction: the user plays the role of Caroline’s friend. The work uses many web-specific
genres: email, webcams and the web diary are among them. It is serial and refuses to
stay inside the conventional boundaries of a work of art; Caroline intrudes into the
users everyday life by sending daily emails to the user. In my reading I emphasise the
relationship between Caroline and user, and relate this to the genre of epistolary fiction
as well as to Online Caroline’s own themes of captivity and power in relationships.
Chapter 4 discusses the second person address rhetorically and narratologically,
and offers a different approach to the question of how users are included in texts. Most
representations appear to ignore the reader, audience or viewer. Literary narratives are
usually told in the first person (“I”) or the third person (“she” or “he”), and characters in
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films rarely stare at the camera to speak directly to the audience. There have been
exceptions to this rule before, and in some eras the direct address was more common
than it was for most of the twentieth century. Today is it common again, and using
discussions of the second person in narrative I discuss the force that is implicit in this
form of address when the addressee does not have the opportunity to answer freely.
The fifth chapter proposes a narratological model for understanding how the
user is positioned in narrative, interactive works. I argue that interaction can be seen in
relation either to the discourse level of a work or to the work’s story level, and I suggest
a model that allows these different levels of inclusion to be compared to each other. I
relate this model to models proposed by Espen Aarseth and Marie-Laure Ryan, and
conclude by discussing how far such a model can take us.
In chapter 6 I discuss exploitative fictions: spam, scams, web hoaxes , genres that
are rarely discussed in conjuncture with art or fiction. Here the question of ontological
fusion becomes crucial, because these systems not only encourage immersion in a
fictional world, they also try to keep the user trapped inside the fictional world. I
explore what happens when the user relates to a specific fictional character rather than
with a work as a whole. Relating directly with a fictional character we straddle the
boundary between actual and fiction. The dialogue between user and fictional character
is a subcategory of ontological interaction.
Chapter seven is devoted to exploring a series of web games and simulations
made in response to the attacks on New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001,
and the political events and wars that have followed. While some of the games are
almost naïve in their simple interaction (the instructions for one of these games simply
read “click to kill bin Laden”), others manipulate the user by only permitting actions
condoned by the values implicit in the work. Discussing these works allows me to
deepen my analysis of power in the relationship between user and work.
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Finally, the conclusion summarises the main points of the thesis and presents a
cohesive view of the various threads that have been dealt with.
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C H A P T E R  1  F I C T I O N  A N D
O N TO L O G I C AL  F U S I O N
When we engage with an interactive narrative, a hoax web site, a computer game or a
digital installation art work, we do something more than we usually do when we watch a
movie or read a book or look at pictures in an art gallery. As stated in the Introduction,
this thesis will explore the way in which interactive works require users’ to perform
actions beyond perceptual actions in order to access digital works, and how these actual
physical actions relate to the fictional world generated through this interaction. The
physical actions the user performs may be no more arduous than clicking a mouse, or
they may include walking around a space in a particular way, pulling a plastic trigger,
jumping on a dance mat and so on.
Though interactivity is a disputed term (Aarseth 2003b), the basic concept is the
same whether one chooses to call it interaction or not: there is a feedback loop between
user and machine where the user has some influence on the machine and the machine
has some influence on the user. Formal definitions distinguish between two or more
kinds of interactivity based on the exact nature of the user’s possible actions (Joyce
1995;  Aarseth 1997). Other definitions focus instead on whether or not the user is or
feels part of the work (Laurel 1991), or experiences immersion (Murray 1997;  Ryan
2001b) and agency (Murray 1997). These latter definitions could be called ontological as
they emphasise the user’s being inside or outside of the fictional world. The formal and
the ontological understandings of interactivity have also been combined in a single
model (Ryan 2001a).
Ontology is the philosophy of being. I call Murray’s and Ryan’s definitions of
interactivity ontological rather than formal because they discuss the user’s being and
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status in relation to the work rather than the actions that the user can perform due to
the work’s structure.
Many definitions of interactivity concentrate on the work. It is possible to instead
view interaction from the point of view of the user. Users may be immersed, be given
agency or permitted to make choices. A more active verb is also found in some analyses
of interaction: the user performs. Jay David Bolter pointed this out as early as 1991, and
reiterated it in the second edition of Writing Space (Bolter 2001: 173): “The reader
performs the text, perhaps only for herself, perhaps for another reader, who may then
choose to perform the first reader’s text for others” (173). Bolter compares this
performance  to that of actors or musicians, who are bound to the possibilities of their
instruments or scripts as we are bound to what our computers and software will allow
us to do. But musicians and actors perform for an audience,  and most interactive works
do not require an audience. They only require users.
Perhaps the user does not perform in all interactive works. Comparing
interactive works to performance art, David Saltz writes that "Rather than functioning
either as performers or as authors, hypermedia audiences function as explorers. (..)
Their object of attention is the work, not themselves in the work." (Saltz 1997: 121) Saltz
sees interaction as performative only when the interaction is the main point of the work:
[A] participatory interaction is performative when the interaction itself becomes an
aesthetic object; in other words, participatory interactions are performative to the extent
that they are about their own interactions. (Saltz 1997: 123)
This is precisely the category of works that I am interested in in this thesis. Unlike Saltz
I think there is some performance inherent in all interaction, and as I will discuss in this
and the following chapter I think that it is this performance that  makes us feel part of
the work.
The performance that occurs in accessing digital works has been discussed
before, though in different ways than I propose analysing it. MUDs have been studied as
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sites of theatrical performance (Tronstad 2001;  Hammer 2002).  Speech act theory and
linguistic performatives have been explored as tools for understanding interaction,
notably by Adrian Miles (2001), who theorises links as performatives, and by Ragnhild
Tronstad (2001), who has analysed quests in games as performatives. Tronstad’s
analysis has later been extended by Espen Aarseth (Forthcoming).
I have chosen a different angle in this chapter: I will look at what Thomas Pavel
describes as the ontological fusion between our actual selves and our fictional selves
when we engage with a fictional work (Pavel 1986) and at Kendall Walton’s theorisation
of how we use fictional representations in our own games of make-believe (Walton
1990). Along the way, I use the example of a rowing simulator and of the interactive
installation artwork Bino & Cool’s Masterclass (Bino and Cool 2002) as illustrations of
how these theories relate to interactive works. In the next chapter I will continue this
line of exposition by exploring Walton’s notion of depiction and using it to analyse
elements of three interactive works.
This chapter, then, is an exploration of the second understanding of interactivity:
interaction not as a formal quality of a work but as a perceived inclusion in the work.
The way in which the user performs is the theme of this chapter.
What is fiction?
Sometimes, when I’m sweating away at the gym, I imagine that I’m an Olympic weight
lifter. The crowd is cheering me on, Mum and Dad are close to the podium holding
banners with “You’re brilliant, Jillikin!” emblazoned on them in huge letters, and if only
I can lift those gigantic weights above my head I’ll win the gold medal I’ve been working
towards for a decade. Actually, of course, I’m pulling handles fastened to pulleys and
weights on a contraption that looks nothing like a dumbbell, and 5 kilos is a significant
load for me. Just as we all do every single day, I am imagining a situation that isn’t real.
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Though my daydream was prompted by my being in a gym, my imaginings were
not prescribed by the gym or the apparatuses. I could have imagined completely
otherwise (that I was skiing or lying on the beach in the sun), or not imagined anything
at all. Indeed, my daydream may have been prompted as much by things internal to
myself as to the machines around me. The process of completing a PhD makes
daydreams of lifting impossible weights come easily.
Let’s leave the weight apparatuses in the gym and move over to the rowing
machines, or as they’re often called, the rowing simulators. While the contraptions in
the gym are non-figurative devices simply designed to exercise particular muscles, a
rowing simulator models an actual boat. You sit in it, grip the “oars” with your hands,
and row. Of course, the simulator doesn’t move as an actual boat would, and there is no
water apart from that in your drink bottle. Some rowing machines have computers
attached to them, too. The computer tracks your movements, interprets them according
to the system it is modelling and represents the results continuously on a screen in front
of you. As you row you see your representation on the screen move down the pixelated
river. Each time you move your oars, your avatar makes the same move. You can even
race the computer or the person in the simulator beside you.
Sitting in this machine, moving levers as I would move oars in an actual boat,
and watching an avatar on the screen move as I move, I imagine myself rowing a boat
on a river. It would be almost impossible to imagine myself being an Olympic weight
lifter about to win the gold while in the rowing simulator. Perhaps you could do it, if you
really tried, but it would be a very conscious effort and you would know that you were
breaking the rules. You are intended to imagine that you are rowing a boat, perhaps in a
race. In Kendall Walton’s terms, the rowing machine generates fiction and fictional
truths:
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A fictional truth consists in there being a prescription or mandate in some context to
imagine something. Fictional propositions are propositions that are to be imagined –
whether or not they are in fact imagined. (Walton 1990: 39)
Fiction, as Walton defines it, and as I will be using the concept, comes from the
combination of imagination and rules. My daydream of being an Olympic weight-lifter
had plenty of imagination, but it wasn’t governed by any rules, and was not dependent
on my interaction with the gym equipment. The rowing simulator, on the other hand,
clearly sets up rules: These levers are to be imagined to be oars. You are to imagine
yourself rowing a boat. It is fictional that I am rowing a boat when I use the rowing
simulator.
The rowing simulator is not itself a fiction. In fact, I won’t be using the term
fiction as a noun that refers to a work or genre at all. The rowing machine generates
fiction. Fiction in this view is more a process or an event than an object.
Interactive works of art tend to have a lot in common with the rowing simulator.
The user must perform actions in order to activate the work. Certain actions are
permitted and fairly specific imaginings are mandated.
Fiction, representation and simulation
Walton developed his theory of fictionality in a series of essays in the seventies and
eighties, and in 1990 he published a cohesive presentation of his theory in a book titled
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representative Arts. Walton is
interested in the way in which the user uses representational works. He argues that the
user pretends,  and that the work of art is a prop in this pretence.
Walton builds his understanding of our relationship with representational works
on an analysis of the way we play games of make-believe as children. A doll is a prop in
a child’s game of make-believe. The doll prescribes certain imaginings. Fictionally, the
child is a parent, giving her baby a bath or putting her to bed. Walton argues that
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representational works of art like novels, paintings and even some music are props that
we use in similar games of make-believe.
Walton’s use of the term “game of make-believe” corresponds to Roger Caillois’
description of games of mimicry (Caillois 2001). Caillois, who originally published his
book on games in 1958, extends Huizinga’s definition of games (Huizinga). While
Huizinga required games to have clear rules and to be played for no personal gain,
Caillois included both make-believe and gambling in his definition.
Many games do not imply rules. No fixed or rigid rules exist for playing with dolls, for
playing soldiers, cops and robbers, horses, locomotives, and airplanes – games, in
general, which presuppose free improvisation, and the chief attraction of which lies in
the pleasure of playing a role, of acting as if one were someone or something else, a
machine for example. Despite the assertion’s paradoxical character, I will state that in
this instance the fiction, the sentiment of as if replaces and performs the same function
as do rules. Rules themselves create fictions. {Caillois, 2001 #335@8}
Caillois’s conclusion here is remarkably similar to Walton’s, though Walton does not
refer to Caillois in his work. Walton also defines fiction as make-believe and rules, and
both Walton and Caillois see games of make-believe (in Walton’s terminology) or
mimicry (as Caillois describes them) as fiction, or perhaps more specifically, as creating
fiction. It is worth noting that since Walton’s use of the word games is equivalent to
Caillois’s games of mimicry it is closer to play (paidia) than to formal rule-based games
(ludus).
The rowing simulator is not a representational work of art, but it is a simulation,
and simulations are a special kind of representation. Gonzalo Frasca defines a
simulation thus:
Simulation is [the] act of modeling a system A by a less complex system B, which retains
some of A's original behavior. (Frasca 2001d)
While literature can describe a boat and describe the feeling of rowing, and images can
show what a boat and rower look like, a simulation models the behaviour of rowing: the
machine is built and programmed so that a tug at the oars will produce the same
sensation of resistance as that produced by actual oars in actual water. Representations
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can be described as one-dimensional simulations. A painting of a boat models one
single aspect of an actual boat, namely the way it looks to an observer.
The rowing simulator may also be a game. When you race against the computer
or against an opponent beside you, the rowing simulator is like any other racing game.
If you’ve bought the right accessories for your game console you can play car racing
games where you control the car with a plastic foot pedal and steering wheel. Similarly,
the rowing simulator provides you with levers that behave more or less like oars and a
seat that slides back and forwards as in a real single scull. There are clear rules, and a
situation where you either win or lose.
Dolls can also be said to be simple simulations. A baby doll looks like the object it
represents, as a drawing does, but a baby doll also models certain behaviours of an
actual baby. Some dolls cry, shut their eyes when they’re held horizontally, wet their
nappies when fed a bottle of water or laugh when you tickle them. Even rag dolls can be
cuddled, put to bed or dressed. Obviously not all aspects of a real baby are simulated,
and the simulation is often approximate or imperfect, but it is still a simulation. A
theory of fictionality and representation that bases itself on simulation rather than on
the aesthetics of narrative or visual art is well suited to help us understand digital
works, because these works often use simulation and the modelling of systems in at
least a minimal way. Though Walton doesn’t discuss simulations as such, he bases his
understanding of representational art on the way in which we use and play with simple
simulations such as dolls.
Walton’s theory is useful in studying interactive works because it discusses
fictionality rather than genres and structures. It is a cross-medial theory and so suits the
many genres of interactive works well. Works as disparate as installation artworks,
interactive narratives and computer games can all mandate imaginings and be used as
props in games of make-believe. There are also, of course, many examples of non-
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representational works of interactive art and games that don’t generate fictional worlds,
or that only barely do so. Tetris is a classic example of a game with neither story nor
fictionality. A net.art project like jodi.org, with its cryptical interfaces and crashing of
your browser, probably wouldn’t mandate imaginings either. Tetris and jodi.org aren’t
representations of an actual or fictional world, they are sufficient situations in their own
right and there is no need for the user to imagine a fictional world to engage with these
works.
It is always possible to use a work as a prop, but it is not always mandated or
intended. For instance, in Hamlet on the Holodeck, Janet Murray interprets Tetris as
the embodiment of an American academic’s hectic life. For her each block of pixels that
falls down her screen is a prop that stands for another item in her to-do list, needing
instant attention (Murray 1997: 143-144). Presumably most players do not imagine this,
and not doing so does not constitute a breach of rules or expectations in the game.
However, the basic assumption that one important function of works can be to allow
make-believe and the generation of fictional worlds lets us think productively about the
relationship between user and work.
The user pretends. For Walton, this pretence or game of make-believe is far more
fundamental than we usually would accept. He argues that even the emotions we feel
when appreciating fictional works are fictional. Watching a horror movie where some
disgusting, animate, green slime appears to be coming out of the screen, the viewer may
feel terrified and exhibit all normal signs of fear: screaming, cringing, a rapid pulse and
so on. In everyday conversation we would say that this person was frightened of the
slime. Walton argues that in fact, the person was fictionally frightened. The fear was not
actual but pretended, part of a game of make-believe. A parallel example that may be
easier to accept is that of a child playing a game with his father where the father
pretends to be a monster. The father jumps up from behind a chair and roars, and the
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child screams and runs away – and comes right back for more. This child is not actually
afraid, Walton argues, but is fictionally afraid, just as the viewer of the horror movie is
fictionally afraid of the slime monster. Another way of saying this is that we pretend to
be afraid. It is a performance.
Bino & Cool’s Masterclass
Walton builds his theory of fictionality on simulations like toys and games, and then
uses this framework to show how we play with art. Works of digital art that are
primarily simulations are thus very easy to read through the lens of Walton’s theory,
however this also means that little new knowledge of the works is gained by applying
the theory. Looking at a digital art installation, Bino & Cool’s Masterclass, will however
provide a foundation for analysing digital art works in which the user’s make-believe is
less explicit.
I experienced Bino & Cool’s Masterclass (Bino and Cool 2002) at an exhibition of
electronic art at the Nordic Interactive Conference 2001. The installation explores
control and the complementary positions of dominance and submission. The system
interprets user movements as either dominant or submissive, and presents dominant
users with images of a slave on screen and submissive users with images of a
dominatrix. When I saw Masterclass, the artists who had created it were present. Bino
was dressed as a dominatrix, in a leather corset, net stockings and stiletto heels. She
held a whip in one hand, casually fingering its tail with the other. Cool stood beside her:
blond, obedient and silent. They stood near an enclosure of about four by ten metres
that was empty apart from a large screen at one of its short ends. A narrow gap in the
fencing allowed a single member of the audience to enter the enclosure and stand or
walk in front of the screen. When it was my turn to enter, Bino handed me her whip,
and told me to try myself against the machine. So I stepped into the enclosure, holding
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the leather whip, and looked uncertainly at the screen  where an image of Bino loomed
over me, cracking her whip and telling me to obey her. I hesitantly stepped backwards,
and on the screen Bino kept ordering me to behave. “You have to move more
aggressively”, the actual Bino coached me, “try to dominate the machine!”. So I tried to
move quickly and decisively. With fast, determined steps crossing the whole floor space,
and an occasional crack of my whip, I managed to dominate the machine for an instant,
and was rewarded with images of Cool on the screen, kneeling submissively in front of
me.
The Masterclass models a system: it replicates certain potential behaviours in a
relationship between two people, or perhaps also between a person and a machine. Of
course this simulation is very simplistic: one element of a possible relationship is
modelled and all others are ignored. To model a system is to interpret it, to emphasise
certain aspects above others. Simulation is as selective and potentially subjective as any
other representation. As a simulation, Masterclass can be understood as a toy, much
like the baby doll that I can pretend to feed, burp and sing to sleep.
Like the rowing simulator, Masterclass is a simulation that places the user inside
the model. When I enter the motion-sensitive area in front of the screen, I become part
of the system. Cracking the whip in front of the screen, I use the artwork as a prop (or as
a system of props) in a game of make-believe. Fictionally, I am a would-be dominatrix,
perhaps a dominatrix-in-training, attending a master class to learn how to dominate the
machine. The fictional world is not absolutely determined, but my imaginings are
definitely guided by props: the images on the screen and the whip in my hand. In
addition my movements position me in relation to this representation: it is a
representation that includes me. In becoming part of the system, I myself become more
clearly a prop than when I look at a painting. (Though I will show, in the next chapter,
how looking at a painting is also to imagine yourself as within the fiction.)
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Walton would say that it is fictional that I dominate – or fail to dominate – the
Masterclass. I pretend to be aggressive or submissive, I am not actually being
aggressive or submissive.  This parallels the child who is not actually afraid of the
parent who jumps up and says boo, or the cinema viewer who is fictionally afraid of the
slime. This pretence is a form of performance, whether mostly or completely for
ourselves, or also for the benefit of onlookers.
Ontological fusion
One way of understanding the user’s position in relation to the fiction is through
Thomas Pavel’s theorisation of dual structures (Pavel 1986), where a fictional world is
overlaid the actual world. If the Masterclass generates a fiction of a master class in
domination, then that fictional world and the actual world of the art gallery join in an
ontological fusion between worlds. Each element of the work is double. Bino and Cool
are both the artists showing their work and the fictional teachers of a master class.
When I enter the area in front of the screen, I too become the site of a fusion between
actual and fictional: I am an appreciator of art at an exhibition, at the same time as I am
fictionally a pupil in a master class. These points of ontological fusion occur in the
elements of the art work that are  props in Walton’s sense, and in a work like
Masterclass, I become a prop when I engage with the work. In wielding the whip I
accept a role in the fiction. I’ll return to this in the next chapter, in relation to the mode
of representation that Walton calls depiction.
There are many different layers in our understanding of reality. Fictional worlds
are accepted as imaginative inventions, perhaps overlaid reality but clearly subordinate
to the actual world. Yet they seem real enough to us that readers flock to Baker Street to
see where Sherlock Holmes lived and gamers relish the opportunity to see the “real”
Lara Croft.
36
The dual structure between the actual and the sacred in many religions is similar
to the dual structure between the actual and fictional. Pavel  writes:
Sacred beings and objects, miraculous or prophetic grottos, holy mountains, places of
worship, all these provide for the points of articulation at which the two worlds meet in
what can be called a series of ontological fusions. (Pavel 1986: 138)
The actual world is the primary level in this dual structure. The secondary level is the
sacred world of the gods. At the art exhibition, the primary level was the exhibition and
the conference while the secondary level was the fictional master class.
The point of ontological fusion can be in objects or places, but also in a person.
The Nepalese Living Goddess ("Nepal Chooses New Living Goddess" 2001) is an
example of an actual person who is a point of fusion between the profane and the
sacred: she is a little girl in actuality, but she is simultaneously the Goddess herself in
the sacred sphere. The fictional and the sacred are different, but they have parallel
relationships with the actual. For the believers in Nepal it is not fictional that the small
adorned girl is the Goddess; for them her being a Goddess is just as real as her being a
little girl. The fusion is less absolute in the fictional than in the sacred. The actual world
has an ontological priority in relation to fictional worlds that it does not always have in
relation to the sacred.
When I crack my whip at the screen in the Masterclass, I use the whip and the
images I see on the screen as props in my game of make-believe, where I imagine myself
working to be stronger than the expert dominatrix. Unlike the four year old girl who is
chosen to be a goddess, I do not enter the secondary world completely. She is the
goddess to her fellow believers, and presumably to herself. I am the trainee dominatrix
for myself, in my imagination – but I am always aware that I am pretending. I know that
my actual self remains in the actual world. Any onlookers  only see the actual Jill
cracking a whip and laughing, though they may in turn use me as a prop in their own
games of make-believe, perhaps generating different fictional truths from those that I
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generate. The people surrounding the Living Goddess, on the other hand, see the girl
simultaneously as the Goddess and as a four year old child.
In effect this separation of actual and fictional self is the same as the
narratologists’ insistence on the difference between the historical (actual) reader and
the textual positions of  implied reader and narratee (Chatman 1978;  Prince 1980).
However, Pavel and Walton give us a different understanding of the relationship
between these selves. As Pavel  writes:
We send our fictional egos as scouts into the territory, with orders to report back; they
are moved, not us, they fear Godzilla and cry with Juliet, we only lend our bodies and
emotions for a while to these fictional egos, just as in participatory rites the faithful lend
their bodies to the possessing spirits. (Pavel 1986: 85)
Pavel suggests that our projected fictional selves may be more “apt to feel and express
emotions than are dry, hardened egos”, and relates this to Schiller’s hopes for
humanity’s improvement through art, which Pavel sees as a hope that “after their return
from travel in the realms of art, fictional egos would effectively melt back into the actual
egos, sharing with them their fictional growth.” (85) This also seems to be the
assumption made by those who would ban video games or role-playing games because
they supposedly cause violence and insanity in the actual world.
When the Nepalese girl menstruates for the first time she will abruptly stop being
the goddess and become just a girl again. Even such a complete identification as hers
with the goddess can cease, just as I cease to be the dominatrix when I step away from
the Masterclass and leave the exhibition.
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C H A P T E R  2  F R O M  D E P I C T I O N  TO
O N TO L O G I C AL
I N T E R A C T I O N
When we play games of make-believe, “we lend our bodies and our emotions” to the
fiction (Pavel 1986: 85). This loan is a bodily, perceptual and often emotional fusion
with the fictional world, and it can take many different  forms. Kendall Walton (Walton
1990) discusses two main modes of representation: the description that is common in
verbal representations like literature, and depiction, which is frequent in images though
not limited to the visual. Walton’s analysis of depiction emphasises the way in which we
imagine ourselves as being part of the fictional worlds generated by depictive
representations.
Unlike descriptions, depictions include the user in the fiction, and this strategy is
also used in many interactive works. However, having developed his theory prior to
1990, Walton does not discuss interactive works at all. In the following I will extend his
theory of depiction to include the non-perceptual actions that interactive works require
of their users. I combine this with Pavel’s concept of ontological fusion to  provide an
understanding of how interaction can cause ontological fusion. Finally I will propose a
definition of ontological interaction, which is a particular kind of interaction.
I will  analyse aspects of three interactive works in order to demonstrate how the
concept of depiction can be used in interpreting concrete instances of interaction, and to
develop the notion of ontological interaction. The works analysed are Michael Joyce’s
hypertext fiction afternoon, a story (1990), the classic text adventure game Zork 1: The
Great Underground Empire (Blank and Lebling 1981) and Leon Cmielewski and
Josephine Starrs’ interactive artwork Dream Kitchen (2000).
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Depiction
In depictions, the act of perceiving or accessing the work is “part of the imaginings it
occasions” (Walton 1990: 294). This chapter
In non-interactive, depictive representations, the correspondence between the
perceptual act  and fictional acts is what causes the user to feel part of the story, or to
feel present in both the fictional and the actual world. I’ll explain this more clearly, and
then build an understanding of interaction that builds upon and extends this. Like all
other representations, interactive works require perceptual actions from the user. They
also require non-perceptual actions such as cracking a whip, pulling simulated oars or
clicking a mouse. Understanding how the user’s perceptual actions fuse into fictional
actions will help us understand the relationship between the actual clicking of a mouse
and the fictional moving through a world or answering a question.
If I go to an art gallery and look at a painting of a ship in stormy seas, I imagine
seeing a real ship. I might well point at the painting and say to a companion: “Look at
those waves!” While a fictional worlds logician might argue that this is shorthand for my
saying something like “In the fictional world of the painting there are waves”, Walton
emphasises the make-believe in the statement: at the same time as I am aware that I am
looking at strokes of paint on canvas, I am pretending to see real waves. This is what
Walton describes as playing a game of make-believe. Now, when I play this game, I
include my own action in the fiction. I could imagine a fictional position for myself: my
son is on that ship and I’m standing on a cliff, watching the ship tossing on the waves so
close to home yet so unsafe. Or I could just as well leave my own position blank and
open. In either case, my act of looking is part of the fiction.
Walton describes this using the user’s engagement with a Hobbema painting as
an example:
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The viewer of Meindert Hobbema’s Water Mill with the Great Red Roof plays a game in
which it is fictional that he sees a red-roofed mill. As a participant in this game, he
imagines that this is so. And this self-imagining is done in a first-person manner: he
imagines seeing a mill, not just that he sees one, and he imagines this from the inside.
Moreover, his actual act of looking at the painting is what makes it fictional that he looks
at a mill. And this act is such that fictionally it itself is his looking at a mill; he imagines
of his looking that its object is a mill. (294)
Two layers of existence coincide, one actual and one fictional. In actuality, the viewer is
looking at a canvas with marks that represent a mill. Fictionally, the viewer is looking at
a mill. The same act of perception – in this case, looking – is both actual and fictional.
The perception of the work is also the fictional perception of the fictional world. Walton
writes:
One does not first perceive [the] picture and then, in a separate act, imagine that
perception to be of a mill. The phenomenal character of the perception is inseparable
from the imagining that takes it as an object. (..) The seeing and the imagining are
inseparably bound together, integrated into a single complex phenomenological whole.
(295)
My act of looking is the site of an ontological fusion between actual and fictional world.
Ontological fusion has been mentioned in previous research on interactive works
(Koskimaa 2000). However, combining an appreciation of ontological fusion with a
theory of fiction that embraces the user’s active role in imagining the fictional world
allows us to see how ontological fusion occurs in interactive works. In interactive works,
depiction is the mechanism that causes an ontological fusion between user and fictional
world.
Walton does not mention interactive works at all, but defines depiction as
covering all “perceptual games of make-believe”, and not merely visual games (333-4).
He discusses depiction in music at some length, writing that “representational music is
depictive, typically, when it represents auditory phenomena” (335). Drums in
Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture represent the firing of cannons, for instance, and hearing
the drums, I fictionally hear cannons. Listening as well as touch can be a perceptual
action:
41
When one listens to Haydn’s String Quartet, opus 32 (The Bird), it is fictional that one
hears the chirping of birds. Touching a teddy bear counts as fictionally touching a bear.
Theater and film audiences fictionally hear as well as see. (296)
The imagined presence of the user in the fiction, fictionally perceiving the represented
events, defines Walton’s notion of depiction.
In interactive works our participation is not limited to perception and private or
communal games of make-believe as it is in the representational works Walton
discusses. In Bino & Cool’s Masterclass, for example, I both perceive and act. My
perception of the dominatrix on the screen is just the same as my perception of the ship
in a storm on the canvas: my perception is both actual and fictional. While perception is
sufficient to appreciate the painting, to fully engage with Masterclass I must perform
actions. These actions are more than perceptual: I crack a whip, and I walk up and down
in front of the screen. When I crack the whip, my action is both actual and fictional. To
rewrite Walton: “The doing and the imagining are inseparably bound together,
integrated into a single complex phenomenological whole.”
Walton and Pavel are clearly aware of each other’s work, but do not connect
depiction and ontological fusion as explicitly as I am doing here. Interaction is a
stronger and more obvious form of depiction, but the same mechanisms are at work in
interactive works as in the painting of a mill by Hobbema. While the actions that fuse
user and work in a non-interactive work are only perceptual (looking or listening, for
instance), interaction also demands non-perceptual actions, such as kinetic or haptic
actions.
Jesper Juul expresses the concept of an ontological fusion in different words, and
specifically discusses games rather than representational works in general:
[I]f we play the World War II game Axis and Allies, all our actions have a double
meaning. We move a piece around a board, but this also means invading Scandinavia
with our troops. We click the keys on the keyboard, but we are also moving Lara Croft.
(Juul 2003)
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Here the actions that exceed perception are physically moving tokens around a board or
clicking keys on a keyboard. Each of these actions is also an action in the fictional
world: invading Scandinavia or moving Lara Croft. This doubling of actions so that they
are meaningful both as a means of accessing the work and as fictional actions is what
causes the ontological fusion and the user’s sensation of being immersed in a fictional
world.
This way of thinking about interaction becomes more immediately useful if we
think about specific works, and particularly if we think about works in which the user’s
performance and make-believe is not as obvious as in Masterclass.
Depiction in hypertext
Hypertext fiction in the late eighties and early nineties was a predominantly verbal art,
although images and visualisations of the structure of the work were important in
several hypertext fictions, notably Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl (1995), John
McDaid’s Uncle Buddy’s Funhouse (1992) and Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory Garden
(1991). In addition, of course, these works are linked, and links are neither a verbal nor
visual form of representation, but something else altogether. In the last five or ten years,
electronic literature has to some extent merged with visual and concept arts, and these
non-verbal elements are often quite easily analysed as depictions. However, links and
words alone can also be depictions that bind the reader’s “doing and imagining”
together inseparably, as I will show in an examination of the first few nodes of Michael
Joyce’s afternoon, a story. I have chosen this work because it appears to have little in
common with a simulation like Masterclass, and yet, as I will show, it uses depiction in
a way that is similar. Afternoon is a minimal example of depiction.
Verbal representations can be depictions, as Walton notes, but this is rare, and
usually occurs when the work as a whole represents a specific object:
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Reading Gulliver’s Travels is, fictionally, reading a ship’s logbook. The representation of
epistles by epistolary novels such as Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, of an autobiography
by Tristam Shandy, and of journals, diaries, and notes by other literary works
approaches depiction. But the games in which these works serve are only minimally
perceptual; reading is about the only perceptual action that, fictionally, one performs. If
one examines the printed text of Gulliver’s Travels, it will not be fictional that one
examines the handwriting of the logbook or observes the formation of the letters beyond
recognizing what letters they are. (Walton 1990: 354)
Uncle Buddy’s Funhouse is a depiction in the same sense as Gulliver’s Travels is one.
Uncle Buddy consists of a box containing a computer disk, two audio cassettes,
proofread sheets of a short story and a letter from a lawyer. The letter states that these
are papers and data left by your Uncle Buddy, whom you may not remember, but who
has left them to you in his will. Reading through the assorted material on the disk and
listening to the cassettes almost perfectly equates the user’s actual perception and
investigation of the material with a fictional perception of the fictional object.
Masterclass  is a depiction in this way too, in that it models a complete situation.
Masterclass is also saturated with visual and aural depictions: looking at the image of
Bino on screen is perfectly equivalent to looking at the mill in the Hobbema painting.
afternoon, a story
Joyce’s afternoon is not a depiction as a whole, as are Uncle Buddy and Gulliver’s
Travels, but it contains elements of depiction that depend on the links. Here is the first
screenful of text you see after the title screen:
I try to recall winter. <As if it were yesterday?> she says, but I do not signify one way or
another.
By five the sun sets and the afternoon melt freezes again across the blacktop into crystal
octopi and palms of ice—rivers and continents beset by fear, and we walk out to the car,
the snow moaning beneath our boots and the oaks exploding in series along the
fenceline on the horizon, the shrapnel settling like relics, the echoing thundering off far
ice. This was the essence of wood, these fragments say. And this darkness is air.
<Poetry> she says, without emotion, one way or another.
Do you want to hear about it?
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The first three paragraphs describe the situation, the characters and the events and they
present the dialogue. When I read these paragraphs, my act of reading  is not also  a
part of the fiction. I am outside of the fiction. Reading, I imagine the fictional scene: I
imagine the woman who speaks, what her voice would be like and what she would look
like, and I imagine the narrator. I imagine the cold winter afternoon, already dark, and I
imagine hearing the sounds of the ice underneath boots, the slam of a car door. I
imagine all these things, using the words and the narration as a prop in a game of make-
believe where I construct a fictional world based on what I read. Perhaps I fictionally
hear the sounds of the ice exploding in the distance as I read the text. But I do not
imagine my viewing of the words of the text to be a viewing of this scene, nor, if
someone reads it to me, do I imagine my hearing of the words to be a hearing of the
snow moaning beneath boots. As Walton writes:
[The reader’s] actual visual activity is only the occasion for his imaginings. It prompts
and prescribes them but is not their object. (Walton 1990: 294)
Perhaps the words “snow moaning” can be said to have an auditory quality that is
similar to the sound they refer to, as the word “shrapnel” does sound a little like an
explosion. If we agree upon that, and we might not, but let us say we do, we could
perhaps describe these words as possessing depictive qualities. I would then imagine
the sound of the word shrapnel (as I pronounce the sentences to myself) to be the sound
of the real explosion. My act of perception (of hearing) would correspond exactly to the
represented act of perception. The main mode of this descriptive paragraph is not
depiction in this sense, though. Had the words been designed to be played by the
computer as a sound file rather than read as words on a screen, their depictive quality
may have been heightened.
The last sentence of this first node is different from the previous paragraphs. It is
a question, apparently directly addressed to the reader, or at least to a narratee: “Do you
want to hear about it?” It demands an answer. By answering the question, the reader
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accepts the role of narratee, and gains a double existence, both actual and fictional. A
contract is established between reader and text, rather like the click-and-accept
contracts you “sign” when you open a freshly purchased program for the first time or
use your net bank (Walker 2001). At this point in the reading of afternoon the user
must respond to the text in some way, or keep this node on her screen indefinitely.
The reader can respond in several different ways. Afternoon is read on a
computer, one node appearing on the screen at a time. A new node is displayed when
the reader clicks upon words in the text to follow links, presses the return key to follow a
default path between nodes, or uses the control strip (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: The control strip in Michael Joyce’s hypertext fiction afternoon, a story. Image courtesy of
Eastgate Systems.
The control strip has four buttons. The back arrow allows the reader to return to the
previous node that was viewed. The open book activates a window displaying the titles
of all the links that lead out of the node, allowing the reader to choose between all the
links. The Y/N button is for answering Yes or No. There is a printer icon for printing out
a node. Finally, there is an open space for typing into. In the directions that are
accessible from the cover screen, the author explains:
Respond to questions using the Yes/No buttons below or by typing. Note that you can
also type some words—and occasional one-word questions—in the text entry box to the
right of the buttons below.
When presented with the question “Do you want to hear about it?” the reader thus has
three choices, besides sitting and waiting indefinitely or quitting the program and
abandoning the story. She may answer the question directly by clicking Y or N for yes or
no or by typing yes or no into the text box, she may press return and follow the default
path or she may choose a different path by clicking on a word in the text or browsing the
available links.
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If the reader types “yes”, or click the Y, a node titled “Yes” appears, starting with
the following sentence: “She had been a client of Wert’s wife for some time. Nothing
serious, nothing awful, merely general unhappiness and the need of a woman so strong
to have friends.” Type “no” or click N, and the computer responds with a node titled
“no”: “I understand how you feel. Nothing is more empty than heat. Seen so starkly the
world holds wonder only in the expanses of clover where the bees work.” The node
continues in similar style: descriptive, poetic and dreaming. No events are narrated for
several nodes. The narrator doesn’t tell the story but instead offers general reflections. If
the reader answers yes or no, then, the work appears to listen to the reader’s answer and
responds appropriately.
In afternoon linked words are not marked. Most nodes have a default link to
another node that is activated if the reader presses return or clicks a word or phrase that
is not linked. Following the default link is equivalent to ignoring the question posed by
the narrator. Most of the words and phrases in this first node are not linked, and will
lead to the same default node as the return key: a node with a sole line: “I want to say I
may have seen my son die this morning.”
As these strings of narration continue, they wind away from their depictive power
and become pure description in Walton’s sense. This means that there is no
correspondence between the reader’s actions (looking at the screen, reading the text,
clicking to move to another node) and the actions represented. Or perhaps, if we stretch
Walton a little, there is a correspondence. The narrator is reluctant to tell his story and
yet clearly needs to speak. The single question posed directly to the reader can be seen
to set up an imagined conversation. Just as when a friend wants to tell us something,
but needs constant assurance that we really want to hear it to be able to divulge her
secret worry, the narrator of afternoon must be continually coaxed into speaking by our
repeated clicks of the mouse or presses of the return button. This is not as immediate
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and complete a merging of actions as those Walton describes as occurring when we
engage with a depiction, though. Remember, Walton wrote of the viewer of Hobbema’s
painting that “his actual act of looking at the painting is what makes it fictional that he
looks at a mill” (295). Though I can imagine that my act of clicking makes my listening
to a friend’s story fictional, this imagining is not prescribed by most of the work. In fact,
many nodes are hard to incorporate in such an analysis, as they are told in the present
tense and ignore the narratee completely, as though they were thought at the time of the
event rather than told to a listener or reader.
The question in the first node, “Do you want to hear about it?” does require me to
imagine myself being directly addressed by the narrator. In that question, the narrator
directly addresses me. Perhaps I imagine Peter, the narrator of the story (though I do
not yet know his name as I read this node for the first time), turning directly towards
me and speaking to me. Fictionally, Peter asks me a question. In the actual world, words
on a screen pose a question. Fictionally, I respond by answering yes, or no, or by
remaining silent. In the actual world, I answer the question by clicking Y or N or by
simply clicking at random. I imagine my actual answer to be a fictional answer. This
question and my answer are an example of a depiction. In this depiction there is also a
brief moment of what Pavel calls ontological fusion. “Do you want to hear about it?” is
asked both of the fictional narratee and of me, the actual reader, and in my acts of
reading and answering the question I fuse with the fictional narratee for an instant.
Walton uses depiction to refer to representations in which the actual act of
viewing, reading or listening is part of the game of make-believe. This has some
similarity with Kacandes’s involuntary performatives, where by reading the words you
enact what they say (Kacandes 1993;  Walker 2001). A sentence like “You’ve read me
this far then? Even this far?” (Barth 1988: 127) is, according to Kacandes, an
involuntary performative. We could also call it a depiction. Reading the sentence, I
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imagine myself in the position of the “you”, and I imagine myself reading and being
spoken to by the text. Walton’s notion of depiction doesn’t cover all the aspects of
Kacandes’s involuntary performative, but it does describe the way in which I imagine
my actual reading as being fictional, or as being part of the fiction.
Earlier, I said that afternoon is not depictive as a whole, as Gulliver’s Travels or
Uncle Buddy’s Funhouse are. Though the work as a whole does not depict something
else, it does have an element of depiction in its broader structure. In afternoon, the
reader’s confused wandering between nodes has often been interpreted as mirroring
Peter the protagonist’s wandering between thoughts and memories (Douglas 1994; 
Walker 1999;  Douglas 2000). Both Peter and the reader search blindly (with no map or
guidelines) for an answer to the question of what really happened that morning,
perhaps suspecting the truth, perhaps avoiding something, but never being certain.
Reading the text, the reader enacts a parallel to Peter’s search for truth. The structure of
the nodes and the links sets up a way of reading that depicts Peter’s own journey.
Examining this question in afternoon indicates that depiction in interactive
works can be not only visual, auditory or conceptual, but can also occur in the links and
in the act of interaction.
Zork
Another primarily verbal form of interactive work is the text adventure game, or
interactive fictions as they are also known. These games were popular in the late
seventies and the eighties, and though they are no longer mainstream, fans of the genre
still play the old games and create new variants of the form. The bestselling Zork trilogy
from Infocom is a close descendant of the original Adventure (Crowther and Woods
1976), and is set in intricately booby-trapped dungeons and caves where the player must
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grapple with monsters and puzzles, gaining points meticulously until finally finding and
securing a glorious treasure.
Afternoon poses one single question to the user: “Do you want to hear about it?”
The player of Zork 1: The Great Underground Empire (Blank and Lebling 1981), on the
other hand, is constantly required to give input in the form of simple sentences. Playing
Zork is a continuous dialogue between game and player. The game briefly describes an
event, situation or object, and then blinks its cursor until the player responds.
Here is a transcript of a typical scene in Zork: a fight with a troll. The words I
typed in are after the > marks, and the rest was provided by the program.
A nasty-looking troll, brandishing a bloody axe, blocks all passages out of the room.
Your sword has begun to glow very brightly.
>kill troll with sword
Clang! Crash! The troll parries.
The axe sweeps past as you jump aside.
>kill troll with sword
A quick stroke, but the troll is on guard.
The troll hits you with a glancing blow, and you are momentarily stunned.
>kill troll with sword
You are still recovering from that last blow, so your attack is ineffective.
The axe sweeps past as you jump aside.
Each segment of text provided by the game is a description, which is the most common
mode for verbal representations. Reading the transcript like this, the act of viewing the
work does not correspond to the fictional act of viewing that which the work represents,
which would be required for the work to be what Walton calls depictive. When you play
the game, though, the experience is very different. The words scroll by on the screen as
fast as you can type your responses, and your typed commands directly cause fictional
actions to occur.
In Zork there are two main kinds of actions performed by the player (in addition
to the interpretation that always occurs): the perceptual action of reading the words
presented by the text, and the typing of commands.
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When I type “kill troll with sword”, that act corresponds to me fictionally trying
to kill the troll with my sword. The correspondence is not as direct as the depictions
Walton discusses, because I actually type but I fictionally fight. Walton wrote that the
viewer’s “actual act of looking at the painting is what makes it fictional that he looks at a
mill.” (294) In Zork, it is the player’s actual act of typing “kill troll with sword” that
makes it fictional that she attacks a troll. However, it does seem that Walton thinks of
the actual action as being the same as the fictional action: it is the action that is the
point of articulation between worlds. In Zork, the actions are different: typing becomes
fighting. But the player’s action still makes something fictional.
The rowing simulator I described in the previous chapter is much more
unequivocally depictive than Zork, though the actions performed are not merely
perceptual as they are in the examples Walton gives. Pulling an oar on the simulator is
fictionally pulling an oar in a rowing boat. In an arcade game, pulling the trigger of a
plastic gun may make it fictional that I pull the trigger of a (fictionally) real gun,
fictionally shooting a bad guy dead. In these examples the correspondence is a lot more
obvious than in Zork, but the principle is the same.
Dream Kitchen
Leon Cmielewski and Josephine Starrs’s Dream Kitchen is an interactive artwork
published on CD-ROM. It is described as an interactive on the back of the CD cover,
and as a game in the options that appear when you press escape to quit it (Quit –
Credits – New Game). However, Dream Kitchen is better described as a toy or a
simulation than as a game. To play with Dream Kitchen is to explore the world and its
carefully limited interface, rather as you would explore the possibilities of a new toy. As
the title indicates, the world to be explored is that of a kitchen: pristine and tidy to begin
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with but becoming more and more grubby and disgusting as the user pries into its
unseen secrets.
The title screen shows an image of a starkly sterile kitchen with a rubber gloved
hand holding a spray can labelled “Domestic Bliss”. There are no instructions to the
user, and the hand is removed from the screen after a few seconds. Moving the mouse
around the screen or clicking on the image of the kitchen gives no results until the
mouse cursor is above the words “Dream Kitchen”. Hovering over these words, the
cursor turns into the familiar hand with the pointing finger that indicates that clicking
here will elicit some response from the computer. A click and the words buzz away like
flies, and the kitchen is animated, or rather, our perspective on the kitchen is animated.
The image swirls around the room as though the user were a fly buzzing from object to
object: under the table, over to the fridge, up to the telephone that is hanging on the
wall, across to the sink and down again in front of the stove before ducking under the
table again to repeat the dizzy circle.
After a few rounds an alert user may notice that the mouse cursor promises
action when hovering on certain key objects: the power socket behind the table, the
fridge, the phone, the drain of the sink and the stove. Clicking on any one of these
objects (there isn’t much time, you must click before you’ve moved on past it) sends you
under or into it, and there is a separate event within each of these places. Once finished
with the sequence or experience within one of these spaces the user returns to the
kitchen, but the kitchen has changed. With each  visit to the disturbing parallel universe
that lies behind the glossy veneer of this kitchen, the benches, walls and appliances of
this main room become dirtier. Traces of human inhabitants appear: a post-it note next
to the phone, photos on the door of the fridge. With these human touches there is
always grime: the circle left on the bench by a grubby bowl, a coffee cup with mould
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growing around its edges, stripes of filth on the fridge and a dark red stain on the floor
by the table that looks as though it could be blood.
Few options are given to the user, but those options become important, because
the user’s choice in Dream Kitchen is usually limited to accepting the offered role or
abandoning the entire work. Some of the subworlds do present the user with toys to
play with (shape a collage from the rubbish down the drain, or choose for how long you
wish to electrocute the frog), but sequences of clicking are more common. The user
moves through the fictional world in jerky movements from image to image, like in
Myst. But here the links onward are often hidden. The user must find the hidden link by
searching around the screen with the mouse, and must click the mouse in order to move
on. In most cases, there is only one option, and the user must work in order to find it.
Often it’s unclear whether your clicking actually makes any difference at all –
sometimes the action seems controlled by time as much as by your fervent clicking.
The blurb on the back cover of the CD states briefly that “The shift from dream to
nightmare can be as sudden as the collapse of domestic bliss into chaos.” A sense of
violence is present in most of the episodes that exist between the cracks of this perfect
kitchen.
Behind the telephone there is an intricate system that folds and unfolds at the
click of the user’s mouse. A small green button  lights up a grid of screens showing
surveillance videos. The format is so small that it is difficult to see exactly what is
happening, but there is a woman and a man and they are fighting. Something that looks
like a gun is shown, and I think I hear a gunshot amid fragments of innocent-sounding
telephone conversations: is the dark red stain on the floor blood from a murder? This
may be the main story of Dream Kitchen, but it is never told directly. We glimpse it
through surveillance tapes and may sense the deterioration of a relationship through
the deterioration of the kitchen. Even stronger are the acts of violence and disrespect for
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other creatures that the user herself commits in some of the other cracks in the facade of
this kitchen. It seems safe to conclude that the whiff of “Domestic Bliss” sprayed by the
blue-gloved hand in the title screen is not protection enough against the often unseen
horrors of family life.
The surveillance tapes clearly frame a world that the user is unequivocally
outside of. The user has no control over the world shown by the videos. This world can
be seen as a framed story. It is formally a fiction within a fiction, but semantically it is
presented as another interpretation or view of the same space.
In other episodes, the user directly causes violence through clicking the mouse,
and this is where the user becomes part of the fictional world instead of merely
watching it and exploring it without leaving any trace of herself. The episodes that force
the user to be violent are the interactions that are particularly interesting in terms of
depiction, ontological fusion and control.
One of these episodes takes place in the world underneath the fridge, where the
user is cast as the executioner to a pen. The first images here show a labyrinth of small
pieces of cardboard, and the pen (a fountain pen with a translucent red lid) is scuttering
away from some biros that are pursuing it. The chase continues in new screens as the
user finds the hidden clickable spot that opens a new scene. After a short while, pencils
fill the screen, moving back and forwards like a crowd of humans. They make scuttling,
scuffling noises, like mice, but listening carefully you can hear that the noises are really
the sounds of pens and pencils moving against paper at different speeds. The pencils
continue their shuffling until the user clicks, and this time the click brings a new object
into being: a pen. New clicks make new pens magically appear, and these pens can be
dragged around the screen, pushing the pencils aside.
So far we’ve seen three different kinds of user actions, in addition to the
perceptual actions of looking and listening. Firstly, the user can click the mouse to move
54
around in the topology of the kitchen and its subworlds. The user’s actual click of the
mouse makes it fictional that the user moves through the fictional world. This
movement seems somewhat academic so long as the user is simply an observer and not
a participant, though it is, I suppose, no  more academic than the inclusion of the viewer
of Hobbema’s mill painting in that fictional world, simply through the act of viewing.
When this kind of movement is possible the mouse cursor turns into a pointing hand.
Secondly, a click among the pencils calls an object into being in the fictional world. This
is a powerful fictional action: a summoning or creation. However, the user has no
control over this. The second or third time she clicks among the pencils she may have
surmised that clicking is likely to generate another pen, but as there are no alternate
actions available this hardly amounts to controlling the situation. Thirdly, the user can
manipulate a fictional object by dragging the mouse while holding down the mouse
button. This possibility is further exploited in the next segment of the pens and pencils
episode.
The three functions of the user’s clicking can be seen as requests from the user to
the system. The first user action, the navigational click, asks to explore a certain area
more closely. The second click summons rather than requests: “Make something
happen here”, the user says with her click. Though the user does not control what
happens or what appears, she does decide where on the screen the summoned being
shall materialize. The third click allows the user to temporarily possess a fictional being,
and thereby to control its actions. Though the user’s choices are extremely limited even
here, the role the user plays is akin to that of a magician with the power to initiate
action, summon beings and possess creatures. The work requires the user’s presence
and the user’s action as paintings or music do not: without the user’s clicking, the pens
will not sacrifice the pencils. Yet for all this power, the magician-user can only work
magic according to the script offered by the work. The user is both used and using.
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Once the pens, controlled by the user, have pushed away all the pencils, a new
scene follows. Two biros dance with a pencil, then lift the pencil between them. They
proceed to push it into a pencil sharpener. At first they seem to be helpfully sharpening
the pencil, but the sharpening continues until there is nothing left of the pencil at all.
The pens repeat this sacrifice using a new pencil, and then another, and another, until
the user at some point realises that she can stop the slaughter of pencils by clicking the
pencil sharpener. The sharpenings fall down and the next scene shows them gathered
into a piled heap. Biros stand cheering behind the heap, and the red-capped fountain
pen is brought in and placed on this bonfire of pencil shreddings (see Figure 3).
It takes the user eight clicks of the mouse and some dragging and dropping to
light the match and set fire to the bonfire of pencil shreddings. Then the user is left to
watch the pen twist in melting agony as a crowd of other pens and pencils cheer in the
background.
  
Figure 3 Lighting the bonfire in Dream Kitchen. Moving the mouse moves the match, so to light the
match, the user strikes it against the match book.
If the user doesn’t click (and of course you do; you’re curious to see what happens next,
you want something, anything to happen) the image is eventually replaced by the title
screen and the work starts all over again.
In this scene, the user is forced not simply to  enact burning a pen at the stake,
but to make each step towards that burning fictional. Each click is a tiny step along this
path. The matchbook must be opened, a match must be taken from it, the match must
be lit, then it must be touched to the pencil shreddings.
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The obedience of the user is a central theme of Dream Kitchen. In the episode
that takes place beneath the stove, this becomes even more explicit than in the pencil
burning episode. Once past another labyrinth of cardboard, the user is presented with a
dark space in which three small animals are placed on pedestals. Another click sets up a
situation that the user can play with by combining elements in various ways. The user is
provided with a scalpel, an x-ray panel and wires for electrocution that can be applied to
each of the animals as the user wishes. At first it is not obvious what any of the three
torture devices do: the user must use each device on an animal in order to see its
function. The animals are for the most part dead, and so these dissections may appear
harmless – except for the rat. Its front paw is disturbing enough as it moves up and
down in repetitive spasms. You see worse when you move the x-ray panel across its
body. Inside the rat’s belly is a glowing, pink human foetus, heart beating just as in the
images we’ve seen on television documentaries and books about pregnancy.
Torturing these animals has no immediate repercussions. Electrocution makes
the animals twitch and high-pitched squeals can be heard against the electrical hum as
the current flows through them, but the electricity does not burn them. Afterwards they
look exactly the same.
Even the foetus inside the rat is unchanged. Its heart still beats no matter how
long you electrocute its host. Slicing up the belly of the rat with the scalpel neither
reveals nor kills the foetus. The human foetus can only be seen using the x-ray panel. In
Dream Kitchen humans are never directly accessible, but are only visible through
technological mediation: the surveillance videos from behind the telephone and the x-
ray panel in the dissection chamber. The computer and the fictional bugs and animate
pens and scraps of rubbish block communication between the human user and the
fictional humans of the Dream Kitchen world. Is this foetus the child of the couple we
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saw fighting in the surveillance tapes? Then we are participating in the destruction of
this family by our interaction with the work. We are complicit in their misery.
Once the user is satisfied with her slicing, x-raying and electrocution, she can
leave the dissection chamber by clicking a thin strip of white at the top of the screen.
Once clicked, the strip lengthens, revealing itself to be a printout of the results of the
experiments the user has just performed – but now we see that it is the user who was
the test subject, rather than the lab animals. The user has just been the subject of an
“Obedience to Interface Test”, and she is rated according to her obedience, sensitivity,
obsessiveness, cruelty and impatience. The user’s apparent control is inverted by the
score card and its declaration that rather than the user using the work, the work is using
the user.
Figure 4: A score card awarded to the user after torturing bugs and other in Dream Kitchen.
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The role available to the user and the actions that the user is required to perform raise
issues of ethics and control. Like afternoon and Zork, Dream Kitchen requires user
actions that translate into fictional actions in the fictional world. In afternoon and Zork
the relationship between user and work is important to a full understanding of the
work, but in Dream Kitchen it is essential. Here the role the user enters into vis a vis
the work reflects back on the user herself. As a user of Dream Kitchen I am left not only
interpreting the work but interpreting myself and my own disturbing actions.
Deixis
The term deixis is borrowed from linguistics, and refers to the quality of language that
emphasises the relationship between speaker and listener rather than the content of
what is being said. Following this, deictic works emphasise the relationship between
user and work rather than what happens in the fictional world. This does not mean that
the events in the fictional world are unimportant, but simply that there is also an
emphasis on the relationship between the user and that world, or between the user and
the material text.
Dream Kitchen emphasises the deixis between user and work very strongly
because the user’s actual actions correspond directly to fictional actions. Mieke Bal’s
discussion of deictic narratives (Bal 1999), from which I have taken my use of the term
deictic, extends the conventional narratological definition of narrative to include events
that occur between the user and the work.  This is highly relevant to interactive works.
 Bal is a narratologist who has turned her attention to visual art in recent years.
In her book on Caravaggio, she explores non-representational ways of narrating;
“narrating outside of figuration”, as she describes it (167). She stretches conventional
notions of narrativity, for instance identifying the narrative dimension of Caravaggio’s
work as being “its appeal to an interaction with the viewer, to its own processing in
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time” (167). Bal describes a form of narrative that lies in the relationship between the
viewer and the work rather than in the work itself. Though “at least two related events
much be involved for a work to be called narrative in more than just metaphorical
terms” (176), for Bal these events need not be represented events. Her interpretation of
David Reed’s non-figurative paintings as narrative makes use of such extra-textual
events:
Instead of marking the canvas with visible traces of paint and paint handling, he offers a
surface so smooth and shiny that the eye, as Hanne Loreck puts it, "bounces off it". Thus
the two events required to make up a minimal narrative are already in place even in so
simple and primary a reading: the eye goes to the canvas, then bounces back. (180)
Bal sees these “events of perception” that are performed by the viewer as exceeding
vision alone. The “dynamic between the I and the you [is] grounded in a sense-based
attraction that is not limited to vision” (181). She writes:
As tyrannical as love itself, the painted surface dictates how the "second person" must
confirm the first person's subjectivity, the kind of subjectivity it wishes to be produced
and hence how the viewer must be engaged: not as a bare, abstract, theoretical,
disembodied retina, but as a full participant in a visual event in which the body takes
effect. The second-personhood I am elaborating here, then, is qualified as erotic so as to
ensure this bodily participation. This bodily participation takes time, and the subject
performing it changes through time. This is a definition of an event. (188-189)
Bal sees this exchange between the I and the you, the viewer and the viewed, as
fundamentally deictic, and akin to the subjectification of which Benveniste (1971)
speaks as occurring in this exchange between first and second person:
Thus the light defines the surface as moving toward the outside world where the viewer
is, begging the latter to confirm its subjectivity so that the viewer, saying "you" to the
surface, can come into his status as a bodily engaged "I". (195)
Though I am not convinced that it is useful to think of such an interchange between
viewer and art as narrative, I find Bal’s discussion of the way in which certain artworks
stress this relationship valuable. Bal is describing an aspect of a work that is neither part
of a fictional world being represented, nor part of the medium itself, nor part of the
discourse. Rather it is similar to what Gérard Genette identifies as the narrating
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situation, the third aspect of his triad of histoire (story), discours (discourse) and
narration (the first two will be discussed in chapter 5):
The third aspect is the narrating situation itself, whose two protagonists are the
narratee – present, absent, or implied – and the narrator. The function that concerns the
narrator's orientation toward the narratee – his care in establishing or maintaining with
the narratee a contact, indeed, a dialogue (actual, as in La Maison Nucingen, or fictive,
as in Tristam Shandy) – recalls both Jakobsen's "phatic" (verifying the contact) and his
"conative" (acting on the receiver) functions. Rogers calls narrators of the Shandian
type, always turned towards their public and often more interested in the relationship
they maintain with that public than in their narrative itself, "raconteurs". (Genette 1980:
256)
For Genette, thoroughly grounded in a print culture, a reader cannot speak back, and
therefore a narrator who speaks directly to the reader, as Tristam Shandy does, must be
fictive. When the reader can speak back and have a voice of her own, the quality of this
dialogue shifts radically. Board games, theatrical performances, oral story-telling and
other non-print forms of text or narrative have emphasised the deictic relationship
between speakers and audience to a far greater degree than printed texts.
Bal’s presentation of deictic narratives presents an approach to understanding
the relationship between user and work that is different to that I have presented using
Walton and Pavel. Walton’s concept of depiction and the correspondence between the
user’s actual and fictional actions, combined with Pavel’s ontological fusion, gives us  a
practical tool for understanding certain kinds of interactivity. Bal’s discussion of deictic
narrative gives us an appreciation that an artwork may emphasise its relationship with
its user more than the content it portrays. The depiction itself may be more important
than that which is depicted.
Comparing interactions
Afternoon, Zork and  Dream Kitchen are works with very clear differences. Afternoon is
literary and for the most part only allows the user to explore its textual fragments rather
than positioning the user as part of the fictional world. The question “Do you want to
hear about it?” is the only direct address to the user (apart from the instructions on how
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to read the work) and it is here we see the depictive elements that Walton describes in
non-interactive representational works. The user’s response to the question in
afternoon, whether it is to press return, click a chance word on the screen, or to answer
yes or no, is also a fictional action. It does not draw us right into the story of the car
crash, the ex-wife and the lovers, but into the frame narrative where Peter tells his story.
This is an extra-diegetic level that frames the main narrative.
When the reader answers the question, the reader is drawn into the narration of
the story. The question and its answer emphasise the telling itself, and as in Bal’s deictic
narrative, the reader’s actions in relation to the work become events in themselves.
Peter tells the story of his afternoon to the reader, and this narration could itself be
retold as a narrative that includes the reader complete with events ordered causally:
“Peter began to tell me his story, and then asked whether I wanted to hear about it. I
said yes, and therefore he told me more.” This narrative is never told within afternoon.
It is not represented, it is enacted or made possible, as in a game or a simulation. This is
the deictic aspect of afternoon.
Dream Kitchen also requires the user’s participation, yet the constant clicks it
demands are better described as illusions of choice than as genuine choice. The user is
usually only able to choose between action and inaction, and inaction is to leave the
work completely, or just watch it cycle dully through a small sequence again and again,
never progressing. And yet the relentless demand that the user click situates the user as
the controller of what happens. Though the choices are limited to one course of action,
taking that course is still a choice. One could leave the artwork. As Lev Manovich and
others have pointed out, “making a choice involves a moral responsibility” {Manovich,
2001 #104@44}. In Dream Kitchen the user’s actions translate directly to cruel,
fictional actions. This makes the user complicit in a completely different way to the
reader of a novel that describes bestial murders. The reader remains outside of the
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fictional world and is a mere onlooker to something that (in most novels, which are
narrated after the fictional event) fictionally has already happened. The user of Dream
Kitchen performs actions that make her part of the fictional world. She becomes
complicit in the horrors of that fictional world.
Ontological interaction
Depiction is not  a sufficient word for the interaction I am describing here. Walton’s
description of how depiction works in non-digital representations, combined with
Pavel’s discussion of ontological fusion, is the foundation for understanding this kind of
interactivity, but we must take it one step further. I propose that we call interaction
where the user’s actual actions directly correspond to fictional actions ontological
interaction. This term has been used by Marie-Laure Ryan in a sense that is almost
compatible with my use of the word, but she arrives at it through other means (Ryan
2001a). Ryan defines ontological interaction as interaction where the user is able to
change something in the fictional world, and opposes it to exploratory interaction. In
exploratory interaction, the user navigates through the fictional world but does not
change it. I see Ryan’s and my understandings of ontological interaction as
corresponding to Walton’s depictive representation, where the user is included in the
fictional world, and exploratory interaction corresponds to Walton’s descriptive
representation, where the user remains outside of the fiction. Ryan couples this pair
with another duality, internal and external interaction. I shall return to this in chapter
5.
I define ontological interaction slightly differently to Ryan. For Ryan, ontological
interaction occurs when the user is able to affect events or situations in the fictional
world. I instead wish to focus on the user’s position: in ontological interaction, the user
is positioned within the fictional world. The positioning of the user inside the fictional
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world happens through the same mechanism as Walton describes in depiction: the
user’s actual actions directly correspond to fictional actions in the fictional world. When
the user’s actual actions correspond directly to fictional actions, the user becomes the
site of an ontological fusion between actual and fictional, and it is this that makes us feel
immersed.
Janet Murray also touches upon this, arriving by different means at a similar
conclusion in Hamlet on the Holodeck, where she describes a Star Trek game where the
user must manipulate various objects in order to free a scientist from under a heavy
pipe:
Operating the tricorder and the transporter in this way – which really only means
clicking the mouse here and there on some unspectacular screen graphics – makes the
world of the game seem much more present than does the same world on Starship
Enterprise, the more visually impressive CD-ROM. It is the experience of using the
objects and seeing them work as they are supposed to in our hands that creates the
feeling of being part of the Star Trek world. (Murray 1997: 111-112)
The theories of ontological fusion and depiction can explain how and why this occurs.
Although some may feel immersion more readily through the complicated manipulation
of objects, it is not the complexity of the tasks or the exact nature of the objects
manipulated that causes the perception of being part of the fictional world. It is the
equivalence between actual action and fictional action.
As I have shown in the discussion of Dream Kitchen, being positioned inside the
fictional world and thus being able to perform actual actions that translate to fictional
actions needn’t give the user any real control over the fictional world. The user’s actions
may not affect the outcome of the story or the presentation of the  fictional situation. In
Dream Kitchen, the user’s experiments with the bugs and the rat do not change
anything in the fictional world, but still position the user within that world.
Ontological interactivity thus can be seen as a subcategory of depictive works.
While a depictive work, such as Hobbema’s painting of a mill, requires perceptual
actions from users and these actions translate into fictional actions, a work that is
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ontologically interactive requires actions that go beyond perception. In addition, the
user’s actions in relation to interactive works generate feedback from the work. When I
click the screen in Dream Kitchen a pen appears. In this sense I do affect the fictional
world by my interaction, but this is trivial given that there is no other option available to
me but to click a pen into being or to quit interacting. When I type “kill troll” in Zork,
the game responds. Here my interaction does change the fictional world. When I look at
Hobbema’s painting, the painting does nothing. I imagine myself to be present in the
fictional world but do not affect it.
In Rob Bevan and Tim Wright’s web serial Online Caroline (Bevan and Wright
2000) the user is staged as Caroline’s friend, and constantly gives advice and answers
questions by clicking and typing. The next chapter is a reading of Online Caroline, in
which an understanding of ontological fusion, fictionality as make-believe, depiction
and interaction can help us understand how we engage with works such as these. Online
Caroline also uses ontological interaction, positioning the user as Caroline’s friend and
confidante, and as in Dream Kitchen, the user becomes complicit in foul play without
having any choice in the matter. Power and force thus become central.
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C H A P T E R  3  F E E D I N G  O N L I N E
C A R O L I N E
I connect my computer to the network, sipping my morning coffee. My hair is still wet
from the shower when I check my email and find it there in between other messages: an
email from Caroline. I read it quickly and then visit her web site. She’s waiting for me.
She holds a shirt she’s just bought up to the webcam so I can see it, asking me
afterwards by email whether I’d like her to send it to me. “Yes”, I answer, clicking and
typing my responses into a web form and giving her my physical address. Caroline
knows I like coffee and she knows I read her email in the morning. Caroline and I are
friends.
Of course, Caroline isn’t actually real. She’s the fictional protagonist in a 24 part
online drama called Online Caroline. The web site and emails are written and designed
by Rob Bevan and Tim Wright, and the actress Mira Dovreni plays Caroline’s part in the
pre-recorded webcam sequences. You can be Caroline’s friend too if you go to her web
site: <http://www.onlinecaroline.com>.
This  chapter is about my relationship with Caroline. Caroline permeates my
everyday life in a way that is unlike other fictional characters. I don’t have to switch on
the TV or pick up a book and start reading to engage in this fiction. Once I’ve signed up
for it, it comes to me. It knows where I am and what I like and how I read. If I don’t visit
for a few days, Caroline complains. I’m bound to this narrative.
Personalised narrative
Caroline is a young woman who worries about her boyfriend David, her friends, her
weight and her job. David is away on research in New Guinea, and his employers, XPT,
have provided Caroline with a web site and equipment so she can find online friends –
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like me – to keep her company while David’s away. A week into our friendship, David
returns and the story becomes more sinister. He coerces Caroline into following an
outlandish diet, making her the guinea pig in an experiment that appears to be
connected to XPT and to David’s own research. Within days, Caroline is feeble and ill.
In the final week of the serial, David takes over the web site bit by bit, until Caroline’s
only voice is in her ever-shortening emails. The story ends as Caroline is silenced, and
can send me no more emails. Instead, I receive an email from XPT, thanking me for my
assistance.
Figure 5: Screenshot of main page on day 2. Caroline has made dinner for two.
This synopsis doesn’t say much about how the story is told, and it is this telling that
makes reading (or playing) Online Caroline a very new experience. Online Caroline is a
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story told to and, importantly, with its reader. It’s built around a database that collects
the information I feed it as I read. I answer questions about myself and the program
uses that information to generate personalised emails from Caroline to me. When I visit
Caroline’s web site the version I see depends on how much of the story I’ve read. Each
day I’m limited to one episode consisting of an email and the appropriate version of the
web site. The site has a daily webcam segment, a regularly updated diary section and
other pages typical of a personal home page: photos of her house and her boyfriend and
so on. It takes me a minimum of 24 days to experience the drama, spending five or ten
minutes on each day’s episode. If I visit the site less than daily it will be spread out over
more time.
The personalisation generated by the database that backs this system is a major
narrative technique in Online Caroline. We’re more familiar with this manner of
seamless adjustment to the user’s behaviour in marketing than in art, narratives or
games. Companies harvest information about us and target ads to our demographic
information. Amazon.com suggests books and kitchen gadgets it thinks I’ll like based on
the last books I’ve viewed, or on books my friends like, as well as on my own deliberate
ratings and preferences. Amazon.com and other commercial sites also allow me to make
some of my own choices. I can search for a book that it hasn’t suggested to me. Most of
the time, the computer system’s suggestions line the margins of the page, allowing my
deliberate choices to take centre stage. The computer-generated recommendations even
masquerade as being my choices rather than the system’s with names like “The page
that you made” and “Jill’s store”. Systems like Amazon’s interpret my actions constantly
to determine what I see on my screen, but they frame their interpretations of my
behaviour (their recommendations) as extra, non-essential, marginal information,
emphasising my role as chooser and not just as a consumer.
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Many games and hypertext fictions give the impression of only reacting to our
deliberate choices, and not to our automatic actions, actions that are so routine we’re
not aware of them. Online Caroline tips the balance the other way by allowing readers
no deliberate choices and by tracking their automatic actions, making automatic actions
we take for granted and don’t perceive as part of the work of reading suddenly become
visible. Making visible that which we take for granted is not a new strategy in art. The
Russian Formalists of the early twentieth century found this to be one of the most
important functions of literature  (Shklovsky 1988: 20-21).
What follows is not a complete analysis of Online Caroline. I want to study the
role that is provided for the reader, and to see how the reader is led through particular
actions. As in davidstill.org and Bino & Cool’s Masterclass, the user of Online Caroline
is made part of the system that is modelled. Here, the system modelled is that of a
friendship. Setting Online Caroline in the context of epistolary fiction, I examine the
similarities between the two dominant relationships in Online Caroline: that of David
and Caroline and that of Caroline and the reader. I argue that David’s increasingly
explicit control of Caroline is a parallel to the text’s increasingly explicit control of the
reader.
Evolving
Caroline changes throughout the serial, and the story revolves around this change: how
is she changing and why? What causes it? What is the purpose? Why doesn’t she resist
it?
David puts Caroline on a diet. At first it seems that the diet is for her health. Thin
as she is, she’s fairly neurotic about her weight and she willingly goes along with the
peculiar diet, which consists of “marrow, tomatoes, aubergine (American), broccoli,
pineapple, porcelain, vitamin C, folic acid, cod liver oil and alcohol blended and drunk
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from a metal container”. It tastes awful, judging from the look on her face when she
drinks it. David is also on a diet, but the reader hears less about it than about Caroline’s.
David’s diet seems to be a lot more lenient than hers, allowing pizza and Chinese take-
away, which I watch him eating on the web cam as Caroline stares wistfully at these
forbidden foods.
As Caroline changes, her web site also changes. The round, friendly fonts
Caroline used in her design are replaced by David’s capitalised, formal titles. His
language is technical and exact, and a stark contrast to Caroline’s inclusive, chatty tone.
“My stuff” becomes “Objects”, “Send me things: shower me with gifts, why don’t you?”
has become “Give and take: Items for 1st level receivers”. By episode 20, the web cam is
labelled “Guinea pig”, “What I’m playing” has become “Aural stimulus”, and even the
text under the web cam is written by David rather than by Caroline herself. He still uses
the same font as Caroline did for this diary section, but the tone is very different. David
has taken over her web site, bit by bit.
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Figure 6 Main page of web site, day 19. David has taken over entirely.
Caroline’s change has to do with her relationship to David and with both their
relationships to XPT. David’s experiments are intended to make Caroline into a
“receiver”. It’s never quite clear exactly what that means, but it seems that other people,
called the givers, somehow control a receiver. David wants to be a giver, and his diet and
the way he dresses (orange and purple; no trousers) is supposed to help him change to
fit this role. But David himself may be being manipulated by XPT. On the webcam I see
two XPT employees slip something into David’s drink when he’s not looking. Perhaps
they’re making him into a receiver too? In addition, Caroline tells me (or rather, she
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tells my characters “Jill” and “Jack”) that David wants to experiment on me as well. On
the web site, he explains that he wants me to follow the same diet that Caroline is on.
The theme of control is constant, both in the relationships between Caroline,
David and XPT and in the relationship between the user and the work and the user and
Caroline. There is a constant movement between playing and being played, between
being made a pawn and allowing oneself to be a pawn.
Viewer and viewed
The rules I must follow to stick with Online Caroline are unarticulated, but they are
simple and unchanging. I can only speak when spoken to. Only a few responses are
permitted. My role is that of the confidante. My function is simply to allow the heroine
to speak. In the first episodes of the story, Caroline asks me to tell her more about
myself, “so that we can really be friends”, and she provides me with a convenient web
form to fill out my details. I answer truthfully or not as I please, though I’m limited to
set options: I can only choose to call Caroline funny, sad or boring, I can’t type my own
word. In the right hand column are Caroline’s own responses.
Figure 7 Excerpt from the second "about you" page.
The responses I’m allowed to give are more in the manner of an active listener than of
an equal partner in a conversation. Often my input has the tone of a sympathetic “me
too” or an “I prefer X”. Caroline always sets the agenda.
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Figure 8 Excerpt from the first "about you" page.
The questions remind me of conversations with girlfriends where a relationship is
strengthened by these little comparisons and affirmations, and where advice is asked for
and given as a token of empathy, though neither of us expects it to be followed. For
instance, the questions after the ones shown above are as follows:
Figure 9 Excerpt from the first "about you" page.
The options offered here are as few and as stereotypical as the characterisation of
Caroline herself. It’s worth noting, too, that the reader isn’t actually asked to answer
questions, but to complete statements by typing in a missing word or choosing between
two or three options. Even at this level, the reader is locked within a constricted
structure. It is impossible to respond “outside the box”.
These statements that the reader fills out are balanced by the right hand column,
where Caroline’s responses are. She has not been limited to filling out the blanks as the
reader is, and often gives answers that aren’t options for the reader. Her responses are
written in the authoritative font of the site, anti-aliased, dark blue and in bold, while the
reader’s font is monospaced, black and thin. The reader is given a font of the sort
commonly used in emails, drafts and web forms, while Caroline’s font is the kind used
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in glossy designer web sites. The power balance is clear: Caroline is in charge and the
reader follows her. Caroline is permanent while the reader is an exchangeable partner in
this dance: filling in these forms I present myself as data streamlined to fit into preset
categories.
My responses affect the emails Caroline writes to me.  In one of my first visits, I
told the database that I have a daughter. The next morning I found an email from
Caroline where she wrote:
There was me banging on about not liking children, and then discovering you're already
a parent. Ah well, you still came back for more. (email no. 4 to “Jill”)
She knew I had a daughter! I felt as though the fiction was adjusting to me, changing
itself according to my input and qualities. I decided to see how Caroline would react to a
different kind of reader. So I started over, using a different email address and inventing
a reader I called Jack, making him the opposite of my original character, who had been
an honest rendition of my real self.
But the emails barely changed, and Caroline’s response to Jack the childless
bachelor shows how changing a phrase needn’t change the story at all:
There was me banging on about children, when you don't have any. Ah well, you still
came back for more. (Email no. 4 to “Jack”)
Another place I can speak up is in the “You decide” box that appears underneath the
webcam image each day. On the eighth day of the serial Caroline is anguishing over how
upset David will be when he discovers that some parcels of his have been stolen. The
title for the day’s “You decide” section is “The great parcel crisis”. Caroline wants advice
on what to do about the stolen parcels. I can choose between three options by clicking in
the appropriate box: “Tell David”, “Avoid David” or “Leave David”. Caroline doesn’t take
my advice though, whether I’m Jill who thinks she should leave David or Jack, who
thinks she should tell him. Whichever choice I make the web page refreshes to show me
the same sentence: “You need to know more about David, I think.” Next morning my
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characters Jack and Jill receive almost identical emails. Although Jack told Caroline to
tell David about the stolen parcels while Jill told her to leave the brute, only a few words
in the email are different:
I do love David. And I want to be straight with him about that parcel business, as you
suggested.
I do love David. And I want to be straight with him about that parcel business. (So I
won't be leaving him as you suggested!).
Though my deliberate actions and responses as a reader do evoke responses from the
text, their influence on the story is trivial. William Cole comes to the same conclusion in
a short paper analysing Online Caroline: “In each case, the responses are substantially
different in detail, but narratively they serve identical functions.” (Cole 2001: 70) Some
readers become upset at Caroline’s refusal to take the advice she asks for, feeling
cheated by a narrative that appears to promise to listen to you but doesn’t (see page 77).
But Caroline never promises anything. She asks for the reader to be her friend and
confidante. I am required to be an active listener who shows empathy by responding,
but not an equal partner with an agenda of my own.
As the plot advances, it becomes clear that Online Caroline’s system is watching
me in more than these explicit ways.  I realise that the program knows more about me
than I have deliberately told it. It’s not only reacting to my deliberate responses and
answers, but also to my silent wanderings around the web site itself.  In email no. 14,
Caroline writes:  
You’ve convinced him that you’re interested in his theories, because you took a look at
the “My Boyfriend” section again last time you came. You shouldn’t encourage him.
My actions as a reader don’t just evoke a response from the text, they seem to affect the
story, even to make me complicit in what happens. Interestingly, my deliberate
responses are presented as having less influence on the plot than movements that I had
thought were unseen. Here I am told that by the very act of reading, I’m encouraging
David in his imprisonment of Caroline. Following this serial doesn’t feel like “just
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watching” or “just reading”. It feels as though I may be partially responsible for what’s
happening in this simulated world.
My complicity in David’s abuse of Caroline implicates me in another way as well:
Caroline tells me that David wants to use me as a guinea pig in his experiment. The
fictional avatar I’ve created called Jill (or Jack), is thus at risk from David and XPT.
Outside the fiction, the real me is also at risk. To be allowed to read this story I’ve
given the database a lot of information about myself: some deliberate, some incidental.
Online Caroline would be the perfect marketing tool for gathering demographics: what
readers like to eat, buy, do, their family situation and so on. In addition, the system has
demonstrated that it’s tracking more than just my responses to its questions: it will
know my computer, my operating system, my browser, my screen resolution, my IP-
number and what time of day I do my websurfing, among other things. Imagine a sequel
to Online Caroline written as a computer virus targeted to hit previous readers of the
series. David might indeed continue his experiments, perhaps by purging my actual
computer of unwanted files so that I could become a pure recipient for his projects.
There are levels of risk and guilt within the story and outside it. Caroline wants
my data so she can get to know me as a friend. Behind that, pulling the strings but still
within the fiction, is XPT, who presumably would like to know more about me, or rather
about Jack and Jill. They may want to make Caroline’s narratees into receivers too. In
the real world, Freeserve, the company who produced Online Caroline, may want to sell
my information as market statistics.
Is she flirting with me?
One of the first questions Caroline asks me is whether I’m male or female. I truthfully
answered female the first time I signed up, as “Jill”. I experienced our relationship as
that of two girlfriends, with standard chatting about boyfriends and clothes and jobs
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and friends. Hearing that men who followed the serial often felt that Caroline was
flirting with them, I decided to use a second character, “Jack”, to see whether Caroline
was programmed to act differently with a man than with a woman. Nothing in the
emails or website changed based on the gender I told Caroline I was. And yet some
readers see flirting while others see mere chatting.
Online Caroline is written to be open enough to allow the reader to fill in the
blanks. Caroline is presented as a heterosexual woman in her twenties, very close to the
stereotypical image of slightly neurotic urban women that we see portrayed in popular
television sitcoms like Friends or Sex and the City or in the novel and film Bridget
Jones’s Diary. It is easy to dismiss Online Caroline for its superficiality and its
stereotypes. The serial feels a lot like a soap opera, in style and content, although it
develops into something more like a conspiracy theory serial or a mockumentary like
The Blair Witch Project. However, the simple, flat, stereotypical characterisation of
Caroline may be necessary in order to leave her open enough to allow a reader to project
themselves into her life, imagining themselves her friend.
Being a heterosexual woman, I fill in those blanks in Caroline’s character and in
my own self-presentation so they will suit my expectations of a relationship between
girls talking about boyfriends and work and emotions. I take her requests for advice in
the same spirit as I do those of my real life girl friends. They rarely want to be told what
to do, no, they want confirmation of what they’re already intending to do. Caroline
reacts exactly as I expect her to when she refuses to leave or shoot David, though I tell
her she should. She would have been stepping outside the “girlfriend” role I expect her
to follow if she’d done as I said. And as a good girlfriend, I stick by her though I think
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she’s a fool. I keep listening, and I keep sharing some of my experiences (my favourite
colour is blue/red/orange) to show her I’m listening2.
If you take the role of a heterosexual man you might interpret Caroline’s
relationship to you quite differently. Male friends of mine who’ve followed the serial
report feeling that Caroline is flirting with them. Some readers express anger at being
“tricked” by Caroline – either when they found that she was fictional and not real
(Armstrong 2000) or when she doesn’t follow their advice, as “promised”. William Cole
discusses Caroline’s betrayal thus:
By gesturing at obeying the reader’s instructions, Caroline briefly promises the reader
real power over the outcome of the narrative. Just as quickly, however, the promise is
withdrawn. (..) Indeed, it seems that the main point of this episode is to create friction
between Caroline and the reader, to show her resisting the reader’s advice and
questioning his or her conception of her. (Cole 2001: 70)
The words used in this description echo the experience of flirtation, sexuality and
power: “obey”, “promises”, “power”, “withdrawn”, “friction”, “resisting”, “conception”.
They sketch a picture of expectations of the traditional relationship between a man and
a woman: the man instructs, the woman promises to obey. Cole believes there is a
promise which is broken, and is frustrated with this. The promise is that of true
interactivity, where the reader has more than trivial influence on the story, but this
interactivity is illusory and turns out to be mere personalisation. The reader is denied
control over the narrative. Cole concludes that Online Caroline doesn’t fulfil the
“ambitious claims” that have been made for hypertext, where readers were expected to
become “the kind of co-creators that hypertext theory has postulated” (70).
Caroline becomes an emblem for the text itself. She is the text who flirts with the
reader, seduces him and then capriciously refuses to give that which the reader believes
she has promised him. The text is like a seductive woman and the reader hopes to be a
                                                  
2 Thank you to Elin Sjursen and Lisbeth Klastrup for first suggesting this interpretation
based on women’s friendships to me in conversations at Hypertext 2001 in Århus.
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conqueror, but the affair ends with disappointment: the text becomes a tease and the
reader is thwarted, unfairly led along, cast aside. It is a subversion of “the objectifying
gaze of the camera”, which film theorists have argued renders women in films as
nothing but objects to be looked at and owned (Modleski 1988). Here, Caroline is
interpreted as promising not only to be looked at but also to be instructed, commanded.
Finally, she both succumbs to David’s control and ignores the reader’s attempts to
control her. The user and David are rivals.
Other readers have experienced similar disappointment and anger when they
discover that Caroline is not real. Steven Armstrong, a journalist, wrote an article on
Online Caroline in the Sunday Times:
We'd had this quite intense relationship after I stumbled on her webcam site, so I felt I
should tell her to watch out. But then David started intercepting my e-mails, so she
thought I wasn't speaking to her, and I couldn't reach her and I thought she was going to
die.
I contacted my mate Richard, who I knew had been e-mailing Caroline as well because
he'd pointed her website out to me, and it turned out he'd dealt with this identical crisis
two days earlier. He'd already moved on and everything had got much, much worse.
Then it dawned on us. This wasn't real life. Caroline was part of some twisted internet
entertainment - and we'd been suckered. (Armstrong 2000)
Readers are involved in this online drama; they feel part of the story. Cole wanted to
control the story – he wanted Caroline to listen to him. Armstrong wanted to look after
Caroline and rescue her. When they are shown that they are in fact only readers, or
receivers to use David’s sinister term, they feel cheated, maybe even violated. Perhaps
this anger is related to our need to believe in our own reality. When we discover we have
no real influence on the story, we realise that we have been caught, trapped as figments
of Caroline’s imagination, as Alice was in the Red King’s dream:
“Only I do hope it’s my dream, and not the Red King’s! I don’t like belonging to another
person’s dream,” she went on in a rather complaining tone: “I’ve a great mind to go and
wake him, and see what happens!” (Carroll 1960: 293)
Interacting with Caroline implies the risk of losing yourself, of being taken captive. As
Armstrong writes, “you might end up being trapped in her sinister web” (Armstrong
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2000). In this text the reader is written into the story. The personalisation makes the
reader feel she or he is a participant of the relationship with Caroline. The user becomes
the site of ontological fusion between Caroline’s fictional world and the actual world:
reading Online Caroline, I am both in the fiction and in actuality. Playing “ourselves” in
this relationship, we take our own person into the text and thereby interpret Caroline’s
actions as intended for us. Reading that intentionality into her gives different results
depending on your interests, and it seems, depending on your gender.
Just as Gulliver’s Travels as a whole is a depiction of a ship’s logbook (see page
42), and thus itself enacts a fictional object of the world it prescribes, the website Online
Caroline is an exact depiction of the fictional website that XPT fictionally have made for
Caroline to help her communicate with her online friends. Similarly, the actions I
perform when exploring this website and answering Caroline’s questions precisely
correspond to the fictional actions in the fictional world where I am Caroline’s online
friend. I become a member of both actual and fictional worlds through my actions.
When I actually eagerly check my email to see if there’s anything from Caroline, I am
also fictionally eagerly checking my email to see if there’s anything from Caroline. When
I ring the phone number given in an email, I am fictionally ringing Caroline. I’m not
translating drums to cannons as I am when I listen to the 1812 Overture. The depiction
is so exact that it is more like the strong fusion between sacred and actual, that Pavel
describes (see page 36) than the weaker bond between fictional and actual.
Captivity
Caroline nicknames the recipient of her emails Bluebird. “Bonjour mon petit oiseau
bleu”, she writes upon returning from Paris. When my character Jack didn’t visit the
site for a couple of weeks, she wrote to tell him how she’d always be there if he missed
her, opening her letter “Darling Bluebird, you've flown away.” At one point she writes
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what seems to be a code on the tiles of her bathroom wall, shaping toy foam letters into
the words "XPT", "Paris" and "bluebird", letting me and XPT know she’s gone to Paris.
Whatever name and attributes I tell Caroline’s database are mine, the text thinks
of me as Bluebird. On the level of code, Bluebird might be a variable, a name that can
point to many different contents. My personal details are exchangeable attributes
attached to a record in a database. The “about you” web forms I fill in are visualisations
of this: entering my data into empty slots.
Caroline has few friends and little contact with the world. She becomes more and
more cut off from the world in the course of the story. We read about and see her “best
friend” Sophie, who becomes absent from the webcam scenes after having a baby, and
we see Simon a couple of times, but Caroline doesn’t tell us of any other friends. She
barely mentions leaving her flat at all. We  do hear about a couple of shopping sprees
and a quick trip to Paris but most of the time she seems to stay indoors. After David’s
return, even these brief excursions cease, leaving her emails and the website as her only
contact with the world. One day, in her diary, she writes, “With TV and you I never have
to go outside again.” I have become her entire world.
Being her world, I’m also her captive, just as the blue budgie she keeps in a cage.
I’ve been appropriated by the text, and I play the role it has given to me. In addition, the
text locks my and Caroline’s world in a present, much as I am locked in my role of
confidante and obedient listener. I can look at “our diary”, a page with thumbnails of all
the webcam videos I’ve seen on previous visits, and from there I can replay any of these.
But the site changes with every visit, and once it’s changed, there’s no way I can go back
and look at the way it was yesterday without signing up as a different character and
going through each episode again. There’s no way to fast forward through the episodes
either, because only one new episode becomes available each day. So I can’t reach into
the future, as I sometimes do skipping pages in a novel, I actually have to wait. My
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reading irrevocably moves the text forward, and I can’t go back. My only way of
controlling the time of the reading is if I refuse to read, thus keeping the text at a
standstill.
Every word in a novel is accessible to me at any time, though I usually read
novels from start to finish. Films have a stricter temporality, but at home a video can be
fast forwarded and rewound, and watched again instantly. This user control has been
programmed into the interface of standard streaming video players on computers, like
QuickTime and RealPlayer. Online Caroline’s temporality is closer to that which is
common in computer games, where you can only back up if you’ve remembered to save
the game earlier on. Except that in Online Caroline there’s no way to save the game. You
can only restart. And you can only do that if you’re a sufficiently sophisticated user of
the Internet that you can provide Online Caroline with a new, working email address.
An important part of Online Caroline’s temporality lies in the emails. Printed
epistolary novels like Pamela (Richardson 2001) or Les Liasons Dangereuses (Laclos
1965) and disc-based hypertexts that incorporate emails like Forward Anywhere
(Malloy and Marshall 1995) present a finite collection of emails. Each email is locked
into the text as a finite body of work. Even online email narratives like Blue Company
(Wittig 2001), Two Minutes (1999) and Love, Life & Email (Interacta 2001)  can now
only be read as archived collections of messages and are no longer accessible in “real
time”, with emails arriving daily as they did when these works were first presented to
readers. In a web archive, all the emails are accessible at any time and the effect is
similar to a printed epistolary novel. Online Caroline doesn’t stay put as these
collections of emails do; it extends itself into the non-fictional world by sending emails
to the real reader.
Although some epistolary novels were originally published in volumes released at
intervals of months or years, this rhythm of publishing didn’t correspond to the time of
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the narrative as Caroline’s letters do. Collections of letters, whether hypertextual like
Forward Anywhere or printed like Les Liaisons Dangereuses are closed. This clear
termination makes it clear that the story the letters relate happened in the past. On the
level of each individual letter in an epistolary novel, narration is fixed in the present and
looks into the future (Altman 1982). In Richardson’s Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded
(2001), for instance, Pamela’s parents have to wait for letters from their daughter, and
they cannot force the speed of the narration, that is, the frequency of the letters. When I
read the novel Pamela, I have greater control over the temporality of the letters than the
characters inside the fiction do: I can read it as fast as I like or skip sections entirely.
The emails in Online Caroline, on the other hand, are spread out in time. You
receive one a day, and nothing in them or on the web site tells you whether there’s a
limited number of emails or whether they’ll continue for ever. You don’t know the size
of the text, and the story appears to be happening in real time. Being part of the fiction
in Online Caroline, I am a captive to the time of the fictional world.
Impotence and guilt
My relationship to Caroline is defined by its impotence. She can ask me for help but
there’s no way I can do anything that will really change her story. And yet I’m left feeling
responsible for her fate.
Don’t think I haven’t noticed how oddly David is behaving, by the way. The question is:
what can I do about it? I mean, what can WE do about it?
What I'm trying to say is - don't just sit there. HELP ME OUT HERE!! (Email no. 19)
I’ve distracted her by being her friend and reading her story. If I hadn’t kept reading,
she’d still be alive, arrested in limbo, perhaps sending me plaintive emails now and then
telling me she missed me. If I hadn’t read David’s parts of the web page, perhaps I
wouldn’t have “encouraged him” in his experiments on Caroline. Reading, in Online
Caroline, is being an accomplice to murder.
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When the story is finally over, Caroline is unable to send more emails. Instead, I
receive a thank you email from the president of XPT, the company David works for. The
email seals my guilt, leaving me feeling that perhaps I could have saved Caroline from
her fate had I made different choices in what sounds more and more like a game.
Thanks to you, our operatives were allowed to carry out their tasks without hindrance,
and Caroline's life was irrevocably changed. We were particularly grateful to you for
preventing Caroline from developing complicated and distracting relationships with
Simon and Sophie. She did not want them. (Final email from Sir Gerald Inomynte,
President and CEO, XPT)
Like the score card rating my cruelty and impatience in Dream Kitchen, Online
Caroline reverses the relationship between me and the work. I’m not in charge at all.
I’m a pawn in an elaborate game of chess or in a lab experiment, and I don’t know the
rules or the goal.
I’m not in charge of reading Online Caroline. I’m not a disinterested reader or
viewer. I’m involved. My explorations through the text make me feel as though I have
choices and as though I am in control. The narrative seems to adjust itself to my actions
and responses. When I look more closely, I see that the choices I have are very limited,
and I’m doing exactly what the system asks me rather than the other way round.  Then I
see that the system is paying as much attention to the details of the way I read as it is to
my deliberate responses.
I’m told what happens in this story, I don’t discover it. I’m not active. I’m not in
control. The text I’m reading is the active party here. It reveals my secrets, and tells me
so. It’s made me a receiver. I don’t play it. It plays me.
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C H A P T E R  4  AD D R E S S I N G  T HE
R E AD E R
“Look straight in my eyes. Talk to me.” These aren’t words between lovers, or from a
parent to an errant child. They’re guidelines for good customer service, tacked up
behind the counter in a Texan bakery. Americans know that you need to be seen, that
you need to be acknowledged as an important person, as you. That need is
institutionalised and commercially exploited. You see it in the service agendas on
bakery walls. You feel it in the soft dollar bill you’re supposed to tip the bellboy, but that
you keep tightly clenched in your palm, still sweating from the Texan heat, though the
air-conditioning is cold, too cold for a Northern European like you, used to harsh
climates but not to these contrasts. The dollar bill lies damp in your hand. You know
you’re supposed to smile. You should say thank you and calmly give the dollar to the
man standing smiling as he’s been taught, looking you straight in the eyes. You’ve been
told the rules of this game. He looks you in the eye to make you feel important, an
individual, and you’re supposed to pay him for it. You know what you’re supposed to do.
But you don’t do it. You can’t play the part.
Maybe you’ve never really been in a Texan bakery and never stood tongue-tied,
too caught in Northern European pseudo-egalitarianism to tip a bellboy. But you’ve met
that “you” before, haven’t you? The “you” that writers use when they want to make the
reader feel seen. The “you” you read at the end of The Cat in a Hat: “What would you do
if your mother asked you?” (Seuss 1957: 61). You hear it when a character in a film turns
to look straight into the camera, straight at you, speaking straight to you. You answer
that “you” with a click of your mouse in afternoon: “Do you want to hear about it?”
(Joyce 1990: ‘begin’); leap into it at the invitation of an adventure game: “You are
standing in an open field west of a white house, with a boarded front door” (Blank and
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Lebling 1981); pay for it in excitement after reading the ads for the newest game: “It’s up
to you to stop the conspirators from achieving their goals.” (Deus Ex Official Web Site,
2000) Caroline, David Still and Bino & Cool’s Masterclass all address you in the second
person: that same inclusive “you” that makes you instantly part of something that you
cannot fully control.
All these “you”s are different. But they have a common ancestor. You, the reader
or listener, have been addressed since ancient times. The ways you’ve been addressed
have names: apostrophes (“breaking off the discourse to address some person or
personified thing either present or absent” (Lanham 1991)) and interrogatios
(popularly known as rhetorical questions: questions directed to the reader or the
audience without any answer being expected). Both these figures are rhetorical in the
sense that they are elements of style and don’t exceed the text or speech. You’re not
expected to answer. I often apostrophise you, my reader, and ask you rhetorical
questions. But when you read this thesis, you’re supposed to read and stay quiet.
There’s no space within the text for you to respond. You can write me an email if you
like (jill.walker@uib.no); stop me on the street to challenge me; ask me questions or
raise objections at the defence. Perhaps your comments will change Jill Walker’s
opinions about the topics discussed here. But your response will always be outside of
the text: neither necessary to your reading, nor changing the text that you read. Even if
you scribble in the margins, there’ll still be copies of this thesis in the library full of
apostrophes to you but with none of your answers.
In hypertexts, computer games and certain other electronic texts, an apostrophe
to the reader can and often does require a response. The reader’s answer is inscribed in
the text, and enacted by the reader. These are simulations where you are part of that
which is modelled. You are the point of ontological fusion between worlds.
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This chapter is about the second person address and how it has been used
through the ages. It’s about how you seem to be part of the texts you read and the games
you play, and how your scripted response can be necessary to the very act of reading or
playing. And it’s also about what being directly addressed as “you” can mean when you
don’t really have the opportunity to answer freely.
“Wonderfully stirring”
Directly addressing the reader (or, I think, the user or player) is an “irresistible
invitation”, writes Irene Kacandes (Kacandes 1993: 139). You’re walking down the
street, when someone calls out “Hey, you!” How can you help but turn? Of course you
assume that you’re the “you”, for an instant at least. You turn because the word “you” is
empty in itself. The vacuum inside it sucks you in, filling itself with you, and it will take
a moment before you realise that you may not belong there (for a political discussion of
this function, see Althusser 1971).
The word “you” is ready to be filled by anyone. It is empty: it doesn’t refer outside
of the situation in which it is uttered. There’s a word for this emptiness: deixis. Deictic
words like “you”, “I”, “she”, “this”, “that”, “there” have no meaning except in relation to
other words and within a context. Their power lies in this emptiness. Filling the empty
space of a “you” can be “wonderfully stirring” for a reader, as writers and rhetoricians
have known since ancient times (Quintilian 1953, 38-39; bk. 9, ch. 22).
In his treatise on the sublime, the Greek-Roman rhetorician Longinus both uses
and recommends this kind of direct address to the reader. His treatise is styled as a
letter to a friend who has asked him to write about the sublime:
You will remember, my dear Postimius Terentianus, that when we examined together
the treatise of Caecilius on the Sublime, we found that it fell below the dignity of the
whole subject, while it failed signally to grasp the essential points, and conveyed to its
readers but little of that practical help which it should be a writer’s principal aim to give.
. . . Since you have urged me, in my turn, to write a brief essay on the sublime for your
special gratification, let us consider whether the views I have formed contain anything
which will be of use to public men. (Longinus 1935: 41)
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Discussing how rhetorical figures can be used to transport the audience into the
sublime, Longinus frequently returns to various forms of direct address:
All such cases of direct personal address place the hearer on the very scene of action. . . .
You will make your hearer more excited and more attentive, and full of active
participation, if you keep him on the alert by words addressed to himself. (111)
“Active participation”: that sounds familiar, don’t you think? The active participation –
dare I say interaction - of the user is one of the highest goals of anyone claiming cyber-
credibility these days. Go to an exhibition of electronic art and you’ll undoubtedly find
the catalogue full of the curator’s enthusiastic writings about participation and
interaction (see, for instance, Stenslie 2000: 17), though the artworks themselves
probably don’t permit much more than the occasional click of a button. Web sites,
entertainment, games, education: they all scream to proclaim their interactive content,
usually meaning little more than a scattering of animations and sound effects. And quite
often, all that user participation means is that they talk to “you”. “You” is used in excess
in electronic texts. It’s present in films, advertising and journalism too. The rhetoric of
participation and of inclusion is all around us.
 But today’s electronic “you” is expected to answer, unlike its non-electronic
counterparts. Longinus’s “active participation” has become more literal. The
identification is external and physical, and not just emotional. So you answer. But what
exactly is the nature of that answer? What are you expected to do? Building on Walton’s
theory of fiction, I would say that you are expected to pretend. But there are other ways
of understanding what happens between you and the text. A common model for
understanding that relationship is the narrative communication model: a system that
draws an absolute line between what is inside the text and what is outside the text. You
are outside of it. The textual you is not you, the flesh and blood reader.
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Narratees and readers
The narratologist Seymour Chatman maps the narrative communication situation as
follows:
Figure 10: Chatman’s model of the narrative communication situation (Chatman 1978: 151).
Outside the box are the elements that are outside of the text itself. On one side is the
real author. The real author of this text is a woman notionally called Jill Walker, who
doesn’t necessarily always identify with the narrating “I” or “me” in the text – although
the conventions of this genre probably lead you to expect a reasonable degree of
identification between the real author and the narrating “I”. On the receiving end of all
those arrows is the real reader. That’s you. Not the “you” that “I” think I’m writing to,
but the actual living person reading these words. According to Chatman (and most other
theorists around) it’s extremely important that you remember that there’s a difference
between the “you” addressed by the text and the flesh and blood individual who’s
actually reading these words.
Moving in towards the centre of the diagram you’ll notice the implied author,
who is not a person or a character, but the implied set of principles organising the
narrative. In other words, the implied author is the reader’s reconstruction of the
designer of the text, which need not correspond to the real author (Booth 1983: 71-76).
The narrator is the text’s “I”, the voice speaking or writing, (that’s me, not the flesh and
blood Jill Walker) and the narratee is the character to whom the narrator is telling the
story (you must be a character to me, because how could I possibly know who you really
are?) Chatman doesn’t think a narrator and narratee are necessary in narrative
communication, that’s why he’s put brackets around them in the figure. Other theorists
disagree with him, arguing that there is always a narrating voice, though it may not call
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itself “I” as I do (Prince 1987: 65). The implied reader, the final element in the model, is
the counterpart to the implied author; it is the reader presupposed by the entire text.
This means that the implied reader is not explicitly inscribed in the text, so is not
referred to as “you”. Likewise the implied author, being merely an idea rather than a
person or character, has no textual voice and cannot narrate. Rather, these two textual
functions are the “implicit image” of author and reader in the text (Prince 1987: 42).
By now you may be wondering what on earth I think I’m doing, saying that “I”
am the narrator of this text. How can a PhD thesis have a narrator? A thesis isn’t a
narrative, and probably most electronic texts aren’t either, so why bother with all this,
you complain. No, this essay isn’t a narrative, not according to any narratological
definition I’ve heard anyway. But there’s plenty of narrating in it. Lots of telling, some
events of a kind, some description and at least two fairly clear characters: the narrator,
which refers to itself as “I” and sometimes “me”, and the narratee, referred to as “you”.
The same goes for electronic texts. Though computer games or hypertext fictions
probably aren’t narratives as such, there is certainly narration in these texts (Aarseth
1997: 94-95). Chatman’s discussion of the positions of the narrator, narratee, real
author and real reader are very relevant for any textual communication, whether
fictional or non-fictional, narrative or merely containing traces of narration.
There are, of course, other ways of seeing your relationship with the text. In the
first two chapters of this thesis I wrote about the user’s relationship with the fictional
world. This chapter and the next stick to narratology and the text rather than the world
it allows us to image.
Voyeurism or performance
When you read a representational work, you’re cast in one or several roles. One role is
that which Chatman calls the implied reader; it’s the set of values the text assumes in
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the reader. Chatman writes that you take this role as a second self when you enter the
fictional contract (Chatman 1978: 150). There may also be a clear narratee in the text, as
when the story is told to a “you”, but this narratee doesn’t have to coincide with the
implied reader. In Les Liaisons Dangereuses, for instance, the narratees (and narrators)
of most letters are much more cynical than the implied reader, who is expected to see
through the narrators’ and narratees’ cruelty (Chatman 1978: 150). Similarly, in Dream
Kitchen (Cmielewski and Starrs 2000), the user is forced to commit atrocities in order
to access the work at all, but these acts are choreographed and presented so that the
actual user not only rejects the actions she fictionally performs (playing a role
equivalent to that of the narratee) but also understands that the implied author and
reader of Dream Kitchen condemn the behaviour.
This all gets rather complicated when the “you” in the text, the narratee, seems to
refer to the real reader. Often these seeming addresses to the reader are ironic
reflections about the main story, from an extradiegetic narrator to an extradiegetic
narratee3. Comments like these often highlight the act of narration or of reading. This
can be seen in 19th century novels:
If you think, from this prelude, that anything like a romance is preparing for you, reader,
you never were more mistaken. Do you anticipate sentiment, and poetry, and reverie?
Do you expect passion, and stimulus, and melodrama? Calm your expectations, reduce
them to a lowly standard. (Brontë 1902: 1)
You can find a similarly ironic voice in hypertext essays:
Nice story, you say? Here’s the point. (Kaplan 1995)
Reading passages like these, you share in an ironic detachment from the act of narration
or argument itself. This sharing can make you feel included: you feel seen by the text.
It’s pleasurable to feel that acknowledgment, in the same way as it feels good when your
                                                  
3 But theoretically never from the implied author to the implied reader, and certainly
not from the real author to the real reader. None of these positions can be inscribed in
the text; they can only be inferred from it.
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waiter looks you in the eyes and seems to really see you. Just so long as he doesn’t look
too long or too hard, or demand too much in return.
You’ve read stories you’ve not been able to stop reading, where you’ve hungrily
devoured page after page, needing to know what happens next. That’s a different
pleasure from the enjoyment of being “seen” by the text, of sharing inside jokes with the
narrator. It’s known as narrative desire or narrative pleasure, and is an easy pleasure
that is often found in non-reflexive texts that don’t problematise things like the
relationship between the reader, the implied reader and the narratee. You happily allow
yourself a “willing suspension of disbelief” (Coleridge 1973: 2:6)4 and see what the text
wants to do with you, letting yourself slip into the shell of the “you” in the text you’re
reading and enjoying the way you’re sucked into the story. You love being seduced by
the narrative.
Texts that have an explicit “you” can often make this seduction more visible and
more self-reflexive. The tension between the safely voyeuristic pleasures of narrative
desire and the presence of a “you” that draws (or forces) you into the story can be an
extra source of pleasure. See how you like reading John Barth’s apostrophe to a reader:
“The reader! You, dogged, uninsultable, print-oriented bastard, it’s you I’m addressing,
who else, from inside this monstrous fiction.” (Barth 1988: 127)
There are some narratives, though, that blur the line between voyeuristic reader
and protagonist in a different way, by making the textual “you” the protagonist of the
story,  similarly to role-playing games, but without the conversational turn-taking of
narrator and narratee. This kind of “you” has been termed narrative “you” by Bruce
                                                  
4 It’s worth reminding you that this isn’t quite what Coleridge meant when he wrote
about a “willing suspension of disbelief”. He was talking about why we can read and
enjoy romantic or supernatural stories them despite their lack of realism. As you’ll see
later, the phrase has taken on different meanings since Coleridge first used it, and the
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Morrissette (1965). According to Morrissette, the true narrative “you” requires a
singular past or present action to be ascribed to the “you”, because narratives deal with
events rather than with generalised observations. If the use of “you” is truly narrative in
this sense, it often seems a disguised ‘I’, “a ‘first person’ narrator talking to himself” (Bal
1997: 37). A “you” that is tied to specific, singular events usually accumulates so many
clear characteristics that you the real reader can’t fit into this very tightly defined
subject position. Italo Calvino’s novel If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller uses such a
narrative “you”. Here the “you” position remains open for the first pages, allowing room
for most readers:
You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a winter’s night a
traveller. Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought. Let the world around you fade.
Best to close the door; the TV is always on in the next room. Tell the others right away,
“No, I don’t want to watch TV!” Raise your voice--they won’t hear you otherwise--”I’m
reading! I don’t want to be disturbed!” (Calvino 1998: 5)
This “you” doesn’t remain empty for long though, it becomes more and more limited. As
a real reader, you may well feel excluded from the offered position. Being told to “tell
the others” is already exclusive; what if you live alone and have no others to tell? Yes,
the “you” in the text is like you the real reader in that he is a reader and seemingly
reading the very same book as you are. But he is male, he has personality traits you may
not have, he falls in love with a female reader – these things may not fit you, the real
reader. As you read, you find more and more that the “you” addressed in the text is not
you, the real reader. Your identification with the textual you becomes more and more
uneasy, and you become more aware of the impossibility of really participating in the
text. Or perhaps it merely adds some spice to your voyeuristic narrative desire, some of
that excitement you feel when you read a letter meant for somebody else?
                                                                                                                                                                  
way we identify with textual positions is one of these meanings. Walton suggests, too,
that rather than suspending disbelief, when reading fictional works we invent.
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There’s another kind of “you” in printed texts, as well, an address that you enact
simply by reading it. Irene Kacandes calls this use of “you” the literary performative.
Literary performatives are fairly rare, and seem to limit themselves to statements of the
reader’s activity in reading, as in Barth’s “You’ve read me this far then? Even this far?”
The act of reading these words is an involuntary performative, Kacandes argues,
because “one can’t help doing what one is told, as long as one keeps reading. . .
[A]ffirmative ‘answers’ are generated . . . as soon as the questions are read by someone
– by anyone!” (Kacandes 1993: 142) Such involuntary performatives are not limited to
literature: Kacandes describes the very mechanism we find in Dream Kitchen.
Identification: the willing suspension of disbelief
In many digital texts, identification is pushed as far as possible. This is most explicit in
computer games, where you will usually have some control over the protagonist of the
game. In the rhetoric surrounding computer games, both from game developers and
players, the difference between playing and being the protagonist is blurred. There is a
brand of total identification that appears to be a mark of excellence, an essential
criterion of quality among gamers, as you can see in this argumentation for Doom’s
inclusion among the “top 50 games of all time”:
Unquestionably, the most appealing aspect of Doom was its sheer fun factor; each of the
editors had to admit to spending countless hours roaming about its virtual halls. But
what was so fun about it? What made this so much more fun than anything else?  (. .)
[I]t’s because these graphics did more to suspend disbelief – crucial to a compelling
gameplay experience – than any game to come before it (and some would say, than any
game to come after it). Before you were even out of the first level, you felt as if you
WERE in those halls, battling those demons. (qtd by Juul 1999: 77)
Notice how this game reviewer uses Coleridge’s phrase, emphasising that the reason the
game was so good was that it “did more to suspend disbelief”. Here the suspension of
disbelief is not about Coleridge’s “poetic faith” but about allowing yourself to be
someone else for a time. It’s about letting yourself believe that you’re really in the halls
you see displayed on your screen. You can see the same mode of identification in the
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marketing announcements for Deus Ex, a more recent game that combines Doom’s 3d
interface of guns and monsters with elements of role-playing:
To succeed, you must travel the globe in a quest for knowledge, develop your character’s
strengths as you see fit, build a network of allies to assist you, determine when stealth
and strategy are more important than action. And each time you think you’ve got the
mystery solved, the game figured out, there’s another, deeper mystery to be unraveled.
You will never know who to trust, who your friends are, who’s in on the conspiracy and
who’s innocent. Maybe no one is. (Deus Ex Official Web Site)
You’ll have noticed how frequently “you” is used in this excerpt. Now look at how the
meaning of this “you” slips backwards and forwards, rhythmically, between you the real
reader (or player) and “you”, the protagonist of the game. “You”, the fictional character
travels the globe while you the real player plan which of your character’s strengths to
develop. By the last two sentences of the excerpt, these two different “you”s have
merged. You (and now I mean you, the reader of this essay and the potential player of
Deus Ex), are supposed to suspend your belief in yourself, rather than in the unrealism
of the game-world, so you can be the character you’re playing. You’re supposed to forget
all about Chatman’s careful separation of real reader, implied reader and narratee. This
extreme identification is different from the voyeuristic, bleak identification we know
from reading novels or watching films. It’s Kacandes’ narrative performative, but
swollen almost past recognition. You have to enact the text’s performative in order to
play.
Forced participation
Michel Butor  has described second person narration as a didactic or interrogatory
situation in which a character is told her own story by someone else, because she is
either unable or unwilling to tell it herself . She may lack the language, the self-
awareness or the memories; or she may refuse to tell, perhaps because her story would
incriminate her or because she doesn’t trust the person who wants to hear it. Butor uses
the example of a detective interrogating a suspect to illustrate a case where the
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protagonist “you” refuses to speak herself, and he connects this to force. This narrative
is forced upon the “you” (Butor 1972: 80-81).
Do you feel forced by the way I talk to you in this essay? As you read, how do you
feel about the way I use “you”? Are you offended, confused, flattered, seduced, violated?
Maybe the “you” position offered to you is open enough that you slip into it hardly
noticing that it’s forced upon you? If using the word “you” is an “irresistible invitation”
(Kacandes 1993: 139) then it can also be felt as a forced invitation, close to an act of
violence. It is an involuntary performative.
Often when you come across “you” in texts, you’ll suspect that the “you” is a
hidden “I” in a concealed autobiographical story – as with the story of the Texan bellboy
and the tipper. The “you” there was actually me, it was I who felt my nervous fingers
wrinkling the dollar bill, unable to follow the script I knew was intended for me. To give
the bellboy – a grown man, my father’s age – a dollar bill or even two or three felt
impossible. I felt I would humiliate him, bruise his self-esteem and make a fool out of
myself. Yet I knew it was expected of me. I felt forced into a situation I wasn’t truly a
part of. I was forced into a role that wasn’t mine and that I didn’t want.
I often feel the same way when I’m confronted with a “you” in a text I’m reading.
I know I’m supposed to feel an “irresistible invitation” at this direct address, and
sometimes I do delight in it, seeing the role the text invites me to enter and enjoying the
thrill of an identification that is grammatical and physical as well as emotional. I return
the waiter’s open smile, listen to his recommendations with interest and leave him a tip,
enjoying playing my part in this scripted ritual. Other times I resist the irresistible. In
Calvino’s novel If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller I can see that I’m supposed to be the
male “you”, the male reader who falls in love with a female reader, but I refuse to play
along. In Mechner’s graphical adventure game The Last Express (1997) I’m supposed to
play the young American man who’s expected to figure out why his friend has been
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murdered and why that friend asked him to be on this train – but I’d rather play the
mysterious woman that “I” (well, the young American man) is obviously supposed to be
attracted to, or I’d like to jump off the train, maybe rifle through “my” own pockets to
see who this creature I’m supposed to be is. When I’m the young American, every other
character in the game calls me “you”, and the help files, where they exist, always tell me
“You are…” But I don’t like playing the role of that “you”. I quit the game. I didn’t give
the bellboy in Texas the dollar bill I should have tipped him either. Direct address in
these cases attempts to forcibly break down the differences between the real reader, the
implied reader and the narratee. I am forced into a script, forced into participation.
Sometimes that feels good. Sometimes I run away.
There is a qualitative difference between the identification you may feel with the
“you” in this essay or Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night and the identification you are
forced to enact with a “you” in an electronic text. You are free to resist my addresses to
you in this essay. But in many electronic texts, this freedom is gone. When you are
asked, “Do you want to hear about it?” in afternoon, it’s almost impossible to keep your
distance to that address. If you click your mouse in answer to the question posed to you,
you accept your role; you become “you”. You perform an involuntary performative.
afternoon still allows you to stop reading, or to follow another path and ignore the
address. But if you answer the question posed to “you”, you let the text force you into a
role.
A game like The Last Express doesn’t allow you any freedom to choose another
path. If you don’t accept that you are the very specific “you” offered, the game will not
move on and there will be no story. By continuing to play you “execute an involuntary
performative.” (Kacandes 1993: 142)
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The ritual of submission
When you perform your part in this gaming performative you take part in a ritual, much
as you do when you complete a complicated task in your word processor by following
steps explained in the manual: “we are like participants in a square dance, repeating
formulaic sequences, with the relevant manual page [for the word processor] acting as
the caller of the dance” (Murray 1997: 128). Janet Murray calls this formulaic
performance of a fixed repertoire participatory, but stresses that the human participant
(yes, that’s you) has no agency:
Agency is the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the results of our
decisions and choices (..) But activity alone is not agency. For instance, in a tabletop
game of chance, players may be kept very busy spinning dials, moving game pieces, and
exchanging money, but they may not have any real agency. The players’ actions have
effect, but the actions are not chosen and the effects are not related to the players’
intentions. (126-8)
These are rituals of seduction or of force, where every citizen, every customer, every
reader, even you, must be individually seen and acknowledged, seduced. We live in a
world where every voter must be made to think she is important. Where looking into
your eyes, pretending to see you rather than yet another customer is the way to ensure a
shop’s (or a book’s or a game’s) survival. Where stories, whether in tabloids, hypertext
fictions or games, must seem to be about you.
You feel pleasure in playing a role. It’s a pleasure that is related but not identical
to narrative pleasure. When you read a narrative you enjoy being a voyeur. You are
driven by a desire to read it all, and reading all, the story ends: your desire is dead
(Brooks 1984). When you play a game, or enact the involuntary performatives of
responding to a link in a hypertext, you are more than a voyeur. You enjoy that feeling
of being part of the text, part of the machine. Do you enjoy the limitations of your
participation: the feeling of being forced, of submitting? Is this the pleasure of ritual? In
games, and even in some hypertext fiction, death (of your character or your reading) is
your punishment when you stray from the path.
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Working with a machine the operator becomes most efficient when she stops thinking
about what she’s doing, and begins to operate in a semi-automatic mode.
This feels good. (Thomas 1993: 20)
Do you think that is why we play games? Do you enjoy submitting to the code?
C H A P T E R  5  A N A R R ATO L O G I C AL
AP P R O A C H
In the discussion of Online Caroline in chapter 3, I found that there is an important
difference between feeling as though one is participating in the action of the story and
feeling that one has influence on the way in which the story is presented. In this chapter
I propose a descriptive model that distinguishes between these two kinds of user
involvement.
Several models and taxonomies have been suggested for describing electronic
texts. Aarseths’s theory of cybertext proposes what is probably the most detailed model,
defining many different variables which in their various combinations can describe a
very large number of distinct genres (Aarseth 1997). Others choose to focus on just a
couple of characteristics, such as interactivity and immersion (Ryan 2001a;  Ryan
2001b), different kinds of interactivity (Murray 1997;  Jensen 1999) or the pair of
hypermediacy and transparency (Bolter and Grusin 1999). Some models emphasise a
conceptual understanding of what digital textuality is (Manovich 2001), the ways in
which games may be narrative (Jenkins 2003) or list layers or aspects of a digital work
that should be examined in an analysis (Konzack 2002).
My model combines aspects of Marie-Laure Ryan’s work and of Espen Aarseth’s
taxonomy, but views these through the lens of the narratological distinction between
story (the events described) and discourse (the way in which they are described). I
propose that users can be positioned as internal or external to each of these levels. The
works I discuss in this thesis all position the user as internal to both story and
discourse. This allows me to describe the works formally and to see more clearly what
distinguishes them from other interactive and non-interactive works.
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This chapter uses the narrotological framework for describing narrators’ position
in relation to the story and the discourse, but transfers this to the reader, or rather, the
user. Narratology accurately describes the narrator’s position in relation to the story,
however it has generally seen both the narrator and the narratee as part of the text
rather than positions that can have their own agency. This careful separation of text
from world is made problematic by interactive works, as Ruth Nestvold points out:
[E]lectronic fiction makes it more difficult to speak of the addressee or reader in the text
as a fictional construct, "something whose existence is strictly circumscribed within
art,"5 as critics have been wont to do since Booth defined the implied author and the
implied reader.  (Nestvold 1997)
Theories of fictionality and reader response criticism are two approaches that refuse to
box the text in, ignoring the reader. This chapter presents a different approach to
understanding interactive works than that laid out in chapters one and two, and it is not
dependent on or necessary to them. This is an attempt to extend narratology to describe
interactive works formally. I have included it here because I think there is value in
considering several ways of approaching these works.
User and story
I will use “story” fairly broadly, to refer to not only the events narrated but also the
fictional world the events are set in, or, in non-fictional or non-narrative texts, the ideas
or world that is represented by the text.
A narrator is either internal or external to the story; that is, the narrator can be a
character in the story he tells or not. I am using the terms internal and external for
simplicity’s sake to refer to Genette’s homodiegetic and heterodiegetic (Genette 1980:
245). A homodiegetic narrator is what I am calling an internal narrator and a
heterodiegetic narrator is what I am calling an external heterodiegetic. The diegesis is
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equivalent to the story level or the fictional world. Extradiegetic levels are frame
narratives. For instance, in Arabian Nights, there is an extradiegetic level in which
Scheherazade tells nightly stories to avoid execution, and there is the diegetic or
intradiegetic level of the events in each of the stories she tells. Following this, a narrator
can be described as intradiegetic or extradiegetic. If a narrator A narrates the story of B,
but A herself is a character in a framing narrative that is narrated by C, then A is an
intradiegetic narrator in relation to C’s extradiegetic level.
Thus, in Arabian Nights, Scheherazade functions as a heterodiegetic narrator (since she
does not tell her own story) and as an intradiegetic rather than extradiegetic one (since
she is a character in a framing narrative that she does not tell). Conversely, in Gil Blas,
the narrator is a homodiegetic and extradiegetic one (he tells his own story, but as
narrator, he is not part of any diegesis). (Prince 1987)
In the following I will use internal and external most frequently, but when dealing with
frame narratives that include the user as a character I will use extradiegetic and
intradiegetic.
My goal in this chapter is to use these descriptions of the narrator’s position to
construct a mirror image that describes the user (reader). Let me start by giving an
example of a narrator who is internal to the story, before moving on to describe a user
who is internal to the story.
A classic first person narrator telling his or her own story is usually internal, as in
Megan Heyward’s interactive narrative I am a Singer (1997). In the first screens we see
phrases and sentences that clearly situate the narrator as the main character of the
story:
I know everything about myself.
I remember nothing.
(..)
There was this accident, you see. That’s how it happened, they say.
(..)
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 Here Nestvold quotes Robyn R. Warhol, Gendered Interventions: Narrative
Discourse in the Victorian Novel (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers U. P., 1989):
197.
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My doctor, my manager, my therapist. Hours are spent each day trying to help me to
remember. (Heyward 1997)
Unlike this internal narrator, an external narrator is not a participant in the story, and is
sometimes nearly invisible. Most nodes in Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory Garden have an
external narrator:
It was early October, a week or so after Urquhart watched her get on that bus to Fort
Benning, a few days into his life of unforeseen solitude. {Moulthrop, 1991 #41@’See No
Evil’}
This is sometimes known as third person narration, since the characters in the story are
all referred to in the third person, as “him” or “her”. “By definition,” Genette writes,
“every narrating that is not (that does not have – or pretends not to have – any occasion
to be) in the first person is heterodiegetic” (Genette 1988: 133). A text where the
protagonist is referred to in the third or second person, rather than in the first person,
thus situates the narrator as external.
A first person narrator will refer to the narratee using the second person pronoun “you”.
If Genette’s classification transfers to the narratee, a narratee referred to in the second
person must then be internal. If the user can be identified with this narratee, the user is
also internal to the story. For this to occur, there must be a clear position in the story
that is reserved for the user: a role into which the user can step.
It is controversial to talk of such an identification between narratee and user,
because a basic tenet of narratology is that the boundaries around the text are
watertight. Chatman’s narrative communication model (Figure 10) illustrates this
clearly with the box separating the narratee and the implied reader from the actual
reader. This makes it very hard to analyse the relationship between user and work from
a narratological perspective. As I mentioned above, theories of fictionality and make-
believe are one alternative approach that does allow us to think about this relationship;
reader response theory is another. I have chosen fictional theories as my main method
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of understanding users and their relationship to interactive works, though this chapter
is an attempt at a more structural model.
To summarise: for my purposes, a user is internal to the story when the narratee
is internal to the story and the user is readily identified with the narratee.
If the user is internal to the story, that is, if the user is positioned as a character
in the story he or she reads or experiences, the user position can be called homodiegetic.
The user position is heterodiegetic if the reader is external to the story, or absent from
the story he or she reads, to rephrase Genette (Genette 1988: 244).
The user of Online Caroline (Bevan and Wright 2000) thus becomes firmly
positioned as internal to the story. Caroline wants an online friend, and the user is that
friend. The program uses the data you give it about yourself (your name, age, likes and
dislikes) to write you into the story, and even sends emails to your actual email address.
It is possible to play a role, and invent a character, not yourself, to be Caroline’s friend.
You can invent a name and personality not your own, create an email account in your
fictional character’s name and consciously choose to play that role in every interaction
with Caroline. Arguably, the user and the narratee are then not presented as
interchangeable. Instead of imagining “I am Caroline’s friend”, the user might think “I
am controlling an imagined entity that is, fictionally, Caroline’s friend”. If so, the user
will not experience herself as being internal to the story. But although this user
positioning is possible, it is not the dominant position offered to the user by the text.
Unlike online role-playing games, Online Caroline does not ask the user to create a
character. It simply asks for the user’s name and email address.
There are a lot of digital narratives that position the reader as barely internal to
the story, or as partially internal. Uncle Buddy includes the user as a character in the
frame narrative, or the extradiegetic level, but the user is external to the stories told by
Uncle Buddy (McDaid 1992). The user’s position is similar to that of Scherazade, who
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tells stories that are not her own. I am a Singer similarly gives the user a job or a
function in the story: to help the narrator regain her memory. This is made explicit on
the CD cover:
“I am a Singer” is a CD-ROM narrative which tells the fictional story of Isabelle Jones,
rising Australian pop star, who is involved in an accident on the eve of a major tour and
suffers amnesia. Although Jones knows her identity, she can’t make a meaningful
connection with who she is.
In “I Am A Singer” the user assists Jones as she attempts to reconstruct her identity
through various sources – media reports, diaries, anecdote, analysis and dream.
(Heyward 1997)
“The user assists Jones”, the cover text reads. There isn’t even an invitation here, merely
a statement of fact. This is the user’s function. This function is less clear in the work
itself. A voice whispers: “I remember (help me) nothing (help me)”. The help me’s are
whispered as soft asides, beneath the narrator’s breath, yet they have no other possible
addressee than the user.  After exploring the singer’s diaries, stories and fragmented
memories for half an hour or an hour, I am a Singer reaches a point of closure as
Isabelle Jones does regain her memories.
Without the description on the CD cover I would not necessarily have thought of
myself as being a part of the story as an active helper. I might not have paid much
attention to the whispered pleas for help. Following the story I had a stronger feeling of
shadowing the protagonist, much as I identify with a character in a film or novel
without feeling like a character of my own in the fictional world.
This is similar to the “Dear reader” of 19th century novels, where the narrator
occasionally speaks directly to the reader, but both remain safely outside of the primary
diegetic level of the story. Both in I am a Singer and in many such 19th century novels,
the user remins external to the main story, or to the first diegetic level, but is fully or
partially internal to an extradiegetic level: a framing narrative which explains how the
reader is given access to the main narrative.
105
Other descriptions of user and story
Espen Aarseth and Marie-Laure Ryan have made similar distinctions between between
a reader who is internal to the work and a reader who is external to the work, though
without the clear connection with the story/discourse division that I wish to emphasise.
Aarseth describes something similar using the terms personal and impersonal
perspective:
If the text requires the user to play a strategic role as a character in the world described
by the text, then the text's perspective is personal; if not, then it is impersonal. A text
such as Italo Calvino's If on a Winter's Night a Traveller pretends to involve the reader
as a participant, but there is nothing for the real reader to do but read. In a MUD, on the
other hand, the reader is (in part) personally responsible for what happens to his or her
character. (63)
Impersonal and personal perspective in Aarseth’s sense crosses the boundaries of story
and discourse. However, the reader need not be required “to play a strategic role as a
character” to be internal to the story. It is enough that the reader be referred to as if he
or she is a character in the story, as in Online Caroline.
Marie-Laure Ryan has proposed a similar distinction between internal and
external interactivity.
In the internal mode, the user projects himself as a member of the fictional world, either
by identifying with an avatar, or by apprehending the virtual world from a first person
perspective. In the external mode, the reader situates himself outside the virtual world.
He either plays the role of a god who controls the fictional world from above, or he
conceptualizes his activity as navigating a database. This dichotomy corresponds roughly
to Aarseth’s distinction between personal and impersonal perspective (63): a world-
internal participation will logically result in the user’s personification, since worlds are
spaces populated by individuated existents, while world-external involvement does not
require a concrete persona. The only potential difference between Aarseth’s labels and
mine is the case of a user who makes strategic decisions for the participants, such as the
commander in chief of an army, a sports coach, an author writing a novel, or a specific
god. (Ryan 2001a)
Ryan completes her model with a second distinction: exploratory versus ontological
interactivity. If a reader can explore a work, but cannot alter the events that occur in the
world, or otherwise affect the fictional world that is represented by the work, the
interactivity is exploratory. If reader actions can change the plot or the fictional world, it
is ontological.
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Ryan’s internal/external couplet is basically the same as my use of
internal/external, and it is close to Aarseth’s personal/impersonal category, except that
Ryan ties her division to the fictional world rather than to the story. There is little
practical difference in that, however, there is a clear difference between her next set of
terms, exploratory versus ontological interactivity and my second set of terms, where I
relate the user to the discourse. I propose that just as the user can be internal or
external to the story, she or he can also be internal or external to the discourse.
User and discourse
The reader’s activity on a discourse level is described by Espen Aarseth’s theory of
cybertext, which is an approach to texts that analyses them based on how the reader
traverses them rather than according to conventional genres. Without claiming to
exhaustively describe every aspect of a text through this model, Aarseth presents seven
variables that can describe any kind of text according to their mode of traversal. The
reader or user functions in the taxonomy allow for four different kinds of action from
the reader. Of course, readers are never passive recipients of texts: readers will always
interpret a text, adjusting it to their own view of the world. However texts that offer the
reader an interpretative function alone are non-ergodic, while texts that require non-
trivial reader action are ergodic.
Besides the interpretative function of the user, which is present in all texts, the use of
some texts may be described in terms of additional functions: the explorative function,
in which the user must decide which path to take, and the configurative function, in
which scriptons are in part chosen or created by the user. If textons or traversal function
can be (permanently) added to the text, the user function is textonic. If all the decisions
a reader makes about a text concern its meaning, then there is only one user function
involved, here called interpretation. In a forking text, such as Cortázar's Rayeula, the
reader must also explore, by making strategic choices about alternative paths, and in the
case of adventure games, alternative actions. Some texts allow the user to configure their
scriptons by rearranging textons or changing variables. And finally, in some cases the
users can extend or change the text by adding their own writing or programming. (64)
Italo Calvino’s novel If on a Winter's Night a Traveller (Calvino 1998), like most novels,
films and images, expects the reader to interpret the text, but not to explore it spatially,
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configure it or add parts to it. A print dictionary or encyclopaedia expects the reader to
interpret and explore, but usually not to configure or add content. Of course readers and
viewers may use the text in different ways. For instance, many fans of popular films,
television series and novels are unsatisfied with just interpreting the series, as they are
expected to, and they write their own versions of the stories in extensive individual and
collaborative fan fiction Readers of Tolkien and other fantasy literature devise their own
fictional universes based on the texts they’ve read and they play role-playing games or
make computer games or perform live re-enactments. Readers may configure texts by
sampling them and picking certain sequences and images to rearrange in new orders, by
quoting and making adaptations, hommages or parodies. They extend the text by
writing their own additions, but these are separate to the first text. Both the configuring
and textonic activities are outside of the text. They may create new texts but they do not
change or affect the first text. I will not be discussing this kind of appropriation and
manipulation of non-ergodic texts here. Rather than being interactivity, this is
intertextuality, a well theorised phenomenon.
A user who is internal to the discourse can explore, configure or add to the work
he or she is engaging with. The discourse adapts according to the user’s actions, just for
that performance, or for future users as well. It is quite possible for this to occur without
the user’s being internal to the story.
In Stuart Moulthrop’s Reagan Library (1999), for instance, the user is internal to
the discourse but not to the story. In Reagan Library the user is presented with a
collection of web pages consisting of text and images. The top portion of the page is
filled with a QuickTime VR image , a panoramic rendition of a smooth vector-generated
landscape where the user can move the mouse to see the full 360˚ panorama. There are
hot spots on certain objects and landmarks in the image, and clicking on any of these
causes a new page to be shown. Each page shows the same landscape in the same
108
panoramic style, but from different places. If I click on the lighthouse in one panorama,
the next panorama I see will show me the view from the lighthouse.
Figure 11 A screenshot of a page from Stuart Moulthrop’s Reagan Library (1999).
The text beneath the images is hard to understand at first, because parts of it are
randomly generated from a database of phrases. Reagan Library changes as it is read,
and each time you return to a page, the text will contain fewer random phrases and
become more and more cohesive. It takes about an hour, maybe two, to read and reread
the whole work until it stabilises.
Reagan Library both tells a story and simulates forgetfulness or Alzheimer’s. As
you read the work you realise that it is in a sense a memory palace, a collection of a
person’s memories – but this person cannot remember easily. The memories stabilise as
they are reread. The way in which this work must be read actualises the condition it
describes. In this way, it resembles Michael Joyce’s afternoon, where the digressive
linking of nodes and sometimes apparently self-contradictory events described in each
node lets the reader mirror the protagonist’s attempts to avoid the issue he must
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confront: that he may have killed – or perhaps only witnessed the death of – his son and
ex-wife. (see also Douglas 1994;  Walker 1999;  Douglas 2000)
I gave examples of works in which the user is partially internal to the story. The
same is possible in relation to the discourse. In  The Impermanence Agent (Wardrip-
Fruin et al. 2000), the user surfs the web through a proxy server which picks up
keywords in sites she or he visits. During the course of a week’s surfing, the story tells
itself as the user surfs through other content, and the order and content of the story
depends partially on keywords in sites the user has visited. The user does affect the
discourse in The Impermanence Agent, but only indirectly, and not through deliberate
actions. So in this work the user may experience herself as external to the discourse, but
does influence it, and so in practice is internal to it.
Online Caroline has almost the opposite strategy. While the user appears to be
internal to the discourse and to have a great deal of influence on what is shown, her real
influence on the discourse is limited to the exchanging of one phrase in an email for
another. Though the user is internal to the discourse, exploring each day’s website as
she wants, for instance, she may feel as though she has a greater influence on the
discourse than is objectively the case.
The user is external to the discourse in standard linear texts: print novels with no
reader choices, e-book texts where the text is static and linear, and standard web
journals and magazines with linear articles. A user surfing between and among linear
web sites is, however, internal to the larger discourse of the web. Just as a story can be
embedded within a frame narrative, the discourse of one text (an article in Wired, for
instance) can be embedded in a larger discourse (the Web).
110
Putting it together
Having defined these different aspects of the reader’s relationship with the text, we can
now look at how they work together, and how various kinds of texts might be described
using these concepts.
user is: external to discourse internal to discourse
external
to story
Classical novels and plays:
Shakespeare, Ibsen, Austen,
Dickens, Zola, etc. Mainstream
cinema.
Afternoon, Reagan Library, Uncle
Buddy’s Funhouse.
TV shows where home audiences
can vote over alternate plots.
Tree narratives or branching
narratives like Same Day Test.
The casino ad discussed in
chapter 6.
Kabul Kaboom.
Impermanence Agent.
internal
to story
Parts of If on a Winter’s Night,
the end of Cat in a Hat,
involuntary performatives.
Nigerian spam (chapter 6) if user
does not respond.
Online Caroline.
Citadel of Chaos.
Bino & Cool’s Masterclass, Dream
Kitchen, Mission 01: Kill Bin
Laden, Ashcroft Online, New York
Defender.
Nigerian spam if user responds.
Table 1: Works analysed in this thesis ordered according to the user’s position as internal or external to
the story and the discourse.
Some works are hard to place. Gulf War 2, for instance (discussed in chapter 7), is a
simulation of events that may be triggered by the war on Iraq in early 2003. The game is
relentlessly linear, and nothing the user does has any influence on the events portrayed
or the way in which they are portrayed. The user is positioned as a god-like creature
who supposedly controls the simulation, and so the user is internal to a frame narrative
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of politicians giving advice though not to the blood and bombs of the war. Yet though
the politicians and generals constantly ask the user to OK their suggestions, thus
keeping the user very busy clicking the mouse, the user’s frantic clicking makes
absolutely no difference one way or another. The user’s only power is to stop the action
by refusing to click. While Online Caroline hides the user’s lack of influence, Gulf War 2
is quite open about it, parodying most strategy games’ several-optioned pop up question
boxes with outrageous remarks to which the user can only say “OK” or “continue”. The
user is only marginally internal to this discourse, despite the incessant clicking.
Most works where the user is internal to the story also position the user as
internal to the discourse, though the opposite is not necessarily true. There are a few
examples of works where the user is internal to the story but not to the discourse, but
this user position appear to be difficult to sustain throughout a narrative. The first lines
of Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller are an example of this:
You are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a winter’s night a
traveller. Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought. Let the world around you fade.
Best to close the door; the TV is always on in the next room. Tell the others right away,
“No, I don’t want to watch TV!” Raise your voice--they won’t hear you otherwise--”I’m
reading! I don’t want to be disturbed!” (Calvino 1998: 3)
In these lines, or at least in the first sentence, the you in the text describes the real
reader of the book exactly. It probably doesn’t describe you, the real reader of this
thesis, because you are not about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, you are
reading a thesis which includes a citation from Calvino’s novel. Actually, even if you
were reading Calvino’s novel today, it would no longer be his new novel, since it was
first published over twenty years ago, in 1980. And do you really always have the TV on
in the next room? It is extremely hard to sustain this kind of direct identification
between real reader and the story. Yet let us agree that a reader picking up a copy of this
novel in the early eighties, seeing these first lines printed on the front cover of the book
(as they are in some editions), would indeed feel internal to this story. The real, flesh
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and blood reader fuses with the protagonist of the story. For a few lines, the reader is
internal to the story. In Kacandes’ terminology, the reader performs an involuntary
performative.
As the novel continues, this fictional homodiegetic reader becomes more and
more part of the story, and is increasingly clearly drawn, though the narrator repeatedly
draws attention to his incomplete knowledge of personality of this reader-character
(whom Calvino refers to as the Reader with a capital R). As I read at times I feel as
though this Reader is me, and that the narrator’s address to a “you” is an address  to me.
Of course, I am not a man, and I realise while reading that I am not actually meeting
Ludmilla and her sister and so on. But I imagine the role of the Reader as mine in an
imagined performance. At other times, it seems to me that I am standing with the
narrator, and we are both addressing this Reader, this protagonist whom we wish to
control.
At other times, the narrator addresses the Reader in almost exactly the same way
as the player of an adventure game like Zork (Blank and Lebling 1981), or a gamebook
like Citadel of Chaos (Steve Jackson 1983). After having discovered that the book he has
purchaced is misprinted, the Reader takes the book back to the shop and asks for a
replacement. While there, he meets the Other Reader, beautiful Ludmilla, who has the
same predicament and whom the Reader instantly desires. The narrator talks the
Reader through his conversation with Ludmilla step by step:
Do you agree? Then say so. “Ah, yes, that sort of book is really worthwhile.”
And she continues: “Anyway, this is also an interesting book, I can’t deny that.”
Go on, don’t let the conversation die. Say something; just keep on talking “Do you read
many novels? You do? So do I, or some at least, though nonfiction is more in my line…”
Is that all you can think of? Are you stopping? Good night! Aren’t you capable of asking
her: Have you read this one? And this? Which of the two do you like better? There, now
you have something to talk about for about half an hour.  (30)
At moments like these, the narrator professes complete innocence of the details of the
Reader’s personality:
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Who you are, Reader, your age, your status, profession, income: that would be indiscreet
to ask. It’s you’re business, your on your own. (32)
Reader, we are not sufficiently acquainted for me to know whether you move with
indifferent assurance in a university or whether old traumas or pondered choices make a
universe of pupils and teachers seem a nightmare to your sensitive and sensible soul.
(47)
The narrator only ever describes the Reader’s actions and emotions. No other qualities
are defined, except for his sex: he is undoubtably male. Surroundings are also described,
but sparingly. For instance, in the first paragraph of the book we are told that “the TV is
always on in the next room”, and the suggestion that the Reader might want to raise his
voice indicates that he lives with other people. Sometimes, the Reader is given a choice.
In the first paragraph for instance: “Raise your voice (..) Or if you prefer, don’t say
anything.” (3)
Though the Reader is referred to as “you” rather than by name, and though the
designation of “Reader” is usually reserved for the actual reader, this diegetic Reader no
longer matches the actual reader and so the actual reader moves into the familiar
heterodiegetic relation to the story.
If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller is a reference point in discussions of the
second person address, because of its extended use of the second person, but also
because of the ambiguity – does the “you” refer to the reader or not? Irene Kacandes
argues that the “you” never completely fits the actual reader. Even the first line “You are
about to being reading…” is already false, for as a reader reads it, she is no longer about
to begin but has already begun to read. "For the attentive reader, then, what this
opening line accomplishes is both a seduction to feel addressed and a realisation that
the call is not quite accurate" (Kacandes 1993: 170). While this may be strictly true,
there is some leeway here. Dennis Schofield  transfers Kaja Silverman’s analysis of the
hailing of the viewer at the beginning of Capra’s film It’s a Wonderful Life to the address
to the “you” at the start of If on a Winter’s Night. He argues that the lack of a clear
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reference for the pronoun “you” allows the pronoun to be easily (though perhaps not
necessarily) taken up by the reader or viewer. Schofield writes:
[B]efore the fictional character arrives on the scene, the only way for the viewer/reader
to make sense of the statement is to situate him or herself as the subject of speech, the
"you" of the utterance, as the only subject available to fill it, so that "the rest of the
sentence . . . organises itself around the viewer [or reader], locating him or her in the
narrative space" in the moments before the protagonist has come to claim it (Silverman,
1983: 49). And having been called into that space, having been interpellated as that
subject, Silverman argues, the reader/viewer permits his or her subjectivity to be carried
forward by the figure of the protagonist (Silverman, 1983: 49-50)albeit that in the
Calvino there will be more subsequent resistance to being carried in such a way than
there will be in a work of classical Hollywood cinema. (Schofield 1998: chapter 1)
This can be seen as a linguistic explanation of the ontological fusion that Pavel
discusses, that I in chapter 2 explained as occurring when the user’s actual actions
correspond to the fictional actions. The two explanations can be seen as
complementary.
Another famous example of a second person narrative is Michel Butor’s La
modification (Butor 1957). Though the second person is used consistently, the “you”
referred to is so clearly defined that it is very hard for the reader to fit in the position of
the “you”. While Calvino’s novel starts by leaving the “you” open enough for the casual
reader to enter it, Butor shuts the reader out. It would be hard to argue that this text
positions the reader as internal to the story, because the “you” of the text does not
appear to refer to the reader. The novel begins thus:
If you were afraid of missing the train to whose movement and sound you are now
already accustomed again, it is not because you woke up later than you planned this
morning (..)
Mieke Bal argues that the lack of exchange between the first and second person mars
Butor’s project:
What is lacking, in La modification, is that very essential feature of deixis: the
reversibility, the exchange, of the first and second person. Not only is the “you” a clearly
distinct, even semantically dense individual doing certain things, but the other people in
his life, hence, in the fabula, are consistently described in the third person. The “you” is
cut off from the others, or cuts them off, so that, rather than mutually confirming one
another’s subjectivity, the figure of this “you” lapses into an alienation, that recession of
subjectivity, rather than a fulfilment of it. As a consequence, the “you” can never be
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identified with the reader, nor is the reader the “you”s symmetrical counterpart, the “I”
(Bal 1997).
It is thus clear that the use of the second person is not always enough to situate the user
as internal to the story.
Uses and implications
Models allow us to think clearly about certain aspects of an object, but of course one
model can never describe every aspect of every object. If it could it would be the object
itself, the Borgesian map of the terrain that is as large as the country it maps.
The model I have proposed is intended to emphasise the user’s position in
relation to the text, and necessarily ignores other aspects of texts. It is useful in
describing the texts I am interested in here, and it allows a clearer discussion of certain
kinds of user engagement in a textual world than is possible with simple notions of
interactivity.
It does a good job of explaining particularities of certain texts that fall between
the two dominant categories of narrative and game. However, it is less useful in
distinguishing between various kinds of games. This is hardly surprising given that
games are not narratives, which makes it problematic to use narratological terms like
story and discourse about games. Another large group of texts fall into the category that
defines the user as external to both story and discourse: almost all traditional literature,
cinema and television excludes the reader or viewer from both these levels. The model
would be of little use in discussing differences between these texts.
This thesis discusses works that emphasise the interaction between user and
work. Looking at these works through the lens of user position in relation to story and
discourse we see that they all position the user as internal to the story. Most also situate
the user as internal to the discourse, but several have a user position that is only
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partially internal to the discourse. This ambiguity is what emphasises the deictic
relationship between user and work.
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C H A P T E R  6  E X P L O I TAT I VE
F I C T I O N S :  S PAM ,
S C AM S  AN D  H O AX E S
Ontological interactivity includes the user in the fictional world, and emphasises the
relationship between user and work. In stories and art this can lead to a sense of
immersion, which can be both pleasurable and seductive for the user. In the readings of
Dream Kitchen and Online Caroline in chapters 2 and 3 I touched upon the control that
is implied by this seductive immersion or inclusion in a fictional world, and  I also
considered power and force in chapter 4’s discussion of the second person address to
the user.
This chapter further develops the topics of ontological interaction, the user’s
inclusion in the work and power, but in a different context. While art and narrative are
for the most part voluntary pursuits that users engage with for pleasure or out of
interest, other works use ontological interaction – or apparent ontological interaction –
to exploit the user. This chapter thus discusses exploitative fictions: spam, scams,
hoaxes and marketing ploys that present a fictional world that they try to lure the user
into. I also explore what happens when the user relates to a specific fictional character
rather than with a work as a whole. Relating directly with a fictional character we
straddle the boundary between actual and fictional. This blurring of boundaries and our
own position between worlds causes endless discussions of what is real or not on the
web, as is evident not only in fiction and art but equally in scams, ads and hoaxes.
The examples I’ll discuss include the Kaycee Nicole hoax, the Nigerian 419 email
scam, bots like Eliza, possibly fictional weblogs and email and popup ads for porn sites
and an online casino.
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Kaycee Nicole
Kaycee Nicole was a high school student who kept a web diary about her struggle with
leukaemia. Kaycee became more and more popular, and maintained friendships not
only through her web diary, but also through email and in chat rooms. Her mother
Debbie started a companion web diary about caring for a child with cancer. When
Kaycee eventually died in 2001, her online friends were devastated. When they found
out that Kaycee and Debbie were fictional, they were furious. They felt deceived and
used (Geitgey 2001;  Powazek 2001;  Woning 2001).
The Kaycee Nicole case was neither the first nor the last time fictional characters
have been presented and interpreted as being real. Orson Welles’ radio production of
H.G. Wells’ War of the Worlds in 1938 is the most well known example of widespread
belief that a fiction is true. Welles’s Halloween joke was taken as fact by thousands of
listeners, who panicked, believing that Martians had attacked the planet Earth and
annihilated much of the United States. Welles had dramatised the science fiction story
as though it were being reported live on radio. The play started with piano music, which
was broken off by announcements that abnormal activities had been observed on Mars,
and then that Martian troops had landed in New Jersey. The play became more and
more dramatic, with the radio reporter instructing listeners to seek open spaces and
avoid congested areas, and culminated in a description of gigantic Martians striding
across the Hudson river and demolishing New York. By this point, many listeners had
already fled their homes and did not hear the ad break that followed the fictional death
of the announcer in New York. According to one survey, as many as 28% of the listeners
believed that the play had been a real news report (Cantril, Gaudet and Herzog 1966).
War of the Worlds mimicked news reports while Kaycee used online diaries.
Both used genre conventions more often used to present factual information than
fiction.
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While Orson Welles and his Mercury Theatre on the Air created War of the
Worlds as fiction and as art and entertainment, the unnamed woman who created
Kaycee had no obvious motive. She did not make any money out of the elaborate fiction,
on the contrary: she sent generous presents to many of her – or rather Kaycee’s – online
friends. Kaycee’s creator put a lot of time and care into building and maintaining
relationships with her readers. She poured emotions into the role she acted, crying on
the phone to van der Woning, for instance, when she was playing the role of Kaycee’s
mother Debbie (Woning 2001). For the actual woman who performed as Kaycee, Kaycee
was fictional. She constructed and found a set of objects that she used as props in her
own game of make-believe: photos of the girl next door, various web sites, presents.
Kaycee’s name, personality, age and the nature of her illness were basic tenets that
determined what was possible within this fictional world.
Representation and dialogue
Networked communication combines representation with dialogue, and this
combination is unfamiliar to us. It confuses us. We’re used to being able to separate
representation and dialogue easily.
I propose that when the user enters into a dialogue with a represented or
simulated character or characters, a form of ontological interaction occurs. The act of
communication spans both actual and fictional worlds. When I write an email to
Caroline, for instance, my act of writing an email is both actual and fictional. The action
becomes a point of ontological fusion. Dialogue is thus one kind of ontological
interaction. All the exploitative fictions discussed in this chapter use dialogue to lure the
user into their net.
Many representations are characterised by the impossibility of dialogue. I can
beg the heroine in a horror movie to run as much as I like, but she won’t obey me. When
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audiences can affect the fictional world that is represented, as in role-playing games and
some oral story-telling situations, we tend to think of the situation as a game, a
simulation or a dialogue rather than as a representation. These dialogic situations are
less often thought of as art than are the closed representations of literature, film and
paintings, though this work- or object-based  view of art has also been challenged, for
instance in concept performance art.
Representation is the standard mode of literate societies and mass media. In
medieval times, when most people could not read, the gospel was communicated to the
masses using images. Later, with mass literacy in many cultures, print became an
important representational medium. Today radio and television serve the same
purpose. In re-presenting an event, an opinion or a fact to an audience, these media
provide one perspective on that which they represent. Though the representation may
present its own claims to authority in different ways, such a representation is in itself a
claim that “this is”. Individually produced representations such as paintings can be
defaced or altered by their audiences. It is sometimes possible to change your own copy
of a mass-distributed representation, such as a newspaper or a television broadcast, but
without illegal manipulation of the distribution channels, no member of the audience
can change a television broadcast or a newspaper. These representations are non-
negotiable.
Of course it is possible to answer back, to write letters to the editor, to create
one’s own competing representations and to create parodies or homages and distribute
them. There is talk-back radio and community television. Yet the representation still
remains closed and unchangeable to the majority of listeners and viewers. Sometimes
people do break the law and alter the original distribution, too, as in March 2003, when
the web site of the Arab television station Al-Jazeera was attacked by American hackers
who replaced the site’s content with an image of an American flag.
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The web is often used as a channel for one-way representations, but it is also an
arena for dialogue. The conventional communication model has arrows pointing in one
direction only: a message is encoded by the sender, transmitted through a channel and
received by an audience. The audience can be seen as having varying degrees of agency
or passivity in this model.   In a dialogue the arrows point both ways: both (or several)
parties contribute to the process. Dialogues are about a process rather than about a
finished whole which is then presented to an audience, although a dialogue can also be
presented as representations, as in Plato’s Dialogues or a play.
The notion of dialogue I’m using here is related to the concept of deixis, which I
discussed in the previous chapter, but it is more general. Bal sees deixis as occurring in
representational art (Bal 1999), but although her discussion is interesting, I think her
use of deixis in this respect is more metaphorical than actual. Dialogue is also more
general than interactivity. When I write that dialogue is about a process rather than a
finished work, I am also relating it to current theories of networked art and networked
communication, where it is the motion of the network that is important, the
collaboration and the process rather than the existence of a well-crafted end product
(Breeze 2003).
Kaycee Nicole established a dialogue with strong elements of representation as
well. The web diaries were clear representations: a one way channel of communication
where readers could discuss the representational work among themselves but could not
change the work itself. Readers could not change the diaries.
The web combines dialogue and representation. There are images and text, just
as in printed, non-dialogic media like newspapers and magazines. Many websites also
have dialogic aspects: they may allow users to add their own content, affect the
presentation of information, perform transactions and participate in discussions. The
same information can often be accessed across several media – for instance, news from
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the BBC is now available in several specialised radio and television channels as well as
on the web. I can pay bills by telephone or on the web as well as in person at my local
branch, and find a phone number by searching a web site, leafing through the printed
telephone directory or by sending an SMS text message to the appropriate number.
Tasks that once required interaction with another human are now often
mediated by a machine playing the role of a human. When you order a taxi, a recorded
voice may answer your call, asking you to speak in the address you would like to be
picked up at. Banks charge more for personal service from a real human being, but
we’re used to dealing with machines in situations where we once dealt with humans.
When Online Caroline provides a phone number for Caroline, it appears to be a
situation that promises dialogue. If you ring the phone number, an answering machine
takes your call, and you can leave a message just as you would for any other friend: this
is both a representation that replaces true dialogue and at the same time, a realistic
interface for dialogue that we know well already. We can use telephones to
communicate with machines and databases as well as with humans. The step from that
to communicating with fictional characters is not that great. The message I  leave for
Caroline will never be heard by Caroline (after all, she doesn’t exist) but though this
dialogue is thwarted, I perform all the actions appropriate to a participant in a dialogue.
Kaycee Nicole is seen as a hoax, not as a fiction or a story or a performance,
though it is easy to imagine an art performance that similarly hides its own fictionality
but still is thought of as being art. Davidstill.org (Still 2002) might be such an example,
though part of its effect is the play with reality. Are the photos really of a person named
David Still? Can he really live in a Dutch suburb called De Realiteit? Davidstill.org
challenges its audience: figure out whether I’m real. The site presents itself as not being
intended as art, but there is an awareness that this is taken as art.
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Spam and dialogue
Spam is another automated contender for our attention and empathy. Some spam, like
this email I received in November 2001, uses fiction, dialogue and narrative quite
explicitly to gain visitors:
Hello this is Wendi!
I Lost your e-mails boy i am glad i found the address in my outbox!!
i just went out and bought a webcam and snapped a few pics of me and posted them here
be sure to check them out and let me know how you like them!
DO NOT TELL TODD!!!!
He would get really pissed at me for showing anyone these pics. He thinks I took them
for him.. :)
love ya!
Wendi
xoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxo
“Wendi” also provided a link which she invited me to check out. As expected, the link
led to a run-of-the-mill porn site of the kind where new windows pop up as soon as you
try to exit the site. I couldn’t find any continuation of the narrative suggested by the
email in the web site.
Wendi is not the only presumably fictional character to fill my inbox. The same
day as her email arrived, I received another email, this time from “Switty”:
Hello my dear Love!!! I'm lost You email, but i'm find with help of my brother, he's cool
hacker :)) You can find gallery of photos that I offered here.
Bye
chmok.... love, Switty......
Switty is less eloquent than Wendi, yet the same approach is used: the email becomes a
prop which the receiver can use to generate imaginings about a fictional world. Reading
these emails may not make me visit the porn site, but it is almost impossible to read
them without at least beginning to imagine the situation that might have produced such
emails. Though I may stop playing this game of make-believe as soon as I delete the
email, I do begin to play the game and to imagine the fictional world to which this email
would belong.
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Both emails directly address their receiver, and brief as they are, they present the
recipient with a clear role. According to the emails, I have met Wendi and Switty in the
past, or perhaps merely corresponded with them, and probably I have flirted with them.
Wendi assumes that I know and could contact someone called Todd, who is presumably
her boyfriend. Playing along with the game I can imagine that I really have met Wendi
and Switty somewhere. The fantasy can be just as satisfying if I imagine that their
emails were meant for someone else, but I will be allowed to eavesdrop and perhaps
even build a relationship with these women. Pornography is an industry that sells
fantasies and props for games of make-believe.
Rather than presenting themselves as complete, these emails pretend to be
episodes in an ongoing dialogue where I am an equal party. Their very effect lies in the
fact that they are not complete works. They invite me to continue a dialogue by making
my own contribution to it.
My inbox fills with another kind of fiction and narrative spam as well: the
Nigerian 419 scams. These emails are framed as requests for assistance from a person
who has recently lost power, and who needs to smuggle a large amount of illicit money
out of the country. To do this, the person would like you – the random recipient of the
email – to help, by allowing him to transfer the money to your bank account in order to
get it out of the country. In return you are promised a significant cut. The scam is based
on an older scam known as The Spanish Prisoner, and is known as the 419 scam
because that is the code by which the FBI identify it. According to an article in Slate, the
ploy earns Nigerians close to US $100 million: “No longer the sole domain of
professional criminals, 419 has become a cozy family business, Nigeria's version of the
Greek diner or Irish pub.” (Koerner 2002) Here is an excerpt from a typical example of
the first emails sent out in these scams:
I am HIS HIGHNESS HAMED ISA BIN SULMAN AL KHALIFA, Emir of the state of
Bahrain.
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I got to know you through a foreign trade office in London during my official trip last
year.
I am making this contact to you to inquire from you if you can assist me manage some
investment for me in your country.  Actually all I want from you is to be my manager
abroad  and partner.  I would like you to invest in Properties(Real Estate) and company
shares and other lucrative ventures of your interest for me.
I have  sixty Million United States Dollars (US$60,000,000.00) into a VAULT with a
Security Finance Company abroad, but due to many commitments I can not travel out of
my domain for the claim, hence I contacted you to assist me make the claim on my
behalf.  I will provide you with all the necessary documents to enable you represent me
as my business manager to make the claim by signing the necessary document for
onward transfer of the money into your account which you will use for the investment.
Here the role of “you” is much more open than in Wendi and Switty’s emails, however,
this initial email asks the recipient to reply. The rest of the scam is conducted through
personal email correspondence, and sometimes even by telephone. Here the scammer
performs his or her role throughout – only the initial email is automated and sent
randomly. This performance has been documented thoroughly by recipients of such
emails, like Buddy Weiserman and Elizabeth Hanes, who have received the initial email
in the scam and have then decided to scam the scammer (Hanes 2001;  Weiserman
2001;  Haxial 2002). They have assumed more or less parodic roles, pretended to go
along with the scam and published all their correspondence online to the great
enjoyment of their readers.
There are many scams like the Nigerian 419 scam that don’t depend on the net at
all. Other means of correspondence can be used, such as letters, telephone and fax, or
scams are conducted in person. The success and proliferation of 419 is in part due to the
ease of sending huge quantities of emails at hardly any cost, though the scam was also
common in the early 90s, using faxes and typewritten letters instead of emails. The
tactics used in both the 419 spam, the spam emails from Wendi and Switty and in the
casino ad are all similar to those used to ensnare the reader of Online Caroline: all
address the user and simulate a dialogue. They simulate deixis. They provide a role for
the user that is on the same ontological level as the protagonist of the fiction. As
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discussed earlier, this creates what Thomas Pavel calls an ontological fusion between
the world of the user and the fictional world (Pavel 1986). The boundaries between the
actual user and the fictional role the user is playing become unclear, and so the
boundaries between fictional and actual world are hard to make out. We become
gullible.
An ad or a chatroom
While I was searching the web for information about web hoaxes an ad for an online
casino appeared in a popup window in my browser6. The ad proved to be highly relevant
to the topic I was researching: it was a simulation of a chatroom where fictional
characters mention the casino in what appears to be the middle of a conversation. A
large space at the top of the window was followed by the following text displayed in the
font Courier:
Caroline> So anyway, that's my story today
Beneath this was a smaller space with a blinking cursor, looking just like the space in
which you type your own comments in a chatting environment. Though I could see from
the title bar and the surrounding graphics that this was an ad, Caroline’s brief reference
to an ongoing conversation and a story intrigued me. Rather than close the browser
window immediately as I usually do when ad windows open up, I moused over it
wondering whether it could possibly be a real chatroom that was perhaps sponsored by
the casino. I clicked on the blinking cursor to see if I could write something there.
Instantly, another line appeared in the chat space:
Sharon7up> wow! Looks like you could use a little fun
                                                  
6 The ad was for the online casino 888.com, and appeared in a pop-up window when I
was reading another website on 6 December 2002. The ad was from doubleclick.net, but
when I returned to the URL I had bookmarked the next day, another ad had taken its
place, and I have not been able to find it since.
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I clicked again, curious though I realised that this was probably scripted. But at this
click, the illusion fell apart as all the remaining lines came tumbling out at once:
Caroline> But I can't go out now - I'm waiting for the cable technician
Joni2go> You don't need to go out! We're going to play craps online - why don't you join
us?
Caroline> I don't know... is it safe?
Sharon7up> of course it's safe! You know me - I only go with the best, and 888.com is
the best place to play casino games online. You can play as long as you like for free!
The content of the ad is not particularly original. The technique of a staged situation
where a person’s friends convince her to buy or try the product is familiar from
television and print ads.  What is interesting here is the seamlessness of the ad. It
disguises itself as a window on a real chatroom, complete with the blinking cursor that
deceitfully promises I can add my words to this conversation. We are presented with a
fragment of a narrative. Caroline’s first line, the teaser that lured me into clicking the
ad, referred to a story she had just told but that I was too late to hear. Caroline has the
final word too, but though we are told no more, the story appears to continue without
us:
Caroline> Sounds really great :) maybe I will join you. You know, that reminds me...
After reading this I clicked the window again, just in case there was more, but it just
started over, looping back to an empty chat window except for Caroline’s first line: “So
anyway, that's my story today.”
Fictional characters
Like her namesake in Online Caroline, the casino Caroline is a fictional character
represented through a digital medium. Though the code that scripts or generates each of
these Carolines is probably inseparable from the rest of the code controlling the system
the characters exist in, I perceive these Carolines as discrete entities and as
personalities. When I see online Caroline in the web cam, or read her emails, or when I
see casino Caroline’s  opening line, I imagine each of these as a person. Fictional,
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perhaps, but still a person, just as I imagine Peter Pan as a person rather than as a mass
of words.
My relationship with Caroline of Online Caroline is that of a simulated
friendship. What is my relationship with casino Caroline? Well, there is no actual
interaction between her and me. What I see is simply an animation of a chat session
that has been programmed to show me a line at a time as I click on it. There is a space
that looks as though I could type my own contributions to the conversation into it, but
clicking on it merely makes the preset animation jog onto the next step. However, I
imagine the possibility of being able to communicate with the people that are
represented: Caroline, Sharon7up and Joni2go. I imagine the possibility of social
interaction between us, though I don’t necessarily imagine the words and sentences of
an actual dialogue.
Lisbeth Klastrup has developed a typology of different kinds of interactivity to
describe virtual worlds such as those found in Everquest and MUDs  (Klastrup 2003).
The worlds of Kaycee Nicole, Wendi, Switty, His Highness Hamed Isa bin Sulman al
Khalifa, Sharon7up and Caroline the would-be gambler are not virtual worlds like
Everquest, but they are fictional worlds and they negotiate various relationships to the
actual world. Online Caroline has fooled some of its users into thinking it’s real
(Armstrong 2000), but is in interviews and other contexts presented as art and fiction.
It has even garnered arts funding and awards. The email spammers and the casino ad
construct fictional worlds to entice customers or fool people and with the clear goal of
earning money. Kaycee Nicole was created for unknown reasons, but the fiction has
never been presented as art or been shown to have given any material benefit to its
creator.
Often we are uncertain of a world’s status as fictional or actual, as in the case of
Salam Pax or Lt Smash (Lt. Smash 2003;  Pax 2003). It is entirely possible, even
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probable that Salam Pax is the pseudonym of an actual Iraqi citizen who blogged from
Bagdad as the war on Iraq began in 2003, just as it is entirely possible that Lt Smash is
the pseudonym of a genuine US soldier who blogged from the front. Yet discussions
have raged as to whether these two bloggers are hoaxes, fictions or propaganda (Walker
2003a). People have searched to find a boundary, cracks in the illusion that would prove
these worlds to be fictional, but though IP numbers and information about ownership of
the domain blogs and photos are hosted on can be tracked down, so far they can neither
prove the sites to be authentic or fraudulent, actual or fictional.
Perhaps possible worlds theory would be the best way of mapping these potential
or simply possible worlds. Like the possible worlds of fiction, the worlds of Salam Pax
and Lt Smash share many qualities with our actual world. our world, Salam’s world and
Smash’s world the geography of the world is the same, the war is the same (though seen
from different perspectives) and the same media broadcast the same stories. Salam
watches BBC World and Al Jazeera just as we may. A fictional world departs from the
actual world in certain aspects. Harry Potter’s world shares London and world history
and geography with the  actual world, but the existence of magic and wizards has been
added. The world of James Bond has even more in common with the actual world, but
has added some people and probably some drama to it.
While James Bond and Harry Potter are clearly contained within books, films
and merchandise, Salam Pax’s possible world has leaky borders. In addition to his
weblog, he exists in emails sent to and quoted by some of his readers, in the IP number
he posts from which he can be tracked down, in the details of his email address and his
missing friend Raed’s email profile at yahoo.com. While Harry Potter’s world is overlaid
our actual world, Salam Pax’s permeates it. If he is authentic, then of course this is no
different from the way each of us permeates, affects and interprets our world. Kaycee
Nicole’s world did not have clear boundaries either. She was a fictional character
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inserted into the actual world. She participated in chat sessions, wrote emails and
published a web diary. The people who interacted with her did so as themselves in the
actual world. This is what the Nigerian spammers aim for too.
Alternate reality gaming, or unfiction, is a movement in entertainment that
dissolves the boundaries that usually delineate fictional works from the actual world
deliberately. Players of these games are usually aware of the fictionality of their game,
but enjoy the fact that clues can be found on apparently authentic websites, or that a
gaming event might take place at any time without warning that this is part of the game
you’re playing. Majestic, the game that plays you that I mentioned in the chapter on
Online Caroline, was one such game, but it was discontinued after only a few months.
Other games have been developed as publicity for movies and conventional computer
games, and fans and players share information about various games in discussion
groups and mailing lists. Unfiction.com is one of the sites collating information about
the phenomenon, which according to the site’s history of the genre is only a few years
old.
How then does our interaction with a fictional world without clear boundaries
against the actual world differ from our interaction with a clearly bordered fictional
world?
Everquest is a clearly separate world where users role-play characters that belong
to the virtual world. Though players may invest a lot of actual time, emotions and even
money in their characters, it is easy to separate a character in Everquest from the actual
player who controls that character. The worlds have clear boundaries.
Let me try to describe the characters in our dramas using Klastrup’s terminology,
despite the lack of boundaries between worlds. The Nigerian emailers and Kaycee
Nicole would be Player Characters, or instances of a Player-in-Avatar: they are roles
played or performed by humans. Our two Carolines, on the other hand, would be NPCs,
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Non Playing Characters. They are bots, pieces of software built to simulate a human –
or rather, to simulate a character on the same ontological domain as the player’s
character. NPCs and their reactions and characteristics are programmed by humans,
but no human controls them once they are up and running. But our Carolines are
different from NPCs, as well. They are inseparable from the works they belong to, and
on the level of code have no independent existence. An NPC in LambdaMOO at first
glance looks like a Player Character, that is, an avatar controlled by a human. It can be
duplicated or changed without making changes to the rest of the world. With a little
effort, it can be ported to another MOO running the same basic code as LambdaMOO.
An NPC in a proprietory system like Everquest probably can’t be ported to another
world, but it is represented in basically the same way as the avatars of human players.
In virtual worlds like Everquest  there are no mere onlookers. To enter the world,
you yourself have to play a role. You are a player character, and  your representation in
the world is identical to other player characters and to many NPCs as well. How then
are we represented in the fictional worlds of Online Caroline or the Nigerian spams?
As the user or human participant, I’m not directly represented in Online
Caroline. Caroline refers to me and addresses me, but I can’t put up my own web cam in
the same space as she has hers. I do fill out forms, and the pages of questions that I
answer are the place in which we are most equally represented. For the forms I’ve
already filled out, my answers are set out alongside Caroline’s (see Figure 8 on page 72).
In this small space we’re almost equal.
In the casino ad I am not represented at all. However, because I am familiar with
the chat interface, I assume that I can be represented, or at least I assume this if I take
the chat interface at face value. It looks as though I could type into the box with the
blinking cursor, and my words would be displayed in the communal chat space, along
with Caroline’s, Joni2go’s and Susan7up’s words. In fact typing is impossible, but if I
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never test the possibility I may continue to think that it is real. There is a promise of
potential representation, which is, after all, a familiar aspect of online communication
with other humans: I am a member of several email lists which I never post to, but the
knowledge that I could post is important to me. In the casino ad I am represented as a
lurker. This is a perfectly valid mode of existence on the net: you are present, but
invisible.
Interacting with a machine
What if we think of the fictional characters as machines that are partners in interaction?
In all these works, my interaction, or perceived interaction, with individual characters is
crucial to my engagement with the work.
When I engage with Online Caroline my interaction with the character Caroline
is as important to me as my  interaction with the work as a whole. In works like
afternoon (Joyce 1990), Magic-tree.com (Lander 2002) or the net.art classic jodi.org
the user interacts with the work as a whole and finds out about fictional characters
while remaining safely outside of the fictional world. When fictional characters relate
directly to the user, the user is drawn into the fictional world. Rather than interacting
with the work (the kind of interaction that Lisbeth Klastrup (2003) specifies as
information retrieval, manipulation and navigation) the user enters the fictional world
that is prescribed by the work, and  interacts with the fictional characters that inhabit
that world.
Social interactions are increasingly being mechanised and automated as are
many other aspects of our society. Social relationships between actual humans are
represented by networks, ratings and reputation management in online social
networking systems like Friendster.com, Ryze.org and Everyonesconnected.com. It is a
cliché by now that television has replaced family conversations. Fortune-tellers and
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prostitutes peddle their wares by telephone, and various kinds of robot toys not only
demand virtual feeding and nurturing, but will tell stories or fight other robot toys.
Perhaps then the simulation of characters should be seen as a genre unto itself.
Dolls would be the origin of this genre. Software bots like Eliza (Weizenbaum 1966) are
the more ambitious members of the family, as they attempt to convince humans they
communicate with that they are humans too. Each year the Loebner contest chooses the
most convincing human simulation from a host of software programs designed to
respond in writing to a human partner’s input. Eliza, developed in 1966, uses the simple
technique of posing as a Rogerian psychologist, which allows her to turn back anything
the user says according to a simple set of rules. The user communicates with Eliza
through a text interface that is similar to that we saw in Zork:
> Hello, I am Eliza.
* Are you human?
> Would you prefer if I were not human?
* I think  you are a computer.
> Does it please you to believe I am a computer? (Weizenbaum, Wallace and Dunlop
1999)
Online Caroline’s rules are much less flexible than those that Eliza follows. Eliza’s rules
are general enough that the user can type almost anything and Eliza will be able to
respond in a more perform a very limited set of actions. Users can ask Eliza questions,
though her answer will probably be another question, but in Online Caroline user’s can
only answer questions that have already been asked. There are usually only two or three
possible answers to a question, and rather than typing them freely, the user is given a
multiple choice questionaire. Since there are so few user options, Online Caroline can
have fully scripted responses to each of the possible user inputs. Yet even with this very
limited flexibility, many readers have thought that Caroline was a real human, just as
others have been fooled, for a while, by Eliza and other bots.
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Online Caroline and casino Caroline may not be full machine subjects but they
are at the very least machine-projections of social partners. Let me back up a little and
discuss the more general idea of machines as social beings.
Machines simulating humans
In 1950 Alan Turing wrote an article describing a game that would become known as
“The Turing Test” (Turing 1950). No machine has yet passed the test, but it is still a
frequently invoked measure of artificial intelligence. Turing starts his essay by asking
the question “Can machines think?” He soon discards this question as too vague and
impossible to answer, and replaces it with a new problem:
The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game that we call the
'imitation game'. It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an
interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from
the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the
other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at
the end of the game he says either 'X is A and Y is B' or 'X is B and Y is A'. The
interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B thus:
 C: Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair?
 Now suppose X is actually A [the man], then A must answer. It is A's object in the game
to try and cause C [the interrogator] to make the wrong identification. His answer might
therefore be
'My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches long.'
 In order that tones of voice may not help the interrogator the answers should be written,
or better still, typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter communicating
between the two rooms. Alternatively the question and answers can be repeated by an
intermediary. The object of the game for the third player (B [the woman]) is to help the
interrogator. The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful answers. She can add
such things as 'I am the woman, don't listen to him!' to her answers, but it will avail
nothing as the man can make similar remarks.
 We now ask the question, 'What will happen when a machine takes the part of A [the
man] in this game?' Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is
played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These
questions replace our original, 'Can machines think?' (Turing 1950: 433-434)
The question Turing then suggests as more useful than “Can machines think?” is
basically, “Can machines role-play?” The ability to play roles, to pretend, to engage in
make-believe, is arguably the most human quality there is. We are social animals. The
135
seemingly most basic human needs of food and shelter in most cases depend on our
ability to adopt social roles and fit into society. In most societies expulsion from the
group is the worst punishment of all, often equivalent with death. Children learn to
behave acceptably by imitating the people around them; by seeing a role and trying to
fill it. As adults we learn to play many roles: parent, lover, provider, colleague, friend,
teacher, student, daughter, sister. We are experts at role-playing and know exactly
which role to play at which times. We scream on a roller-coaster but never on the bus
(unless the bus behaves like a roller-coaster). We know we shouldn’t swear at old ladies.
Sometimes several roles are available to us: silent young woman, confident professional,
pushy bitch. Sometimes our roles are in conflict with each other. We play roles
constantly.
Today machines can compute numbers and disarm bombs and gather food, and
they can do it faster and more efficiently than we can, if we program them properly.
Role-playing is still the final frontier, as in Turing’s day. Computers can be programmed
to pretend to be humans so well that they trick many people into thinking they really are
humans – if our only communication with the machine is via the net, say, and only
textual.
Turing wrote of this imagined skill at role-playing as a test of computers in 1950.
Today our experience of computers is complex and personal. Computers can be
intimate, personal tools accompanying us in myriad tasks and situations. I invest my
computer with my own subjectivity and with a feeling that it has an agency of its own.
My computer is a private space that functions as an extension of me,  “my outboard
brain” (Doctorow 2002), and at the same time it acts like a distinct other:
The computer itself, even without any fantasy content, is an enchanted object.
Sometimes it can act like an autonomous, animate being, sensing its environment and
carrying out internally generated processes, yet it can also seem like an extension of our
own consciousness, capturing our words through the keyboard and displaying them on
the screen as fast as we can think them. (Murray 1997: 99)
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Narratives and computers are “ambiguous psychological locations”, Murray argues,
“something safely outside ourselves (..) upon which we can project our feelings”. (100)
Donna Haraway writes that it is possible to have social relationships with
machines:
I insist that social relationships include nonhumans as well as humans as socially (or
what is the same thing for this odd congeries, sociotechnically) active partners. All that is
unhuman is not un-kind, outside kinship, outside the orders of signification, excluded
from trading in signs and wonders. (Haraway 1997: 8)
This is probably not exactly the kind of relationship we have with Online Caroline. I
have something approaching a social relationship with my laptop computer, though our
relationship is closer to that between a human and a dog than one between two humans.
I tell my computer off when it won’t behave, caress it when I approve of it, groom it
until I am happy with its appearance and train it to do the things I want it to do. My
computer and I have an intimate dependency on each other. Perhaps it won’t really
mind when I buy a new computer and leave my current one gathering dust in a closet,
but I depend on it for communication with other humans, entertainment and work.
Caroline does not act as a computer, on the contrary: she simulates a human being. It
makes as much sense to think of her as a simulated human as as one of Haraway’s non-
humans.
Perhaps my computer’s unyielding non-humanity is the reason why my
relationship with it is so strong. It doesn’t pretend to be human, as Caroline does.
Machines that are indistinguishable from humans have fascinated and terrified us for
centuries. Intelligent machines, conscious machines, emotional machines, cyborgs,
androids, robots: our stories and games tell of all these. Pinocchio wanted to be a real
boy, similarly to, though less threateningly than, the clay Golem of legend who, learning
what people know, wanted to be a person. Humanoid robots in Asimov’s science fiction
were benevolent only because they had been programmed with strict rules making them
unable to harm humans.
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In the popular late 1990s film The Matrix, a traditional fear of science fiction is
reiterated: machines have taken over the world and made humans their slaves. The
Matrix presents a dual structure between the real world, where humans are bred and
kept in tubs, feeding the machines with their bio-energy. To keep the humans happy
and alive, an extensive simulation is fed to their brains so that the humans think that
they are living in a late 20th century world. The machines generate infinitely replicating
simulated humans as agents to act within the simulated world. Endless copies of this
simulated Agent Smith fight Neo and other humans who have become aware of the real
state of affairs.
Caroline could be seen as a frightening, machinic Agent Smith, a simulated
human who can step into our perceived reality in order to control us. Perhaps this is
why people are so furious when they discover they have believed in a hoax website or
thought that Online Caroline was real? Our anger may be a simple self-defensive
mechanism, because we know that our dependency on our machines carries with it a
very real risk.
Immersed or trapped?
Perhaps this has changed in the last few years. The web is continuous and we use it daily
for communication, information and entertainment. Murray describes a Holodeck
which is a clearly bordered work of art that users choose to engage with. The fictional
worlds presented in this chapter are far less clearly outlined. They arrive in the user’s
email inbox uninvited, they are episodes torn out of sequence and never presented as
whole, complete works. They are suggestions of fictional worlds where the user is often
unsure even as to their status as fictional or actual. What is the user’s position in
relation to these worlds?
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Immersion is the feeling of being inside a fictional world. Feeling immersed
relies on what Coleridge called “the suspension of disbelief”, but which is perhaps more
properly “the pretension of belief”, as Pavel dubs it (Pavel 1986), or in Janet Murray’s
words, “the active creation of belief” (Murray 1997: 110). Walton’s theory of fictional
works also stresses this, emphasising our pretence: we feel part of a fictional world
because we pretend to be part of it, and because we generate that world through our
game of make-believe.
The concept of the avatar is frequently used to avoid seeing the actual user as
internal to the fictional world. The avatar is inside the fictional world, and I control it
like a puppet. If we try to align the concept of avatar with Walton’s make-believe, the
avatar is a role we play. Pavel might call it the projection of our egos into the fictional
world.
Interestingly, the word avatar originally meant just the opposite of an actual
person’s extension into fiction. On the contrary, an avatar is a term from Hindu
mythology, and is the embodiment of a deity on earth. Had Christianity used the term,
we might have called Jesus an avatar. In its original sense, then, the term avatar
encompassed the simultaneity of this dual existence, this dual ontology as Pavel calls it,
without forcing a choice between actual and sacred.
The avatar, in this interpretation, need not even be a “projected ego”, but is a tool
“transmitting signification to a parallel world”, as Gregory Little writes in The Avatar
Manifesto. This view could easily coexist with the narrative communication model of an
actual reader and writer both clearly distanced from each other and from the text itself.
[T]he avatar is a mythic figure with its origin in one world and projected or passing
through a form of representation appropriate to a parallel world. The avatar is a
delegate, a tool or instrument allowing an agency to transmit signification to a parallel
world. (..) the original remains in its originary environment while sending a tool of
signification, the avatar, into a second. (..) The avatar is essentially a visual
representation, a virtual instrument or imaged prosthesis of its referent – the user, and
so fundamentally related to linguistic signs and representational icons. (Little 1998)
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In digital media, avatars are our projections into fictional worlds or other mediated
environments such as chat rooms. As Janet Murray notes, there are several stories
about readers entering a story, or people entering other fictional worlds. In these
stories, the reader rarely has an avatar, but enters fully, as herself. Often time in the
actual world ceases: the paradox of existing in two worlds at once is solved by making
the time scales of the worlds different from each other. The protagonist is fully absent
from the actual world, but her absence is not discovered because no actual time passes.
This is the case in C. S. Lewis’s Narnia series (the children enter a world that is not
posited as fictional in the actual world of the novels, but that is clearly separated from
the actual world of mid-twentieth century England), and in E. Nesbit’s The Magic City
(where the fictional world has been constructed in blocks by one of the children in the
story). There are many stories about the places Pavel calls ontological fusion points.
These places are magic places where two worlds meet, where humans may find
themselves slipping into the land of faery, perhaps never to return, or to return a
hundred years later when all their friends and family are dead and gone, as Rip van
Winkle did.
Michael Ende’s The Neverending Story is an example of such a novel. The
protagonist Bastian, a lonely young boy, finds and reads a book which is also called The
Neverending Story. Bastian’s story and the story of the fictional world in the book he is
reading alternate in the novel. This book that Bastian reads (the book described in the
book that we read) tells the tale of Fantastica, a fictional world where the Childlike
Empress will die unless a human names her, and thereby enters the fictional world.
Fantastica is thus a fictional world twice removed from our actual world: it is a fiction
inside a fiction. It becomes clear, as we read, that that human who must save the
Childlike Empress is Bastian. But he is frightened of becoming trapped in the fiction,
and hesitates, upon which the hero Atreyu says
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‘He just doesn’t want to come here. He just doesn’t care about you or Fantastica. You
don’t mean a thing to him.’
The Childlike Empress stared wide-eyed at Atreyu.
‘No! No! Bastian cried out. ‘You mustn’t think that! It’s not that at all! Oh, please,
please, don’t think that!’ (Ende 1984: 150)
Bastian still doesn’t dare to enter the fictional world, and so the Childlike Empress
makes the story restart from the beginning, right from the beginning, so that Bastian
finds himself reading about himself finding the book and beginning to read it. Rather
than be caught in this endless loop of reading he gives the Childlike Empress her name
and enters Fantastica to become a saviour of the fictional world.
Our fear of being trapped in a fictional world is reiterated in Harry Potter and
the Chamber of Secrets (Rowlings 1998), where first Ginny and later Harry enter an old
diary that turns out to be enchanted by Voldemort, Harry’s arch enemy. The younger
version of Voldemort that exists inside the diary exploits Ginny’s insecurity and
empathy, controlling her in ways that affect the actual world of the  novel and that
endanger the whole wizarding world.
In both Harry Potter and The Neverending Story, the readers’ care for the
fictional characters is essential to their being sucked into the fiction. Ginny felt sorry for
the boy in the diary, while Bastian is mortified that the characters he is reading about
think that he doesn’t care about them. Kaycee Nicole likewise appeared to feed upon her
audience’s care and sympathy.
Making readers care about the fictional characters has always been crucial to
fiction, as is evident from Aristotle’s demand that tragedy should bring forth the
spectator’s pity and fear (Whalley, Baxter and Atherton 1997). With the power to make
readers care comes a fear of caring too much, as we see in these stories where (fictional)
readers literally enter the stories they’re reading, and in novels like Don Quixote and
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Madame Bovary, where readers want their own lives to be like a novel (Cervantes
Saavedra 1950;  Flaubert 1950).
In literature the world entered is often a world described in a story, and so the
ontological fusion is described as being in narrative itself. Representation is often
posited as a window to another world. Often, this window is conceived as transparent
but impossible to open or go through.
Metalepsis
The motif of readers and viewers entering the represented world is common enough for
Genette to call this kind of transition of a character from one diegetic level to another
metalepsis (Genette 1980: 234-237). Yet in the examples above from literature and film
this metalepsis is always represented; it remains within the textual world. I can read
about Bastian who enters the world he is reading about, but I can’t enter either Bastian’s
world or the world in which the Childlike Empress exists. With digital media, as with
games, the boundaries between my world and the represented world are much less
clear.
Classical representational art presents physical boundaries between the viewer
and the object. There is the canvas and frame of a painting, the paper, ink and binding
of a book, the stage in theatre, the screen of the cinema, the television set and the
computer. Within these material frames and boundaries we have formal ones, like the
genre conventions that let us separate the different worlds of television: news,
commercials, soap operas, reality TV. Some representational art refuses this separation
from the viewer, dispensing with material boundaries all together: as in sculpture,
frescos, architecture, music, virtual reality, installation art and street theatre.
Janet Murray writes about immersion in electronic stories and games, and asks:
How will we know what to do when we jump into the screen? How will we avoid ripping
apart the fabric of the illusion? (Murray 1997: 106)
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She answers her question by giving examples of various ways in which an immersive
experience can be structured, and also talks of “threshold objects” that are in a sense
between worlds. The mouse and keyboard can be seen as threshold objects, influencing
both worlds (108), as are game world objects that we are able to control in predictable
ways from our world (112).
Fusion
The fictional worlds of Kaycee Nicole, the Nigerian 419 scam, the popup casino ad and
the emails from Wendi and Switty do not require threshold objects. We don’t need to
“jump into the screen” in order to feel immersed in these worlds. Rather than entering
the fictional worlds of these characters we engage in a dialogue with fictional
inhabitants of those worlds.
Perhaps metalepsis has become so common in films and literature because this
bridging of worlds is familiar to us. Ringing a friend in Spain or Australia I establish a
dialogue between inhabitants of worlds that in many ways are quite separate, although
both are actual by common distinctions. Lt Smash’s weblog is as real – or fictional – to
me as Kaycee Nicole’s diaries were, or as Online Caroline appears to be.
For now, Caroline, Kaycee Nicole, Wendi and their siblings are for the most part
benign simulations of humans. They are created by humans and automated by
machines, and there is little formal difference between these characters and the more
explicitly fictional simulations of humans we are familiar with from popular culture:
Lara Croft, Peter Pan, Luke Skywalker. Caroline, Kaycee Nicole and Wendi are different
because they enter our everyday life, just as Mr Andersen and his copies enter the
simulation of ordinary human life in The Matrix.
Participating in a dialogic relationship with fictional characters requires an
element of trust. I am willing to enter Caroline’s world, in Online Caroline, because I
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know that it is fictional and trust that my surrender of control is limited. Online
Caroline plays with the boundaries of my actual world, but does not affect my actual
friendships, my income, my home or my family. If David’s boss came knocking on my
door, forcing me to eat pineapples, I would probably not be as enthusiastic about having
trusted this fiction.
Sometimes the allure of ontological interaction is used to trap us in a fiction, as
in the Nigerian 419 scam. Here the user may indeed become trapped just as Bastian is
trapped in the fictional world of Fantastica. Perhaps the victims of the Kaycee Nicole
hoax felt trapped just in the same way.
144
C H A P T E R  7  C L I C K  HE R E  TO  K I L L
B I N  LAD E N
This chapter discusses a series of political web games  that make statements about
international politics. The Bin Laden games appeared right after the terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and are ritualised
slayings of the man assumed to have masterminded the attacks. Other games I discuss
present the horror of the subsequent wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, and simulate the
increased surveillance of citizens and the treatment of captive terrorists.
My main focus when examining these games is control and restriction. While
commercial games rarely make the user’s lack of control a theme, it is an important
motif in almost all these political games, as it is in the interactive art works I discuss in
other chapters of this thesis.
It has been questioned whether political games or games dealing with ethical
issues are possible at all (Frasca 2001a). There are not many examples of overtly
political computer games, though it can be argued that any game carries with it an
implicit ideology. The surge of non-commercial, political web games in response to
September 11 and subsequent events is therefore very significant and suggests that
games are becoming a popular medium for expression as well as of entertainment.
Because of the great cost of developing a full scale computer game, games have
mostly been developed by the commercial gaming industry, and their main goal is of
course to make money. There are also many small-scale games that are made by gamers
or as part of marketing and branding strategies and shared on the web or distributed
informally through networks of friends. By the turn of the century, tools like Flash and
Shockwave made simple game development easier than ever, and community sites on
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the web, along with personal sites, gave these grass root games efficient distribution
channels.
Community-based games
The political web games I’ve found are all developed by individuals rather than by a
commercial or even political organisation. They are small, taking a matter of hours or
days to make and minutes to play. They have all been made quickly in response to
current events, and they have simple premises, gameplay and imagery. Some of the
games are published on personal web sites, while others have been uploaded to
community sites.
Newgrounds.com is one of the largest and most popular of the community sites
that focus on web games. Members of Newgrounds upload Flash games and animations,
play the games uploaded by other members, and discuss the merits and flaws of these
games. Each game is displayed with author information and the author’s comments
about the game, and the number of reviews for each title is often in the hundreds. The
reviews are usually very brief and often inane or abusive. Still, they can be pithy and to
the point, and the criticism can be quite constructive. Here is a typical comment to Bad
Dudes vs. Bin Laden: “i like the part when u kick him in the nuts and the finishing move
but add more people to it” ("User comments", Fulp 2001) This review is
unsophisticated, but specifies the game’s good qualities and offers constructive
criticism. The community also recognises development in individual contributors’ work,
and reviews often discuss a work in relation to its author’s previous creations. Also it’s
clear that the reviewer assumes that the review will be read by the game’s author, and
that the author will consider advice and perhaps change either this game or future
games. Few reviews discuss the political aspect of the games other than to crow that
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they like kicking Bin Laden in the nuts. I suppose that is a political commentary of sorts,
and its lack of sophistication does match that of the game.
 The games at Newgrounds are made by individuals or small groups of friends,
and they are quick and fairly easy to make. Because of this ease, Flash games have
become a medium in which opinions and feelings can be fairly easily expressed. It is
clear from the author’s statements at Newgrounds that most of the political web games
are created not only as a form of self-expression but as a ritual or self-therapy. This
ritual experience appears to be shared by the players of the games.
I had this need to see Bin Laden die! I made this game so I could see it over and over.
Splatter his ass all over the desert! ("Author's comments" Lippard 2001)
This is my little way to vent my anger and pain about what happened at the World Trade
Center in New York. I hope it will put a smile or two on people's faces. I'd like to thank
everyone for the overwhelming positive reactions. (“Author’s comments” Bregman 2001)
After September 11 so many games about Bin Laden were uploaded to Newgrounds that
special themed categories were made for the games. A few months later a more general
“War on Terrorism” category was added as well. People outside of the Newground
community were alerted to the games by links on discussion forums, weblogs and news
sites. Within a few weeks Wired and Le Monde published articles about the Bin Laden
games (Benner 2001;  Jardonnet 2001), and general interest community sites like
Metafilter.com and Plastic.com started discussing the games.
Other games were published on personal web sites or on smaller community
sites. One of the most popular games, New York Defender, was posted to a French site
for web games, Uzinagaz.com. This site appears to belong to a group of game developers
rather than being an open community like Newgrounds. Gonzalo Frasca posted Kabul
Kaboom! to his personal site Ludology.org, and Ashcroft Online 1.0 and Gulf War 2 are
both from another personal site, Idleworm.com. Bin Laden Liquors was first published
at Fieler.com, a site belonging to the games creator. By 2003, that site only showed links
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to casinos and pornsites. The game is still available in multiple copies at many other
sites, though.
Most of the games from Newgrounds are pro-war, and the reviewers’ comments
are often harshly critical of liberal and pacifist views. Most participants in the
community appear to be American and there is a lot of emphasis on the post-September
11 American brand of patriotism. New York Defender is French and more ambiguous.
Later games on the Uzinagaz site, like the lesser known New York Defender 2, are
strikingly apolitical despite their setting. New York Defender 2 presents the player with
a map of Manhattan and a tiny surveillance plane that is controlled with the player’s
arrow keys. When the player steers the surveillance plane close to passenger jets, they
light up green or red. The red ones have been hijacked and must be shot down; the
green ones are innocent and must not be shot down. The game is macabre, but it is
simply presented as a technical challenge. The game may have received so little
attention because of its lacking political stance, but it is more likely to have won its
obscurity due to the gameplay being slow, repetitive and unchallenging.
The games by Frasca and from Idleworm are overtly critical of the aggression
against Afghanistan and Iraq, and of the increasing surveillance and control of ordinary
citizens after September 11. There does not appear to be a game community for this
political viewpoint. Community sites like Newgrounds are more right-wing and
generally games posted there express right-wing sympathies. Left-wing satires like
those from Frasca and Idleworm are posted on personal sites and like the Bin Laden
games, have been publicised on discussion forums and weblogs, as well as on political
and academic mailing lists.
There are far fewer anti-war games than there are pro-war games. This is
consistent with Frasca’s research on games about the Holocaust:
Interestingly, as far as we know, the only games that explore the Holocaust are
underground pro-Nazi  videogames. These games, while not extremely popular, receive
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sporadic media attention as they emerge, like Camus’ pestilent rats, from their
hideaways in the Internet. In one game in particular, which was available in many
European BBSes during the early nineties, the player was offered to take the role of a
concentration camp administrator and had to coordinate mass murders. (Frasca 2001a:
173)
The games we see at Newgrounds are supportive of the dominant US regime rather than
of the Nazis, and in late 2001 the basic theme of brutalising bin Laden was hardly
underground or seen as criminal as neo-Nazis are. However some of the games are
sadly reminiscent of the concentration camp game Frasca describes. Al Quaidamon
allows the player to beat up the prisoner, who is of course a suspected terrorist and not
an innocent civilian arrested because of his or her race.
Frasca suggests a possible answer to the question of why there is no humanist
game about the Holocaust: “a computer game through the eyes of a Holocaust victim
might be perceived as even more monstrous than a neo-nazi game” {Frasca, 2001
#107@173}. This seems to be consistent with the criticism of New York Defender, which
does not portray gratuitous maiming, as being “insensitive” (Discussion on
Metafilter.com, 7 October 2001).
Goals and hindrances
Ludo, Chess and Space Invaders are all games that present the player with goals that
are difficult to attain because of hindrances in the form of puzzles, dexterity challenges
and luck. The goal of Ludo, for instance, is to get all your tokens to the centre of the
board before anyone else can. This goal is meaningless outside of the gaming situation.
Seen from outside of the game, the goal is trivial. It can be simply achieved by simply
lifting up your tokens and moving them. Doing that, of course, would completely spoil
the game, but it demonstrates that the hindrances between player and goal are both
elective and the point of the game.
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Games rely on restrictions. Games must restrict the player’s freedom, or there is
no game. “A game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles7”, writes
Bernard Suits  (1978: 41). Roger Caillois, writing in 1958, notes the “gratuitous
difficulty” that is  innate in ludus (2001: 27). Most games (all, by some definitions) have
a goal that the player must aim for. Restrictions on permitted behaviour delay the
player’s achieving the goal, as do puzzles and difficulties and sometimes chance.  The
sole purpose of these restrictions is that they create the game. Solitaire without
restrictions on where cards may be placed is no longer a game: it is merely sorting out
cards. In computer games that are set in a world, rather than being pure puzzle games
like Solitaire or Tetris, the world will have limits and there will be objects that the player
can imagine that don’t exist in the gameworld. Even in Solitaire the textual basis of the
game is limited: there are no Princesses or elevens in the deck. Rules are restrictions on
the player’s freedom.
At the same time, games tend to proclaim the player’s autonomy and freedom.
Computer games, especially, emphasise the player’s agency, and as simulation becomes
a growing basis in all computer games, rules are downplayed. Of course rules don’t
disappear, but they become less explicit. In a simulation like The Sims there are plenty
of rules determining what can be done and what effects any player action can have, but
                                                  
7 Suits’s book is devoted to discussing the definition of games, and many objections to
this definition are debated The full definition, from which the “portable” definition
above is taken, is as follows:
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using
only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more
efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are
accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]. I also offer the
following simpler and, so to speak, more portable version of the above: playing a game is
the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles. Bernard Suits, The
Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Toronto, Buffalo: University of Buffalo Press,
1978) 41.
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most of these rules are never spelled out as they are in a game of Monopoly (see also
Johnson-Eilola 1998)
All the bin Laden games at Newgrounds have the same goal: harm and ultimately
kill bin Laden. The goal is extremely easy to attain: there are hardly any hindrances at
all here. The interface is simple, the tasks are simple, and it is almost impossible not to
attain the goal within a few minutes.
In these games the usual relationship between goal and hindrances is inverted.
Whereas the goal in Ludo is rather arbitrary, and mostly a pretext for engaging with the
strategy and luck involved in the hindrances, the goal in the Bin Laden games is their
whole point. These political web games emphasise the goal above the hindrances.
Bad Dudes vs. Bin Laden
Bad Dudes vs. Bin Laden is a typical game from the Newgrounds collection of bin
Laden games. The instructions on the entry describe an extremely simple interface:
simply click your mouse where you want to punch bin Laden:
We have Osama bin Laden in custody.
Are you a bad enough dude to kick his ass?
Instructions: Simply click your mouse where you want to punch bin Laden. Click
anywhere to start. (Fulp 2001)
The game has a rudimentary scoring system where the player’s remaining life is
compared to bin Laden’s remaining life. Bin Laden does hit back, but will only really
harm the player if the player does nothing. The game encourages harsh means, and a
mouse click on bin Laden’s torso translates to a fictional punch in the balls (see the
middle image in Figure 12).
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Figure 12: Screenshots from Bad Dudes vs. Bin Laden. The text in the first image reads “We’ve got no
problem with our Arab buddies... except for one.” The third image shows the final scene where
the “Dude” kicks off bin Laden’s head.
The player controls an avatar in this game, whereas the other games I discuss leave the
player outside of the represented space, controlling abstract crosshatches or, in Bin
Laden Liquors, controlling a disembodied hand holding a pistol. The “dude” the player
controls in Bad Dudes is a heavily muscled body-builder with fighting gloves. In the
screen that immediately follows the instructions (the first image in Figure 12) there are
two dudes, though only one is involved in the fights. They are as alike as clones, and
display their muscles in careful poses, with tight-fitting singlets emphasising their
pectorals. In the background we see the skyline of New York, without the twin towers of
the World Trade Center. The fighting, on the other hand, appears to take place in an
Arabic bazaar, unpopulated, but filled with banners and stalls. The winning sequence is
abstracted from time and place altogether, and as the Dude kicks bin Laden’s head right
off, the background explodes into a red blast of blood and victory. The lack of realism in
the backgrounds and setting corresponds to the lack of realism in bin Laden’s
decapitation and in the ease of killing him. These elements are not realistic, they are
symbolic.
The difficulty level is so low that acquiring greater skill becomes uninteresting.
The interface is undemanding: "simply click your mouse". The simplicity of the interface
parallels the un-nuanced political statements made in the games. This is also their
152
strength. These games are popular because they're quick to play and easy to understand:
they have an extremely clear message.
In their very simplicity, these games epitomise the essence of the fighting game
genre: kill or be killed, shoot or be shot at. Marie-Laure Ryan suggests that shooting
may be particularly suited to computer games because the medium encourages us to
want to act often and for our actions to be responded to:
The predominance of violence in computer games has been widely attributed to cultural
factors, but I think that it can be partly explained by a desire for immediate response.
Moreover, of all human actions, none is better simulated by clicking on a control device,
than pulling a trigger. I am not trying to defend the violence of computer games but it
seems to me that the theme of shooting exploits with frightful efficiency the reactive
nature of the medium. (Ryan 2001a)
The lack of challenge in the game demonstrates that ludus is not an important element
in the game either. The goal of killing bin Laden is easily achieved and the challenge of
getting to the ending is not the point of the game. This is a game as ritual. Playing Bad
Dudes is a  fictional wish-fulfilment.
Mission 01: Kill Bin Laden
Mission 01: Kill Bin Laden (Sapient 2001), another Newgrounds game, is an even more
extreme example of this ritual game where the goal takes precedence over the
challenges of the journey: it is quite impossible to lose this game.
The game begins with the display of an animated image of Bin Laden's face. The
face blinks and says in a fake Arabic accent: "There is no god but Allah". The title of the
game appears letter by letter as though it is teletyped to the screen: “Mission objective:
Kill Bin Laden”. There are three separate scenes within the game. First, there is target
practice. A minaret fills the screen and in front of its many arches targets pop up with
bin Laden’s face on them. The target stays still until the player has manoeuvred the
mouse cursor (represented as the cross-hatch in a gun) onto it and clicked to shoot it
down. If the player shoots elsewhere or does nothing, the target stays where it is and
153
nothing happens. Once the user has shot down a number of targets, the mission begins:
“Shoot to kill”. Bin Laden himself (represented as a small man in white robes) begins to
dart in and out of the archways in the minaret. He moves fast, and it is surprisingly
difficult to hit him. Surprising, that is, unless you move your mouse very, very slowly.
Then you will notice that the tiny bin Laden figure remains perfectly still in an archway
until the mouse cursor approaches it. Then, just before the mouse is on top of the figure,
it slips away. It is quite impossible to shoot it.
After the user has shot and missed bin Laden several times, a close-up of bin
Laden’s face replaces the minaret. He smiles and speaks: "My friend, don't shoot. Let us
negotiate". As soon as he has spoken these words, the crosshatch reappears, but larger
this time, so that we can only see what is visible in the target of the imaginary gun. The
player is free to move the gun around the screen, but the only way to continue is to click
the mouse – and clicking the mouse, of course, means to fire the gun and blast off a
section of bin Laden’s head. It takes four or five shots to reduce him to a headless neck,
and the details shown are both gory and strikingly unrealistic (Figure 13).
  
Figure 13: Two scenes from Mission 01: Kill Bin Laden. In the first, bin Laden darts in and out of
archways, always avoiding the player’s aim. In the second, he has asked to negotiate but the
only option available to the player at this point is to shoot him.
Like Online Caroline, this is a work that pretends to be influenced by user choices, but
that in fact is completely scripted. It promises agency but offers none. It lacks even the
personalisations of Online Caroline. Players may not be aware of the lack of possibility
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if they only play the game once and try to shoot fast without scrutinising the behaviour
of their target.
As a political statement, the game appears to have been created with the
intention of getting back at bin Laden, but its interaction design implies a different
ethics. Why is the game designed so that it is impossible to shoot bin Laden using “fair”
means? Perhaps the idea of the Al Qaida hiding in the desert and behind columns fits
the presentation of the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon as “cowardly”. The game
implies that the way to get even with bin Laden is by trickery. The ending, where you kill
bin Laden though he wishes to negotiate, is distinctly unheroical.
New skins for old games
These individually produced games are remakes of older, arcade games. A familiar game
is given a new “skin”, much as new versions of Chess are sold with characters from
StarWars instead of bishops and pawns. In most cases the rules remain the same while
the skin, or the semiotic level, is altered. Espen Aarseth’s distinction between three
layers in games makes this easier to discuss. The three layers are:
- Gameplay (the players’ actions, strategies and motives)
- Game-structure (the rules of the game, including the simulation rules)
- Game-world (fictional content, topology/level design, textures etc.) (Aarseth 2003a)
The gameplay is the player activity resulting from application of the rules to the
gameworld. Gameplay is what happens when one or more individuals play a game. It is
what happens when the player engages with the rules, and the experience of playing.
The game-structure, or rules define what can be done and what the goals of the
game are. The rules of chess define that your goal is to capture the opponent’s king, that
you capture a piece by landing on it with one of your own pieces, and they specify how
each piece may be moved.
The third layer of the game is the gameworld or topology. This includes the
fictional world if the game has one. Not all games afford fictional worlds, though. It is of
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little use to talk about Tetris or  Poker as having a fictional world, though Tetris has a
topology of sorts; there is a sense of space on the screen) The gameworld includes the
textual and sometimes also material aspect of the game: how it looks, sounds and feels.
The images on a computer screen, the shape, feel and look of a deck of cards, the
joystick or the dice and the graphics on a monopoly board are all elements that belong
to the semiotic system of their games.
In many games, the topology, look and textures may change without players
experiencing the game as a different game. Chess is still recognisably Chess whether it is
played with rocks in the mud or pieces that look like the Simpson family. On the other
hand, if you keep the gameworld but change the rules, players tend to experience the
new set of rules as defining a new game. Bridge and Go Fish are clearly different games,
though both can be played with the same deck of cards.
 Likewise, many popular computer games allow players to design their own
“skins” to game characters and objects. When I play The Sims I can download or make
my own extra furniture and faces, thus changing the semiotic aspect of the game. The
game remains the same, but the mere fact that players often invest a lot of time in
customising their games suggests that the semiotic level does have great significance for
our experience of the game. Perhaps the very fact that we can affect this level, and
adjust it to current events, is crucial. For instance, after September 11, skins of Bin
Laden were almostly instantly developed and downloaded en masse for popular games
such as The Sims and Quake (Cyberextruder.com 2001). In Norway, the marriage of
Princess Märtha Louise was accompanied by a set of royal sims developed by net artists.
The set included not only the royal family, but “hangers on” and ex-girlfriends, familiar
from the tabloids (Eidsmo et al. 2002).
Some political web games do pretty much put a new skin on an old game: they
take an old set of rules, but change the semiotic system. New York Defender (Stef & Phil
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2001) is conceptually very similar to Missile Command. Gulf War 2 (2003) is like a
caricature of Civilization (1991). Kabul Kaboom! (Frasca 2001b) has a lot in common
with Space Invaders (Space Invaders, 1978), and Rumsfeld Invaders (Rumsfeld
Invaders, 2001) is a very specific remake of Space Invaders. Al Quaidamon (Fulp
2002)and Osamagotchi (Drugfilms 2003) are take offs of Tamagotchi games, and Bin
Laden Liquors (Fieler 2000) is like dozens of arcade games of cowboys shooting in bars.
Caricature and irony is of course often the main point of these games: making the royal
family into Sims is as much social commentary as it is art. Sometimes the game referred
to carries a lot of meaning.
The semiotic level is thus the most original level in these games, and in many it
carries far more meaning than the simple, copied rules and gameplay.
Political web games don’t simply take the rules and basic concept from older
games, they also sample images and sounds from other media. Bin Laden’s photograph
is used many times over in the kill Bin Laden games. Gonzalo Frasca’s Kabul Kaboom!,
on the other hand, appropriates details from Picasso’s Guernica, and places them on top
of the pixellated image of dark green night sky that became so familiar on CNN and
other news sites and television channels during the bombing of Afghanistan.
Political web games combine elements from two usually separated spheres of
meaning: rules from a familiar game with images and sounds from a familiar current
event, and sometimes, as in Kabul Kaboom!, from other art. The effect of the games is
in the clash between these two domains. Metaphors work the same way, as do jokes and
political cartoons.
New York Defender
While the political web games at Newgrounds in the weeks following September 11 were
almost all ritual slayings of Bin Laden, other themes were explored in games published
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elsewhere. New York Defender is a French game that aroused disgust and delight in
discussion forums like Metafilter.com. The game shows a simplified image of the New
York skyline and gives the player the task of shooting down the planes that keep flying
straight towards the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Though the first planes are
easy to shoot down, more and more planes come towards the towers at ever increasing
speed, and it is impossible to keep them at bay forever. Once two or more planes hit a
tower, it will collapse. When both towers are collapsed, the game is over.
Some writers at Metafilter found the idea of a game about such a horrific event
disturbing and even unethical. Others found the game to be hilarious. Games are often
seen as frivolous, and the very idea of making a game about an event that shocked
society as  these attacks did appalled many people.
Figure 14: In New York Defender the player has to shoot down the aeroplanes before they hit the
towers. More and more aeroplanes appear, so though you can postpone the catastrophe you
cannot avoid it.
The instructions given for playing New York Defender are simple:
"Utilisez votre souris pour combattre le sentiment d'impuissance". “Use your mouse to
combat the feeling of powerlessness”, would be the English translation, though the
game is resolutely French and offers no translation. The line is scarcely necessary in any
case, because the game’s interface is so familiar: a crosshatch always means a weapon,
and if the mouse will control the weapon, then clicking the mouse is to fire. Interpreted
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as practical instructions, the single line (there are no other guidelines) is reminiscent of
the instructions for Bad Dudes: “Simply click your mouse where you want to punch bin
Laden.” Yet the sentence says much more than this. “Use your mouse to combat the
feeling of powerlessness” is a statement that extends beyond the fictional world of the
game and into the actual world where the player has watched this scene on television
again and again.
Although the game may offer a feeling of control for a short while, allowing the
player to gun down the planes and protect the city, the control doesn’t last for long. As
the planes come faster and faster, it becomes more and more difficult to defend New
York. While the only possible outcome of Bad Dudes and Mission 01 is that bin Laden
be killed, the only possible outcome of New York Defender is that the towers collapse.
The player is powerless to win. Using the mouse will only delay the feeling of
powerlessness. But that is all that is promised by the game, anyway: “Use the mouse to
combat the feeling of powerlessness”. To fight does not mean to win, and perhaps this
brings New York Defender closer to the traditional balance of a game than the
Newgrounds games. Powerlessness is held at bay so long as there are hindrances to
fight. Because this game cannot be absolutely won, it can be played for ever, or at least
again and again. The current high score is 545088 points, which would require
deferring powerlessness for quite a long stretch of time.
And yet the game does come to an end, and this end can be interpreted as a
declaration that fighting terrorism in this manner can’t work. One of the first
commentators of the game on Metafilter.com drew this conclusion, and saw New York
Defender as a clear descendent of the arcade game Missile Command (1980). In Missile
Command the player is defending California against nuclear attack. The attacks are
ceaseless and like in New York Defender, their speed increases as the player destroys
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them. The game ends when the player is out of ammunition, upon which the final scene
is played out: an Armageddon of explosions across the screen.
Bin Laden Liquors
Bin Laden Liquors (Fieler 2000) is another of the most popular games of the weeks
immediately after September 11.
Figure 15: Bin Laden Liquors, in major carnage mode. The carnage is in fact quite mild, and is simply
indicated by the splashes of red blood against the cigarette shelves. Dead bin Ladens simply
disappear.
Like New York Defender, Bin Laden Liquors is a game that cannot be won, but while
New York Defender has been met with scepticism and the suspicion that it casts doubt
upon the possibility of fighting terrorism with violence, Bin Laden Liquors has been
taken at face value as an opportunity to shoot bin Laden clones again and again and
again.
Bin Laden Liquors is a simple shooting game. There is only one scene: a liquor
store that is very reminiscent of bars in cowboy arcade games. A hand at the bottom of
the screen holds a gun that the player can move horisontally using the mouse.
Terrorists, all wearing bin Laden’s face, pop up from behind the counter, and almost as
often, the naked torso of a hostage pops up. The aim of the game is to shoot as many bin
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Ladens as possible, while not harming the hostages. The game is over when you’ve
missed ten terrorists, but as long as you keep hitting terrorists, new ones will continue
to reappear. There is no winning situation, only the promise of a better high score.
It is quite easy to shoot these bin Ladens, although a lapse of attention will tend
to lead to a shot hostage (punished by a simple voiceover: “You wounded a hostage!”)
and perhaps an escaped bin Laden. This narrator also reads the introductory threat as
the image of the liquor store is first displayed: “You’re messing with the wrong people,
bin Laden!”. Bin Laden, who appears to be the proprietor of this liquor store, responds
to this threat with an affronted “Get out of my store!”, in a fake Arabic accent. As more
and more of the bin Laden clones are shot, they (he?) utter various other expletives at
random, starting quite early with “I piss on you!” and repetitions of “Get out of my
store!” and only advancing to “I kill you!” and “Death to all Americans!” after the first
nine or ten clones have been shot. The tempo of the pop-up terrorists remains steady
throughout, and does not increase as do the attacking aeroplanes in New York
Defender.
The player, represented by the bodiless hand holding the gun, is given no voice
during the game. The player is however given a beer: after a few minutes, the left hand
appears in the frame, holding a glass of beer, which is held up as though the player has a
drink of it. Then the hand disappears from the screen again, to return a few minutes
later for another sip. The  beer confirms the strangely detached role the player is given
in this game, and the disconnection between player-role and the inhabitants of the
liquor store.
In the political setting of this game, though, the beer drinking resonates strongly
with the armchair entertainment most Westerners expect wars to be after the media
shows of the 1990 Gulf War. New York Defender has none of this reflexivity. There is
the indirect reference to the media in having chosen to make a game out of  precisely the
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scene that replayed again and again on our television screens. But the player is invisible
apart from the abstract crosshatch that targets the aeroplanes, and there is no
acknowledgement of any discontinuity between actual player and the fictional defender
of New York. The ontological fusion is given fertile ground here.
On the surface, it may seem that New York Defender was seen as disrespectful
and ghoulish because it replays the awful images that had already given so many TV-
watchers nightmares. Making a game of images of death may be more disturbing than
the simple replaying of them on television stations around the world (Frasca 2001c).
What may be more upsetting is that the game pretends to give the player a chance of
averting the disaster, but as the speed and number of planes increases, it becomes clear
that that promise was fraudulent.
Bin Laden Liquors promises revenge and aggression rather than useless defence
that will always be too late. Just like Mission 01: Kill Bin Laden and the many other
games of this ilk, Bin Laden Liquors allows angry and frightened Westerners to ritually
slaughter the designated scapegoat. But where the other games make the slaying final,
Bin Laden Liquors generates endless new bin Ladens. It would be easy to see this as an
argument for the impossibility of fighting terrorism with guns, but this doesn’t seem to
be the intention, or the way in which most gamers have interpreted it. Instead the
endlessness and the beer drinking can be seen as an ironic comment on the gaming
situation itself. The very idea of a store called Bin Laden Liquors is rather absurd in the
first place, as is the model aeroplane hanging from the ceiling and the Camel cigarette
ads. When a bullet hits one of the bin Ladens the effect is anything but gory or realistic:
the bin Laden emits a surprised “Oy!” and is obscured behind the cartridge that has
been ejected from the gun. The hostage is equally absurd: a muscled man with bored-
looking eyes in narrow-rimmed glasses, a  conventional haircut and a hastily
photoshopped gag around his mouth.
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The game has two modes: minimal carnage and major carnage. The only
difference between them is that major carnage results in rather un-bloodlike splashes of
translucent red appear on the cigarettes behind the counter each time someone is killed.
Death is clean in this game, and the dead are instantly reborn to mock the player, as
Emmanuelle Jardonnet noted in Le Monde (2001). Even when the game is lost, nothing
suggests that the bin Ladens and hostages in the liquor store cease their strange dances,
all that happens is that the player is expelled from this world and awarded points for his
or her actions. Losing New York Defender is a very different experience: the world
collapses and the player is left helplessly to watch.
Bin Laden Liquor thus relies heavily on humour and the detachment of irony,
while New York Defender is perfectly serious. Of course New York Defender can be
seen as implicitly ironic in its very portrayal of such a scene, but if so, it is a poker-faced
irony that is not marked on the semiotic level as in Bin Laden Liquors. Ridiculing bin
Laden was, of course, extremely common once he had been named as the orchestrator
of the terrorist attacks. Jokes about the attacks themselves also proliferated, but these
had a forbidden taint to them, and were never presented as being quite acceptable as
was the ridicule of bin Laden. Perhaps there is a similarity between jokes and games,
especially these brief games, that we have yet to discover?
Kabul Kaboom!
The irony in Kabul Kaboom! is of a very different kind: it is deliberate and critical. The
images set the scene immediately. The player controls a mother, mouth up in a wail or a
hungry mouth. She is carrying her infant child with desperation speaking through her
whole body. The image is taken from Picasso’s massive anti-war painting, Guernica.
The background is from a very different source: it is a poor quality videophone image of
a night sky over Kabul, alight with bombs. This image and others very similar to it held
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the place of pride on CNN’s website and in their broadcasts in the early days of the
bombings of Afghanistan.
Figure 16: Kabul Kaboom, by Gonzalo Frasca.
The “point” of Kabul Kaboom, New York Defender and Gulf War 2 is that you cannot
win. To understand the message of the game, you have to play it until you see that this
rule exists. These are mini-games, so it doesn’t take more than a few minutes to discover
this. Once discovered, the game can be replayed but this is just repetition. There are no
new challenges.
Games such as these make a double move. First they claim that a current
situation is a game. Then they say that this game cannot be won.
Games and simulations
While the initial Bin Laden games are based on shooters and arcade games, there are
other political web games that are based on strategy games like Civilization and The
Sims  instead. These games are more argumentative: rather than simply allow the ritual
slaying of a hated enemy, they simulate a situation to demonstrate their interpretation
of something that is planned or is happening. The final section of this chapter is about
three of these games: Gulf War 2, Ashcroft Online and Alquidamon.
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It could be argued that these, along with the more limited Bin Laden games such
as Mission 01: Kill Bin Laden, are false games, or more correctly, works of
representational art that use the rhetoric of games but are not themselves games. As
Suits writes,
Ring around the Rosie and the like are not games, for they are what I should call scripted
undertakings; that is, activities whose execution is prescribed beforehand, as in a
theatrical performance or ceremonial ritual. (Suits 1978: 92)
Many of the Bin Laden games are precisely such scripted undertakings, and their
repetitive slaying of the declared nemesis of Western civilisation is very close to ritual.
Games where loss can only be postponed but never avoided, or games that cannot be
lost but only won, lack the challenge of attaining a goal that most games depend on.
Though I use the word game to refer to the political web games, I see that some
of them are bad games while others are scripted: they refer to games but are not
themselves quite games. Most of them promise to be games, but turn out to be so
restricted that they are either bad games or simply animations with added interactivity.
Yet they are generally referred to as games in their respective communities.
The term “game” can be defined quite broadly, as Roger Caillois does. His 1958
definition of games includes make-believe, sports, puzzles, gambling and physical
pleasures like roller-coasters. However, he distinguishes between various kinds of game.
He outlines a continuum from paidia, the free, chaotic, improvised play of children, to
ludus, which is the disciplined, rule-bound form of play that often involves particular
skills, puzzles and overcoming “gratuituous difficulty” (Caillois 2001: 27). In addition,
he lists four elements that are varyingly present in games: agon (conflict), alea
(chance), mimicry (make-believe and imitation) and ilinx (vertigo and other physical
pleasures, such as dizziness). (Caillois 2001: 27).
The Bin Laden games are centred on agon, and thus naturally draw upon arcade
games from the seventies and eighties, a time when agon was primary in most
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videogames. This is of course also because arcade games are simple visually and
conceptually, and games programmed by individuals at the spur of the moment must be
simple. The works that simulate situations rather than enact a contest the user must try
to win (Ashcroft Online, Al Quaidamon and Gulf War 2) are more dominated by
mimicry and representation.
What is striking about political web games is that alea, or chance, is almost
completely absent from them. Though most of them are not absolutely scripted, most of
them have only one possible outcome. Even a game like Al Quaidamon, which allows
two opposite player strategies, has only one ending, as I will discuss below. This may be
due to their extremely limited size (remember, they are written quickly and most can be
played in less than five minutes), or it may be due to their role as political statements or
arguments.
Gulf War 2
Gulf War 2 presents itself as a game, but is totally scripted. The player is kept active
accepting settings that cannot be changed, watching the results of imagined choices and
clicking “Continue” buttons in regular infoboxes. Gulf War 2 refers very deliberately to
the strategy game Civilization, using a similar map view, small icons that represent
troops and cities, and popup windows for advisors to suggest strategic moves. This
simplified version of Civilization has been given a fresh skin: the map is of the Middle
East and the advisors are American politicians.
The rhetorical insistence of its gameness is played out not only visually in the
map, tokens and advisors, but in words and in the rhythm of the interaction as well,
though not in the meaningfulness of the interaction. The style of writing refers not to
Civilization but to war and strategy games, often those in which the player is a lone
hero: “Do you accept this mission?” The starting sequence where the player is shown the
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different kinds of soldiers and weapons is also a classic rendering of the pre-mission
equipment check. In the games Gulf War 2 copies, the player can usually choose which
kinds of equiptment she wishes to use. In this game, however, there is no choice. The
repeated situations where we expect choice can be seen as belonging to a rhetoric of
interactivity. Choices are continually offered but then negated. The advisors do not
allow alternatives, as in genuine simulation games, instead there is only one available
button, labelled “Continue”. The player cannot choose weapons or soldiers. And yet the
player is constantly addressed as though she has agency and choice.
Choosing a broader definition of game, as Caillois does, Gulf War 2 is clearly a
game. It is however masquerading as a particular kind of game. It mimics wargames
and strategy games, games in which agon and alea are important. In Gulf War 2, agon is
always at the forefront, the game is completely centred on the conflict between the US
and Iraq and then other Arab nations. However there is a mismatch  between the
assumption of a game in which the player has control and the forced passivity that
actually ensues. Of course this mismatch transfers easily to the actual war, the role of
the lone protagonist that America appears to be choosing, in contrast to the
predetermined outcome the game’s developer believes and claims that a second Gulf
war will have.
The player has nothing to do other than inspect the troops (and press “Continue”
when she realises she has no choices and nothing more will happen) and watch the
action play out, with regular interruptions from advisors who report on the situation,
and sometimes squabble among themselves, but never allow the player to respond with
anything other than a meek “Continue”. So here there is agon, but it has slipped from
being between the player and another contestant or a difficult puzzle or object, to being
an agon which the player is forced to watch, complicit but not in command.
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Gulf War 2 contains many references to wargames, strategy games and
simulation games, which all have a strong element of alea, or chance, which affects the
outcome of the game along with the strategy and dexterity skills of the player. By relying
on genre conventions Gulf War 2 appears to promise that there is an element of chance
and uncertainty in the game. Gulf War 2 thus relies on the players expectation of alea
for its effect.
Gulf War 2 has such a heavy dosing of irony that the player’s make-believe is
likely to be quite distanced, rather than being a major part of the gameplay. The game
clearly mimic other games, and thus sets up a double role for the player. The player can
imagine herself playing a simulation game of the invasion of Iraq, and she can also
imagine herself truly in control – or rather, not in control – of the US forces.
Winning or losing
Simplicity moves towards two ends in these games. Either it's easy to win or it's
impossible to win. It only takes a few minutes to "kick Bin Laden's ass" and watch his
head spin off. (Is it possible to be killed by Bin Laden in this game?) In Bin Laden's
Liquors, on the other hand, the stream of terrorists is endless and you can never shoot
them all. The game doesn't end when you win or lose, it ends when your time is up. New
York Defender and Kabul Kaboom! are equally unwinnable, and that's part of the point
of the games. The unwinnable or neverending game is a classic genre in videogames.
Steven Poole describes Space Invaders similarly:
Space Invaders was (..) the first “endless” game. Previously, videogames had stopped
when a certain score was reached, or restarted; Taito’s classic, on the other hand, just
kept getting harder and harder, the aliens becoming a terrifying blur as they whipped
across the screen raining bombs and hurtled ever closer to ground zero. Therein lies the
game’s special tension: it is unwinnable. The player’s task is to fight a heroically doomed
rearguard action, to stave off defeat for as long as possible, but the war can never be
won. Earth will be invaded. (Poole 2000: 37)
Winning or losing is not the main point of these games, nor is developing skill or
chance. The outcome of the game is to all practical extents predetermined. Strictly
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speaking it may be more correct to call them simulations rather than games, as Gonzalo
Frasca suggests, writing about his game Kabul Kaboom!
Technically, I would rather refer to it as a simulation that draws on certain videogame
conventions. However, from the start, my goal was to do some kind of absurd game, with
no score, ways of winning or losing. Still, I did not want it to be an addictive game, like it
happens in "New York Defender" which has good gameplay - I think that players should
not enjoy a game about terrorism. In other words, replayability kills the political
message because it makes it invisible and all you can see is the gameplay. (email
correspondence, 12/10/2001)
The point of each game is not quite the conclusion – you die or Bin Laden dies – but
rather the underlying rules. In most of the games, there is no doubt that we will win. In
a counter-games like Kabul Kaboom! there is no victory, only more slaughter. In New
York Defender defence is impossible.
Most computer games are painstakingly unpolitical. They’re set in neutral
territory and the plot is abstract enough not to have any real life consequences. Wars are
generic, not specific. If a real war is referred to in a game, it’ll usually be an old one that
gamers are too young to remember. For example, Wolfenstein is about the Second
World War.
In addition to the few overtly political games (like Chris Crawford’s Balance of
the Planet from 1990) prior to the web games discussed here, a lot of games can be
interpreted politically. Civilization and Sim City and The Sims are all biased in various
ways (towards consumerism or public transport or armed conflict, for instance). This
kind of insidious politicisation may have a lot of influence on players in various ways.
Political opinions and emotions have traditionally been expressed in all sorts of
art - but they’re almost absent in computer games -  a sort of parallell to our doubt that
computer games might be art. Gonzalo Frasca, who is also the author of Kabul Kaboom,
argues that games can and should be political. However, he suggests that the
replayability of games is in conflict with the possibility of a political game. One solution
to this conundrum is to develop games that can only be played once, so that choices are
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binding and thereby more ethically meaningful. Games that can be saved and reloaded
at any point encourage a playing style where players try out every option. I may make
ethical choices the first time I play, but I’m very likely to go back and see what would
have happened if I’d made another choice. In Bin Laden Liquors, for instance, the goal
is ostensibly to kill the terrorists and not the hostages. Your score worsens with each
hostage you kill, and yet, built into the game, is the possibility of killing hostages.
A lot of computer games treat the bad choices much the same way as the old
pattern we know from fairy tales. Many fairy tales are built around this pattern: the
protagonist is given something precious, but an item or a part of the valued object or
situation is forbidden, usually for no clear reason. The protagonist promises to respect
this prohibition, yet inevitably breaks his or her promise. Once the prohibition is
broken, trouble arises, yet after some struggle, the situation is resolved happily for the
hero. In Beauty and the Beast, Beauty marries the Beast, but must promise never to
look at him at nighttime. In Bluebeard the princess must promise to never use the
seventh key. This pattern is far older and deeper than fairy tales, it is the stuff of myths:
Adam and Eve were given a beautiful garden, but must not eat the apple. Pandora’s box
must not be opened.
In Bin Laden Liquors, the prohibition is clear: do not shoot the hostages. Unlike
the fairy tales, this prohibition is ethically meaningful, and corresponds to the laws and
assumptions of every day life. It is similar to the fairy tales in that the very existence of
such a prohibition promises that there is something behind it. From our cultural
grounding in fairy tales and other examples of this pattern we know that if we do what is
forbidden, we will experience something exciting and perhaps finally beneficial.
Pragmatically we also know that the game developers will have coded some reaction to
killing a hostage, and much as a child will click on every object in a child’s computer
game to see if something interesting pops up behind it, we’re interested to see what
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would happen.
Bin Laden Liquors is a simple game, so not much does happen when a hostage is
killed. Also it is quite hard to avoid hitting a hostage now and then, so killing a hostage
needn’t be a matter of choice. In this sense Bin Laden Liquors isn’t the best example of
this pattern of prohibition in games. Consider though, the end of a game. If you win the
game by achieving the correct goal, you are still likely to want to know what would have
happened in one of the other possible ends.
This testing out of possible consequences, combined with the adventure game
genre with its relatively linear plotline, does not encourage an ethical engagement with
the characters in the game, Frasca argues. He believes that serious, ethical videogames
must be irreversible, so that user’s are forced to treat their fictional actions seriously
(Frasca 2001a). The ability to play with various outcomes can lead to distance rather
than engagement and caring. Simulations, on the other hand, rely on this kind of testing
out of possibilities, and the message, if any, of a simulation can only be discovered
precisely by breaking the apparent prohibitions and seeing how the system will react.
Ashcroft Online is an example of a political simulation of this kind.
Ashcroft Online and Al Quaidamon
The raw conflict of us against them dominated the first wave of games that came out of
the War on Terrorism. As Bin Laden remained elusive and initial anger and desire to hit
back reduced, other aspects of the war on terrorism were dealt with in online games.
Fights and simple anger are easily dealt with in classic arcade games. New games deal
with themes like the treatment of prisoners suspected of being in allegiance with Al
Qaida, the increased surveillance of the American population and the consequences of a
war on Iraq. These themes have been presented as simulations and, in the case of the
possible war, the genre of strategy games rather than fighting games.
171
Ashcroft Online 1.0 (O'Connor and O'Connor 2002) is named for the Attorney
General of the United States, who has permitted heavily increased surveillance after the
attacks of September 11. The work simulates web browsing in a perhaps not so distant
future where civilians are under constant surveillance. Playing upon the way America
Online (AOL) presents its millions of users with a simplified and controlled version of
the web, Ashcroft Online is an internet browsing system where anything the user reads
or visits affects his or her “Patriot Rating”.
Figure 17: Ashcroft Online 1.0. This screenshot shows one of the news articles you can view from within
the very closed network.
If you click the link to the poll (“Do you trust  Wall  Street”), for instance, a popup
window declares “Yes!” and reports that 100% of the votes are positive – without ever
actually allowing us to vote. Though some of the titles listed in the News section suggest
the possibility of dissent, such as the article on “Child labor used by US firms?”, the
content of the article is clear: “No” (see Figure 17). There are other sections availble:
Showbiz, Finance, Humor and Adult. Choosing Adult immediately makes your
computer wheeze “you perv”, and your Patriot Rating sinks drastically. Reading weblogs
and other non-approved sites likewise lowers your Patriot Rating, as does trying to read
any news story that is critical of the government or status quo. If your Patriot Rating
reaches zero, a message appears on your screen:
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Attention citizen! Your surfing habits indicate that you  have subversive tendencies. Stay
where you are; officials from the Department of Re-Education will arrive at your home
to relocate you to your new home.
Alright, this was just a simulation of things to come. Do you want to keep surfing?
Al Quaidamon is very similar in its strategy, though its politics are at the opposite end
of the scale. Just as in Ashcroft Online there is a bar that rates your conduct according
to your actions. However, here the simulated situation is that of keeping a prisoner.
When the first suspects were arrested after the attacks on the World Trade Center, they
were imprisoned in circumstances that were criticised for being in breach of
international conventions about the treatment of prisoners.
In Al Quaidamon, the user’s task is to look after a prisoner. The tools available
are a hairbrush for grooming, a doughnut for feeding, and a boxing glove for hitting. If
you feed and groom the prisoner, he looks happier and happier, his clothes improve and
your rating increases. If you neglect him or beat him he becomes unhappy, he loses his
clothes, and the rating sinks.
Figure 18: Al Quaidamon. The prisoner has been treated fairly well, as you can see by the scale on the
right, stating that he’s treated a little better than a middle class American family, and by his
clothes.
The ratings scale implicitly argues that human rights activists demand better terms for
prisoners than for middle class American families. From bottom to top, the scale reads:
“Hitler’s Approval, Prisoner in ‘Nam, 3rd World Country, Lower Class American Family,
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Geneva Convention Approval, American in Prison, Middle Class American Family,
Upper Class American Family, Human Rights Activists’ Approval.” (see Figure 18).
Both Ashcroft Online and Al Quaidamon are simple simulations that give
unambiguous, immediate feedback to the user. The world of a simulation like this
defines its own values. Both use irony to express their message.
An interesting effect of simulations is that users will try out all the options, even
enacting the options that are in conflict with the simulations or the user’s set of values.
When I played Al Quaidamon I started by treating the prisoner well, but although I
could fairly easily get the “Human Rights Activist Approval” stamp, I wanted to see what
would happen if I beat the prisoner too. So I beat him ruthlessly, watching him whimper
in pain, until I was close to having “Hitler’s Approval”. At that point an extra tool
appeared: a gun. I picked the gun up, pointed it at the prisoner, and shot him with a
click of my mouse. That, of course, was a far more satisfying end to the game than
simply having treated the prisoner well. Anyway, unless I quit the game as soon as I had
achieved “Human Rights Activist Approval”, the prisoner rapidly became unhappy
again. Unless the prisoner is constantly fed and groomed, the game tends towards
death.
Dream Kitchen, which I discuss in chapter 2, is an artwork that uses a similar
strategy, but in Dream Kitchen the user has no choice in the matter. There are no
alternatives to cruelty in Kitchen, so I must either quit the game or torture small
animals. Kitchen does not give its user immediate ratings as Al Quaidamon and
Ashcroft Online 1.0 do, but after the torturing is complete, it issues the user with a
report card that specifies how the user scored in obedience, sensitivity, obsessiveness,
cruelty and impatience. The user’s actions are forced but condemned. In Al Quaidamon
the user is not forced to do anything, and cruelty  is not necessary, though it is rewarded
by a new toy (the gun) and a dramatically satisfying ending.
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Perhaps I would not have played Al Quaidamon at all if I hadn’t been researching
political web games. That would have been a way of refusing to become  complicit in the
ethics the game induces its users to enact. But having entered the game I feel compelled
to act against my conscience.
Brevity
Perhaps the Bin Laden games are so virulent and so successful because they rely solely
on this one main element of digital media: they are reactive. They respond to user input.
They simulate a desire and allow the player to feel active in a situation that in reality
forced most people in Western cultures into passivity and waiting.
Games always enact an implicit ideology. SimCity , for instance, is built upon
assumptions about urban planning and taxes that are far from universal (Starr 1994).
Yet overtly political games are rare. It is interesting, though perhaps not surprising, that
political games appear to be a popular form, made by individuals and widely shared and
discussed in sprawling communities of gamers. While political web games have a lot in
common with political cartoons and satire, their distribution channels are very
different. Some are uploaded to community sites like Newgrounds.com. Others are self-
published as standalone works, or as part of a site belonging to an individual or small
group of people, like Idleworm.com or Uzinagaz.com. They are never presented in
online journals or other edited fora. People find these games either because they
frequent the gaming sites, or through links posted to discussion forums, mailing lists,
weblogs or sent to friends by email. The entry screen to Bin Laden Liquors encourages
this kind of viral marketing with an ironic message: “Do your part to rid the world of
terrorism. Email this page to all your friends, associates and fellow patriots!”
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In his writing on political video games, Gonzalo Frasca has written of the
possibility that video games could be used for social change and not just for
entertainment:
Videogames are not a trivial medium sentenced to merely serve as entertainment, but
(..) could also be a powerful representational form that encourages critical thinking,
personal empowerment and social change. (Frasca 2001e)
The political web games I’ve discussed in this chapter are small, often imperfect, and
they are unlikely to change the world. But there are quite a lot of them. There are
formalised communities like Newgrounds that foster the growth of independent, small-
scale game authorship,  and there are channels of distribution for non-commerical
games like these: mailing lists, web discussion forums and weblogs have all popularised
the games.
Since the 60s, people have been making their own non-commerical computer
games. In the eighties, youngsters wrote text adventure games and simple graphical
games on Commodore 64s, and sometimes they’d upload them to bulletin board
systems on their 1200 baud modems. Flash, the ubiquity of images that are easily
reused, and the internet’s expansion have added critical mass to those home brewed
games.
The terrorist attacks of September 11 appear to have been the first political events
to have caused such a stream of games specifically about a current situation. Since then,
more political games have been created, as we have seen: about the treatment of
prisoners, the planned war on Iraq among other issues. Perhaps a ball has started
rolling?
Most of these games are very brief, and their messages are fairly simple. Is this
because a game with an ulterior motive apart from pleasure and/or competition cannot
be sustained?
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I think perhaps the answer lies elsewhere. Think of one-frame political cartoons,
and the difference in expression, popularity and force in relation to full-length narrative
comic books. “Feature-length” commercial computer games are not narratives, but like
narratives they rely on the passing of time and on a development of skills and
experiences. These Flash games have none of that. They can be played in two or three
minutes each. Most of them have a fairly clear message, and many of them play upon a
simple twist of meaning, as do jokes or political cartoons.
Click here
Ultimately, the satisfaction found in these games lies in the simplicity of the interaction.
Users simply have to “click here to kill bin Laden”. The user comment I cited earlier
confirms this: “i like the part when u kick him in the nuts”, the user happily notes. The
actual action of clicking the mouse effortlessly translates into the fictional action of
attacking bin Laden. This is a clear example of ontological interaction.
Several of the games stress the control innate in such interaction. Mission 01:
Kill bin Laden first makes it impossible to kill bin Laden, and then impossible not to kill
him, scripting the user’s possible actions as strictly as Dream Kitchen does. Ashcroft
Online and  Al Quaidamon  rate the user’s actions, and the actions that the work
presents as morally justified are rewarded  with more interesting feedback. New York
Defender and  Kabul Kaboom! present the user with situations where the user cannot
possibly win.
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C O N C L U S I O N
This thesis has two main focal points. One is the ontological fusion that can occur
between user and fictional work, and the ontological interaction that makes the fusion
happen. The other examines works that emphasise the deixis between user and work
rather than the content or story, and the issues of control that arise from the
relationship between user and work.
The concept of ontological fusion is from Thomas Pavel’s work on fictional
worlds, and I have applied it fairly directly to interactive works. I have been particularly
interested in cases where the user becomes the site of ontological fusion between the
actual and the fictional world. The user’s experience of being within the story or within
the fictional world has been discussed by other researchers in terms of immersion
(Douglas 1996;  Murray 1997;  Ryan 2001b).
I have added to this discussion by explaining how such an ontological fusion
comes about, building my explanation on Walton’s theory of depiction. When the users’
actual actions are also fictional actions, Walton argues, the user positions herself as
within the fictional world. However Walton only discusses non-digital works, and the
actual user actions he discusses are only perceptual actions, such as looking or listening.
I expanded this to include non-perceptual actions as well, such as clicking a mouse,
moving one’s feet on a dance mat connected to a gaming console or pulling the trigger of
a plastic gun in a gaming arcade. This expansion of depiction goes beyond a depictive
representation, but follows the same mechanisms. I called this ontological interaction.
The second focus of the thesis is on works where the relationship between user
and work is emphasised and on the control and power inherent in this relationship. This
was theoretically explored through Mieke Bal’s concept of deictic narrative as well as in
discussions of the second person address and the use of force that it implies.
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Chapter 5 presented a structural, narratological approach to the user’s position in
relation to the work. Here I discuss the user’s relationship to the text rather than to the
fictional world. The user can thus be internal to the story or to the discourse of the work.
This allows me to contextualise my terms in relation to other terms that are similar to
ontological interaction, and to describe aspects of the works I discuss, but the
narratological approach proves limiting because it is not capable of discussing what
causes the user to feel part of the story. The approach provided through ontological
interaction and fictionality has proved more useful. It is also this approach that can
provide an understanding of the power innate in interaction, thus connecting the two
main threads of the thesis.
Because ontological interaction equates actual and fictional actions, the user
becomes responsible for fictional events, and this relates to the question of power.
Chapters 6 and 7 analyse two kinds of works that have goals beyond entertainment or
art: exploitative fictions and political web games. In these we see how ontological
interaction and deictic control come together.  In the exploitative fictions, the user is
drawn into the fictional world through the deixis of a dialogue between the user and a
fictional character. Such a dialogue is a type of ontological interaction. Once inside the
fictional world, the user is trapped there – if the creators of the hoaxes, scams or
marketing ploys have their way.
It is the simplicity of the interaction that makes the political web games so
powerful. An actual click translates directly to fictionally killing bin Laden, and this is
precisely what most of the players would like to do in the actual world, judging from the
user reviews the games have received. Others of the political web games are more
sophisticated, and coerce the user into acting according to the value judgements that are
built into the game. These techniques are similar to those used in Online Caroline and
Dream Kitchen, but in the web games they are used for explicit political purposes.
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Interactive artistic and fictional works are new genres, and until the last few
years, it has often seemed that there is more theory than art in the field.  This is no
longer the case. There is a large range of interactive art and narrative. Recent research
also shows a far greater emphasis on analysis of specific works than was common
during the 1990s. In this thesis I have aimed to participate in this movement by
discussing many concrete examples of interactive art and narrative, as well as other
interactive genres, and by using the works themselves to develop an understanding of
interaction. In addition, I have attempted to develop and refine the methods we use for
interpreting and describing interactive art and narrative.
There is still a lot to do. Online Caroline, Dream Kitchen and the bin Laden
games are among the first of their kinds. As the genres develop, so will our
understanding of how we interact with machines generating fictions.
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